Re: [ga] Negative outreach norms, board claims regarding consensus in favor of "reform" efforts

[jefsey <jefsey@club-internet.fr>]

Dear Thomas,
This is absolute nonsense

You plead the ICANN is the only chance to balance interests in the mission 
creep area. Where it has  no mandate. No one wants the ICANN to have any 
teeth to defend anyone. No one expects the ICANN to fall on any side. This 
is actually what the consensus OPPOSES.
ICANN is not a government, it is a small technical registry. It is only in 
being small, in being neutral and in treating everyone equal that it can 
could protect everyone's interests and foster competition. Otherwise it has 
absolutely NO interest and for many interests it is a DANGER they must control.

Public control will not result from a GA vote. It will come after reading 
what you said, to investigate. Why do you think Lynn called the Govs? Have 
you ever called the Cops?

After that you say what we all agree: that mission creep is absurd. And you 
want to make us being absurd telling it? From what you say you are a 
mathematician: I do hope your logic is better with numbers than with names.

As you known I a moderate about, Jamies motion. I think you are right: it 
is urgent to vote it. As you way it will not kill the GA to ask for someone 
reasonable to step in. Why would Lynn have alone the right to call for the 
Govs?

I am going to petition the EEC, will you join us?
jfc


At 01:34 09/05/02, Thomas Roessler wrote:

