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[ga] FYI: NC Structure Taskforce: At Large Discussion Paper v3
[3rd draft, 8-Jan-02, by Philip Sheppard, converted from Word doc
at http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/nc-str/Arc00/msg00072.html,
for comment until January 15. /// Alexander]
=================================================================
DNSO NC TF on Structure Discussion paper
=================================================================
Draft outline analysis of and recommendations on the
ALSC final report proposals -- draft version3
=================================================================
Record of input
Constituency | version 1/2 | version 3 |
BC | Yes | |
IPC | | |
gTLDs | | |
ccTLDs | | |
Registrars | | |
Non- coms | Yes | |
ISP | Yes | |
GA | Yes | |
1. Summary of key proposals within the ALSC November 2001 report
-- for information only
-> Define potential electorate as individual domain name holders
(and outreach beyond in future)
-> Establish an At-Large Supporting Organization (ALSC) to
organise that electorate
-> Fund the ALSO via membership dues as a condition of voting
-> Establish 6 ICANN regions (or give Asia-Pacific two seats)
-> Elect 6 At-Large Board directors with 3 year term
-> Elect one 12 member ALSO Council (two per region)
-> Hold regional elections for 3 international posts and 3
regional posts
-> Post no 1 (most votes) elected as At-Large Board director
-> Post no 2 and 3 (second and third highest votes) elected to
ALSO Council.
-> No 2 through no 6 regional winners form 5 member Regional
Council.
-> Hold first elections in 2002.
-> ALSO provides consensus-based policy advice within ICANN's
mission.
-> Use Registrars as conduit to reach the potential electorate.
-> Review after two election cycles (6 years or 2008).
2. Evaluation against established criteria
-----------------------------------------------------------------|
Criteria |Evaluation |
-----------------------------------------------------------------|
a. the efficacy of policy making within the DNSO |
-----------------------------------------------------------------|
- degree of formal |Uncertain. But compared with an |
interaction between |individual domain name holders |
stakeholders |constituency WITHIN the DNSO, the |
|degree of interaction between At-large |
|and the DNSO is clearly lower. |
-----------------------------------------------------------------|
- quantity of predicted |Low. There will be high overlap between|
unique issues of a new SO|issues discussed by an ALSO with those |
outside the competence of|of the DNSO. |
DNSO versus issues within| |
competence of DNSO | |
-----------------------------------------------------------------|
- mechanisms for cross-SO|Uncertain. No mechanisms are proposed. |
communication |There will be membership overlap and so|
|informal cross communication. There |
|will probably be a need for formalised |
|mechanisms. |
-----------------------------------------------------------------|
- effect on the DNSO |High. The ALSO provides the |
consensus process. |organisation of individuals and is an |
|enabler of consensus. The DNSO could |
|use this input as part of its consensus|
|process but a mechanism is needed. |
-----------------------------------------------------------------|
b. the efficacy of ICANN decision making |
-----------------------------------------------------------------|
- the ability of each |Uncertain. The ALSO would be expected |
proposal to generate |to enhance consensus within itself but |
valid consensus-based |not per se within the ICANN community. |
policy making | |
-----------------------------------------------------------------|
- possibility of the |High. Today the policy areas of the |
Board receiving |three SOs are distinct. With an ALSO |
contradictory advice from|feeling able to comment on all ICANN |
its SOs and the impact on|policy areas they may conflict with |
resolution mechanisms |each of the three existing SOs. What is|
|required is a means of coherence for |
|policy input to the DNSO to make name- |
|related policy input to the Board |
|coherent. |
-----------------------------------------------------------------|
- likely financial and |Uncertain. The real test of individuals|
representational |interest in at-large will be when |
robustness of any SO |members are asked to pay to vote. The |
|choice of fee and the degree of self- |
|funding will be a highly significant |
|determinant of success or failure of |
|the ALSO. |
-----------------------------------------------------------------|
- likelihood of the |--> High. The proposed ALSO structure |
proposal to achieve | should produce better at-large |
adequate, balanced and | representation than the status quo |
fair stakeholder | (subject to the financial question |
representation on the | above.) There will be one |
Board | additional at-large member than the|
| status quo. (But three less at- |
| large members than envisaged in |
| the by-laws). |
|--> Setting up a sixth ICANN region |
| uniquely for ALSO is not |
| recommended. If a sixth region is |
| needed then it should relate to all|
| ICANN activities. |
|--> To avoid capture and ensure |
| plurality there will need to be a |
| minimum threshold for participation|
| in the ALSO before elections could |
| start. |
-----------------------------------------------------------------|
3. Recommendations of the Structure TF based on evaluation
1. Board directors. Against an objective to create a means of
electing ICANN at-large board directors the TF endorses the
ALSC proposals to create an ALSO.
2. Policy consensus. Against an objective to outreach and develop
policy consensus among individual domain name holders, the TF
endorses the structural proposals of the ALSC.
3. Policy support to the Board. Against an objective to provide
policy input to the Board, the TF recommends that the three
members of the proposed At-large administrative council are
given membership of the DNSO Names Council, and participate
within that body exercising voting and other policy-related
privileges in the same way as the three representatives of the
DNSO constituencies. (The three ALSO reps would have no vote
in the election of DNSO Board members).
This solves at a stroke three issues:
--> the likelihood of contradictory or confusing advise
reaching the Board from the DNSO and the ALSO
--> creating a clear mechanism for ALSO/DNSO policy
interaction.
--> avoiding duplication by DNSO constituencies in policy
work in both the DNSO and ALSO.
Mechanistic details:
1. ALSO is formed and directly elects 6 Board members.
2. ALSO also elects 12 member Administrative Council (as ALSC
proposal but with an administrative role to organise the SO
and outreach downwards on policy)
3. ALSO Administrative Council selects 3 members (or the 3 top
geographically diverse of the directly-elected council
election list) appointed to Names Council to input on policy
matters.
4. The individuals petitioning for an individual domain name
holders constituency within the DNSO are encouraged to
participate in the ALSO and become AL Administrative Council
members and reps to the NC.
5. The GA reverts to its intended role of uniting all DNSO
constituencies (and expands to include the AL Administrative
Council and NC reps).
4. Threshold for ALSO membership before elections could start.
The ALSC report there were 143,789 on the first At-Large e-mail
list, that 76,183 were validated to vote and that 34,035 voted.
A threshold of 30,000 seems reasonable for the proposed ALSO
membership before elections can begin.
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