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[ga] CYBER-FED 10: Origins Of ICANNS's At Large Membership
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CYBER-FEDERALIST No. 10 March 27, 2001
THE ORIGINS OF ICANN'S AT LARGE MEMBERSHIP
Hans Klein
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR)
http://www.civsoc.org
The Internet Democracy Project
http://www.internetdemocracyproject.org/
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THE ORIGINS OF ICANN'S AT LARGE MEMBERSHIP
Of the many controversies surrounding ICANN, perhaps the most contentious
have been those about At Large Membership (ALM). Should there be a
membership? If so, what form should it take? Now that it has been created,
should it be abolished? Who would want to abolish it and why?
Underlying all these issues is one foundational question: What is the
appropriate role of the Internet user in Internet technical coordination?
Furthermore, as we recognize the linkages between Internet technical
coordination and public policies for intellectual property, industry
competition, and even national sovereignty, the foundational question can
be restated as: What is the appropriate role of the Internet user in global
Internet policy-making?
The ALM issues go very deep indeed!
Here I don't attempt to define the user's role in technical coordination or
in policy-making. Instead I review the history of the ALM's creation. By
understanding that history, we can better understand questions confronting
us today.
Before ICANN: The Internet Society (ISOC)
=========================================
>From the earliest days, proposals for an institution to perform technical
coordination have included a mass membership component. The early model
for this was the Internet Society (ISOC).
ISOC was created in 1992 to serve as the institutional home for
standards-related bodies like the IETF and, later, for the IANA function of
technical coordination. ISOC is a membership organization, with both
organizational and individual members (who today number around 6,000.)
ISOC's founders include many individuals who were active in the creation of
ICANN, most notably Vint Cerf, Jon Postel, and Mike Roberts.
In a 1996 document known as "draft-Postel," a proposal was made that ISOC
assume responsibility for technical coordination. Had this proposal
succeeded, then ISOC would have assumed the role of today's ICANN -- and
ISOC's members might have had a status similar to today's At Large
Membership. Technical coordination would have been performed by a mass
membership organization with an elected Board of Trustees.
That proposal was rejected, however, and its place there came the IAHC plan
in 1997 (URLs of web sites with more information are below). In the IAHC
plan ISOC shared top authority with WIPO, ITU, and other groups. ISOC, a
mass membership organization, controlled two board seats.
Right from the beginning, then, attempts to institutionalize the technical
coordination functions included a mass membership component. Furthermore,
that membership-based approach was pioneered by people like Vint Cerf, Jon
Postel, and Mike Roberts.
The Green and White Papers
==========================
Following the US government veto of the IAHC plan in 1997, new policy
parameters form membership were defined. These were set out in 1998, first
in the Green Paper and then in the White Paper.
While both documents pointedly ignored any special role to ISOC, they
defined a role for Internet users in technical coordination. The language
for this was somewhat vague, however.
Relevant portions of the GREEN PAPER read as follows:
"Principles For A New System. [...] 4. Representation. Technical
management of the Internet should reflect the diversity of its users and
their needs. Mechanisms should be established to ensure international
input in decision making."
"... the organization and its board must derive legitimacy from the
participation of key stakeholders. Since the organization will be
concerned mainly with numbers, names, and protocols, its board should
represent membership organizations in each of these area, as well as the
direct interests of Internet users."
"... membership associations representing 1) registries and registars, and
2) Internet users, must be formed."
The WHITE PAPER came a few months later and contained official US policy.
The White Paper stated:
Technical coordination "... should be vested in a single organization that
is representative of Internet users around the globe."
"Principle for a New System. [...] 4. Representation. The new corporation
should operate as a private entity for the benefit of the Internet
community as a whole. The development of ... policies ... will depend on
input from the broad and growing community of Internet users."
These policy guidelines do not provide a definitive answer to the role of
members in technical coordination. They do, however, provide some
indications of what the role would be. First, the focus is now on *users*,
rather than on Internet professionals. ISOC is a professional association
not a user organization, so this change in definition is significant.
Second, there is specific reference to the creation of a membership
association for users. User participation would be in the form of members
joined in association. Third, there is mention that the Board should
represent users' "direct interests." Mention of direct representation
suggests that there should be little intermediation between users and their
board representatives, while the reference to interests recognizes that
user participation goes beyond issues of technical expertise. In summary,
the White and Green Papers emphasized a role for Internet users, they
conceived of users as members joined in association, and they foresaw
direct board representation of users.
The ICANN By-Laws
=================
Following the release of the White Paper, in the summer of 1998 there took
place the International Forum for the White Paper (IFWP) to design the
bylaws of what would be ICANN. The bylaws would translate the White
Paper's broad principles into operational rules.