>On 2002-05-08 16:09:40 -0400, James Love wrote:
>
>>1.  What is the argument for not having people vote in a GA ballot 
>>measure, if they care about an ICANN issue?
>
>The argument, which has, by now, been repeated ad nauseam is that
>the GA, as a body, is not the appropriate channel to make the
>statement you are asking it to make.
>
>>2.  One reason to have this vote is that the ICANN board and staff are 
>>telling governments (everywhere) that they have a consensus in the 
>>"Internet community" on the reform process.  And if they say
>>so, who is to say otherwise?  Unless, for example, you have
>>something like a vote.  Right now a GA vote will be a data point. I think 
>>a useful data point regarding the degree of consensus on
>>the Lynn/Board "reform" efforts, and it would be more interesting
>>if there was larger participation, going even beyond the
>>hyperactive GA-list posting community.
>
>You're mixing a couple of things which should, for the sake of
>clarity, be treated separately.  I'll try to rehash some arguments
>which have popped up before in various places.
>
>
>You start by confusing reform process and the Lynn proposal.
>1. Reform process: It's quite evident that ICANN is not functioning
>in the manner expected by many.  I'm deliberately saying:
>"expected".  Because one of the sources for the problems we are
>currently experiencing are vastly different expectations of what
>ICANN should do.  Let me give some examples: Verisign and their
>attorneys at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (in particular, Susan
>Crawford and David Johnson) are talking a lot about what consensus
>means.  David coined the phrase of the "consent of those governed."
>The ICANN they imagine could by the very definition of that
>consensus not make any policy which is detrimental to the economical 
>interests of Verisign.  This expectation is mirrored when Verisign's 
>Cochetti talks (on behalf of the whole gTLD registries'
>constituency!) about ICANN as a cooperative effort in Names Council
>calls.  In the other end of the spectrum, user constituencies (like
>the business and non-commercial constituencies) and the at-large
>activists likewise expect that ICANN safeguards their interest
>against self-interested activities of registries and registrars.  It 
>should be pretty obvious that these expectations are not compatible
>in any manner, and that an ICANN which tries to fulfill both of
>these just has to break.  (Likewise, a discussion process on reform
>which does not address this conflict, but hides it under layers of
>rhetoric for the sake of a simulation of consensus, is doomed to
>fail.) Of course, this is not the only source of problems.
>
>Also, the very idea to push for a re-bid of functions implies that you do 
>believe that ICANN needs to be reformed quite urgently,
>doesn't it?
>
>2. Reform proposals: I've certainly seen better pieces of English
>literature. I see better logic from other mathematicians on a daily 
>basis.  I have seen more realistic ideas about government involvement with 
>ICANN.  I have also seen ideas for ICANN which actually respect public 
>participation instead of just talking about it.
>
>That said, there is one benefit with the Lynn proposal: It falls
>clearly on one side of the expectations above.  And that's the
>users' side, not the suppliers'.  In particular, the ICANN
>envisioned by Lynn's propsoal is supposed to have the teeth
>necessary to safeguard user interests.  It is designed in a way
>which could balance the registries' and registrars' interests.  This is 
>worth keeping in mind.
>
>Bad enough, there have been very few realistic ideas about ICANN
>reform at all.  Note, BTW, that the R&E commitee's policy-making
>paper is one of the better documents in this area - in particular, it's 
>some orders of magnitude better than the "mission and core values" article 
>published a day earlier.
>
>
>For these reasons, I believe that it's actually safe to state that there 
>is consensus in the larger Internet community (including both James Love 
>and Stuart Lynn) that "something has to be done about ICANN." ICANN's 
>response is the "reform process."
>
>
>The next question you don't address clearly is: What could happen
>after a re-bid?  (Whatever that means, in detail...)
>
>The obvious options are: Another private entity pops up, ICANN
>remains in charge, but is reformed, and the USG (or some
>international government-backed organization, such as the ITU) may take over.
>
>Of these, the first option (a different private entity) seems to be
>the one least likely.
>
>Of course, some of you folks may be dreaming about the ORSC administrating 
>the DNS root for the public benefit, ideally without any involvement from 
>the IPC and business communities.  That may be a nice dream for some, but 
>it's unlikely to become true.  The key aspect to understand is that the 
>interests in DNS policy are not going to change.  The trademark lobby is 
>there to stay (they wouldn't even have a problem with a USG takeover - 
>that's why they are called "lobby," after all).  Business interests are 
>there to stay.  The GAC is there to stay.  Verisign is there to stay.
>
>Why should all these parties start to build an entirely new
>structure when they can just as well build on the framework
>(including all the contracts!) established by the current ICANN?
>Why should any of these interests go for a different private entity
>for the administration of the DNS - when they can just as well
>force the current ICANN into a reform process?
>
>Thus, the only options which remain realistic are: (1) A reformed
>ICANN, and (2) an end of the privatization experiment.  You folks
>don't seem to like the first option.  I find the latter one even less 
>desirable.
>
>
>Put into other words, a "successful" re-bid would mean public-sector 
>control over Internet policy.  Do you want THAT?  If so, please say it openly.
>
>
>
>Finally, you seem to say that someone has to say something about
>ICANN reform.  I agree.  However, I believe that such a statement
>should try to point out perspectives for private-sector control over 
>Internet policy.  What you suggest leads, if investigated closely,
>just to the opposite result: To a declaration of bankrupcy of the
>very idea of private-sector control over ICANN's areas of activity. Since 
>the very idea of having a General Assembly like this one is
>essentially based on the concept of private-sector control, the
>declaration of bankrupcy would include the GA.  Yes, it would be
>collective suicide - but not because we'd say something "they" don't like, 
>but because we say that the structure we are part of is
>fundamentally wrong.
>
>(In fact, one may even argue that Jamie's suggested statement would
>inevitably lead to the dissolution of the GA in a little cloud of
>logic, as punishment for producing a textbook example of a paradox:
>Being part of ICANN structure, the GA would say that this structure
>is fundamentally corrupt, and should not be relied upon.  Respecting this 
>recommendation would imply to ignore the GA.  It would, thus,
>mean that the recommendation should be ignored.  "The present
>statement is not true." That's very similar to: "The entity which
>makes the present statement should not be relied upon.")
>
>Of course, there's a lot of fine statements the GA could reasonably make 
>on reform process:  The GA could outline a framework of principles.  It 
>could try to address the contradiction in expectations stakeholders have 
>in ICANN - that contradiction is hidden behind rhetoric once again in the 
>E&R committee's "core values and mission" paper.
>
>
>To re-iterate my recommendation: Don't even try to use the GA as a
>channel for calling for a re-bid.  Do that through outside channels, which 
>are surely available to organizations like the Consumer
>Project on Technology. Try to use the GA as what it is: As a channel by 
>which additional input can be directed into ICANN's processes.
>
>--
>Thomas Roessler                          http://log.does-not-exist.org/
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