[ga-full] Re: [ga] GA Rules don't go far enough

[Jeff Williams <jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com>]

Dave and all,

  Well Dave I see you ate your can of "Whip-Ass" today!  Mercy!

Dnsipv6@aol.com wrote:

> Joe Kelsey and everyone else,
>
>   Joe Kelsey, you are a twit and idiot.  Most folks here
> already know that, they are just too nice to tell you.  Well
> I am in my Taxpayer/Consumer mode right now so I don't
> give a shit if you like me or what I got to say on this post
> to you or not.  Is there any part of what I just said YOU
> Joe Kelsey, that you don't understand?
>
>   Your idea stinks to high heaven for several reasons, some obvious
> other not.  You must have had a brain fart when you came up with
> this bunch of nasty gas.  Because that is about all it is.
>
>   Why you ask?  Well there are too many reasons to list here,
> but I will give you a few for a clue!  >;)
>
>   First off you would need to charge allot of $$ to get the pikers
> and frauds from participating.  That eliminates participation by
> people in less advantaged countries.  Thereby ICANN would not
> be able to meet its mandate and requirement to have multinational
> participation in a realistic way and some countries none.  But of course
> you being a twit, you didn't think of that did ya?  Of course not! :(
>
>   As for well known PKI certificates from well known companies.
> Well I would not except some I have seen from IBM as they
> can generate those at will. Same goes for allot of companies
> Hardly making them any more creditable.  than self generated
> ones.  So that is just some more hot gas, out of your ass!  >;)
> And given that IBM for instance has been busted right here in
> my area for employing illegal immigrants, I would not be surprised
> that for the right price, they would generate any certificate I was
> willing to pay for if the price was right.  I would probably get
> some extras for my four dogs as well, just to make it interesting,
> if I wanted to.  Which I sure don't.
>
>   So Joe Kelsey, you twit, what you need is two things.  First
> and independent Certificate authority to generate Certificates
> PKI, ECC, PGP Keys, or whatever flavor/type.  And new ones
> to be created for each member every year or every month issued
> by this same Independent CA.  Next, and in addition to, for purposes
> of voting each member should assigned an E-Mail address for voting
> purposes only aliased to their existing registered E-Mail address.  These
> should remain permanent or for as long as they are members.
>
>   The last thing you need to do is get proper security installed on the
> site where E-mail list and voting is going to take place requiring
> login and authentication for voting.  IPSEC should be use here
> as well or SSLv3/TLS.  IPSEC is difficult to implement properly,
> so I would opt for SSLv3/TLS instead with strong encryption.
>
>   Now this is a beginning....  Got that you little twit?
>
> In a message dated 2/15/00 7:24:12 PM Pacific Standard Time,
> joe@zircon.seattle.wa.us writes:
>
> << Roberto Gaetano writes:
>   > Harald wrote:
>   > >Because the rules that were adopted say that the proof of identity
>   > >iprocess s only invoked when an identity is challenged, and the list
>   > >imonitor is satisfied that there's reason to pursue the challenge.
>   > >
>   >
>   > There's also another reason to limit the check to the challenged
>   > cases.
>   >
>   > We will have to move, for a number of reasons, to a situation in
>   > which "Membership" is a concept distinct from
>   > "Mailing-List-Subscriber", and in which there will be *many* mailing
>   > lists, with specific focus.  At that point in time, it will seem
>   > reasonable to check the identity for "Members" (the more 'stable'
>   > population, that will have the right of vote, ....), and this may be
>   > done once and for good, while the 'mobile' population (the people
>   > subscribing to a general-purpose mailing list) will necessarily not
>   > be subject to systematic control (too expansive).
>
>  All professional societies avoid the problemof identity simply by the
>  fact that they charge for membership.  If you have to pay for something,
>  you have to identify yourself and you have incentive to not pay multiple
>  times.  Unfortunately, this option is not available to a so-called open
>  membership group as the DNSO.  However, any serious member of the DNSO
>  would, no doubt, belong to one or more professional societies, many of
>  whom may have network presences.  I know that the ACM and IEEE do, and
>  undoubtedly some lawyers groups must along with other groups fitting
>  most of the members of the DNSO.  Maybe we can work out some method of
>  validation with these groups.  ACM and IEEE offer e-mail forwarding
>  services for members-only.
>
>  My idea is really only partially formed, but it might have promise.  I
>  cannot really come up with any other ideas that do not involve charging
>  for membership.
>
>  Of course, a signed PKI certificate from a well-known organization that
>  requires physical proof of identity should always be acceptable.
>  Certainly, any self-signed certificate is worthless, but a certificate
>  from a well-known company (GTE, IBM, etc.) should also be acceptable.
>
>  What it really boils down to is requiring something other than a simple
>  e-mail address to be eligible for voting.  A specific e-mail address
>  from a source that requires membership (ACM, IEEE) would do, or a
>  suitable certificate.  Both of these are more or less trivial to
>  validate, but do not prevent duplication by a determined persona.
>
>  Other ideas?
>
>  /Joe >>

Regards,

--
Jeffrey A. Williams
Spokesman INEGroup (Over 95k members strong!)
CEO/DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java/CORBA Development Eng.
Information Network Eng. Group. INEG. INC.
E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
Contact Number:  972-447-1894
Address: 5 East Kirkwood Blvd. Grapevine Texas 75208


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