In the IFWP process one of the most hotly contested issues was whether
ICANN would be a membership organization. Jon Postel at IANA now opposed
membership, and one may surmise that this position was shared by others
with close ties to ISOC. Despite their earlier attempts to give a major
role to ISOC, they now opposed linking users and technical coordination.
Working in a independently of the public forum, they produced a set of
bylaws with no provisions for membership.
A second bylaws proposal was produced by some of the participants in the
IFWP who called themselves the Boston Working Group (BWG). They proposed
bylaws that included membership. They also put the membership provisions
in the articles of incorporation rather than the bylaws, to protect them
against later attempts at elimination. (It is more difficult to amend the
articles than the bylaws.)
In a September 1998 article in _The_Standard_ Larry Lessig summarized the
differences between the two approaches:
"These two processes produced two very different results. IANA proposed a
powerful but closed corporation. Principles of separation, or checks on its
powers, don't sing in its draft. The board need not answer to the demands
of "members"; there are no "members." The only check on its powers will be
the California Attorney General, who might have other things to do than
monitor this board. It is an engineer's corporation, but with none of the
virtues of openness and vulnerability that mark organizations such as the
Internet Engineering Task Force." (Lessig, 1998)
In the fall of 1998 the US Department of Commerce reconciled the two
versions of the bylaws by requiring that provisions for membership be
included in the bylaws. Membership was included in ICANN, but it was
codified only in the bylaws, leaving membership vulnerable to later
attempts at expurgation.
Conclusions
===========
>From this history we can gain a better understanding of ICANN's At Large
Members.
ICANN's membership was intended to represent Internet users from around the
globe. Members were conceived as joining in association and having direct
representation of their interests on the board. Their role was seen as
balancing the influence of the ICANN board, serving as a check on its power
and ensuring accountability.
ICANN's membership provisions were actively opposed by groups working
closely with IANA. This opposition represented a shift from their earlier
proposals to locate technical coordination authority in ISOC, itself a
membership organization. However, ISOC and ICANN embody different
conceptions of members: ISOC's members are conceived of as Internet
experts, whereas ICANN's members are intended to be Internet users. ICANN's
At Large Membership is intended to be open, independent, and consisting of
users rather than experts.
Perhaps the greatest historical irony is that today's on-going process to
revisit and possibly eliminate the At Large Membership was anticipated from
the start. The bylaws have shown themselves to be a weak mechanism for
protection of membership provisions. Shortly after its creation, ICANN
began modifying its bylaw provisions about membership. These amendments
weakened the membership provisions -- and may yet lead to the termination
of user involvement in technical coordination.
Today's "clean sheet" study of the ALM re-opens a question that was settled
in 1998. Should Internet users have a role in technical coordination? The
answer in 1998 was a definite "yes": the US Department of Commerce's
recognition of ICANN was conditioned on its membership provisions, and
membership was broadly supported in the IFWP process and even in the
earlier draft-Postel and IAHC plans.
Despite this, at its 2000 Yokohama meeting the ICANN board modified the
bylaws to state: "previous decisions and conclusions regarding an "At
Large" membership will be informative but not determinative." This was a
striking turn-around from a commitment made just two years earlier. The
amendment holds the prospect of eliminating the main mechanism for
achieving a balance of influence in ICANN.
History helps us understand the functions of the At Large Membership as
well as to identify the supporters and opponents of the membership. Today's
review of membership must be seen in historical perspective in order to be
fully understood.
References
==========
Draft Postel.
http://www.newdom.com/archive/draft-postel-iana-itld-admin-01.txt
Also described in Milton Mueller (1999), "ICANN and Internet Governance:
Sorting through the debris of 'self-regulation'" (published in INFO).
http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/muell.pdf
Internet Society. http://www.isoc.org/isoc/related/ietf/
IAHC. http://www.gtld-mou.org/
Green Paper. http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/dnsdrft.htm
White Paper. http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htmBWG,
Boston Working Group. http://www.cavebear.com/bwg/
Lessig, Lawrence, "A Bad Turn for Net Governance." The Standard. September
18, 1998. http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,1718,00.html
ICANN Yokohama Bylaw Amendments.
http://www.icann.org/committees/at-large/study-comments.htm
At Large Membership Study Committee. http://www.atlargestudy.org/
###
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CYBER-FEDERALIST is a regularly published series of analyses and
commentaries on Internet governance and ICANN. See:
http://www.cyber-federalist.org (archive)
It is produced as part of the Internet Democracy Project. See:
http://www.civsoc.org
http://www.internetdemocracyproject.org/
The Cyber-Federalist is written by Hans Klein:
http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~hk28/
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