<<<
Chronological Index
>>> <<<
Thread Index
>>>
[ga] Re: [ncdnhc-discuss] The Nominating Committee
Jamie and all assembly members, stakeholders or interested parties,
From:
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-structure-09may02.
htm
"II. The Nominating Committee Concept
The Lynn proposal suggested a fifteen-person Board, with five ex officio and
ten At Large members - with five of the At Large members to be selected,
somehow, by governments. The rationale was two-fold: (1) a less directly
representational Board would likely be a better Board in the long run, and
(2) the government-selected At Large trustees would provide a voice for the
general public interest, and thus respond to the accountability/legitimacy
issues that generated much of the motivation for At Large online voting. The
Lynn proposal further suggested that the five At Large trustees not selected
by governments (and about half of each Policy Council Steering Committee) be
selected by a Nominating Committee (NomCom) made up of three Board members
and four other persons selected by the Board."
=======
This clearly shows that Stuart Lynn is not listening and has not
been listening or just plain ignoring the huge numbers of stakeholders
and interested parties.
There is no justification in this leading statement that advocates a
less representative Board... When will the ICANN staff and
BoD pay attention??? I say they will not unless or until
a Rebid of the ICANN Contracts ( MoU and White Paper )
is effected or the present ICANN BoD and staff are
abruptly removed except for those that were elected
by the now defunct At-Large...
To many, this very questionable attitude from Stuart Lynn
and other staff and Board members has been a catalyst
for a call for a Rebid vote by the DNSO GA members
as well as other stakeholder groups. Such an attitude
and total disregard for Transparency and openness
as well, shows that this ICANN BoD and staff with
two exceptions ( Karl A. and Andy M-M. )
cannot be trusted...
James Love wrote:
> Alejandro,
>
> 1. What are you mixing up is both the nomination and the election process.
> The term "nominatng committee" is misleading if the committee nominates and
> elects.
>
> 2. I find it completely wrong to have the board members having any say over
> who gets elected to the board. Here is just one reason. Suppose it is
> well known that the only way to get on the board, is to be selected by the
> board itself. Suppose then you have a choice of speaking out in favor of
> something the board is doing or opposed to what the board is doing. What
> are the odds you would ever be elected to the board if you criticized the
> board? Ok, where does this dynamic lead?
>
> 3. Every member of the board should be elected by non-board members, no
> matter who they are. This should be basic. This is not like a family
> trust, foundation or other non-profit organization that is run by self
> perpetuating boards, it seems to me. If Bill Gates wants to put up his own
> money to advance some charitable purpose, he gets to set up a self
> perpetuating board. If ICANNWatch, CDT, EPIC, EFF, CPTech or anyone else
> wants to create a self perpetuating board, that's fine too, this a basic
> right of association. But it isn't the right model for something that
> wants to be a global Internet regulator.
>
> 4. If the ICANN BOD wants authority, it has to give up control over the
> election of its members to others, who have some creditable basis for doing
> so. The process should not be designed to produce a board of persons who
> will not be critical or will not dissent.
>
> 5. I'd rather have SOs electing board members, including SOs that represent
> user interests, than having the board elect itself. There may be other
> ways of doing things too.
>
> 6. Has the reform committee decided to junk the at large membership voting
> idea? I just want to have some clarity on this, since I was just elected to
> some panel to organize such an at large membership (coming out of the ALSC
> process and the go forth and multiply Accra thing).
>
> 7. How about things like term limit or rotating chairs, to reduce the
> danger of empire building?
>
> 8. Who elects the board is closely related to what powers the board will
> have. If it can do literally anything in the name of Internet stability,
> then you need an election process that is quite representative of the
> public. If it coordinates six technical tasks and that is the end of its
> authority, then maybe all sorts of less representative structures are
> acceptable.
>
> Jamie
>
> http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-structure-09may02.
> htm
>
> II. The Nominating Committee Concept
>
> The Lynn proposal suggested a fifteen-person Board, with five ex officio and
> ten At Large members - with five of the At Large members to be selected,
> somehow, by governments. The rationale was two-fold: (1) a less directly
> representational Board would likely be a better Board in the long run, and
> (2) the government-selected At Large trustees would provide a voice for the
> general public interest, and thus respond to the accountability/legitimacy
> issues that generated much of the motivation for At Large online voting. The
> Lynn proposal further suggested that the five At Large trustees not selected
> by governments (and about half of each Policy Council Steering Committee) be
> selected by a Nominating Committee (NomCom) made up of three Board members
> and four other persons selected by the Board.
>
> As indicated earlier in this paper, for purposes of this discussion we
> assume that governments will select no Board members in the relevant time
> frame. Thus, the NomCom on this assumption would be responsible for filling
> vacancies in the ten At Large Board seats, not just five as suggested in the
> Lynn proposal.
>
> A. The Rationale for a Nominating Committee
>
> The major criticism of the NomCom idea to date has been that, since it was
> made up of Board members and Board appointees, it was too controlled by the
> Board, and thus formed a "closed circle" that was too self-reproducing,
> preventing needed renewal, corrections, and adjustments as the Internet
> evolves. This criticism appears to the Committee to have some merit, and
> thus we solicit comment on a modification designed to respond to that
> criticism while retaining the perceived benefits of a NomCom process.
>
> We would like to solicit comments on the following concept: a NomCom
> consisting of delegates from identified constituencies (possible examples
> would be such groups as registries, registrars, RIRs, large business users,
> consumer organizations, academic or other non-commercial organizations,
> etc.) Such a NomCom might have a non-voting chair appointed by the Board
> (possibly a Board member, possibly not), and it might also include one or
> more liaisons (IAB, GAC, etc.) that could either have voting rights or not.
> These could serve to provide insights about particular needs on either the
> Board or a Policy Council Steering Committee, and about the strengths or
> weaknesses of particular people being considered based on prior knowledge or
> experience. Another way to accomplish this goal is to have some ex officio
> members (voting or non-voting) on the NomCom from the Board.
>
> We use the word "delegate" intentionally. For ICANN to be the most effective
> organization it can be, its Board should be as neutral and objective, and as
> capable, as is possible under the circumstances. We do not believe that a
> Board composed primarily of representatives of specific interested groups is
> the best way to reach this goal. By contrast, we believe that a Board
> composed of persons with diverse skills and perspectives and the right
> personalities, that can act collegially and effectively to make decisions
> that are grounded in the best interests of the overall communities affected
> would serve both the public interest and the long-term interest of all
> direct participants in ICANN. This view suggests that on the NomCom, the
> general public interest could be represented by those delegates selected by
> consumer organizations and user groups, while the providers would also
> supply delegates to the NomCom. We do believe it is both appropriate and
> useful to have those constituencies that are directly and consistently
> involved in ICANN to have an important role in the selection of Board
> members, but we respectfully suggest that it is more consistent with the
> goal - a consistently high-quality, effective Board - that all constituency
> representatives on the NomCom (whether from providers, consumer groups, or
> users) think of themselves as "delegates," not as "representatives" - in
> other words, as bringing a particular perspective and knowledge to the joint
> process of selecting good ICANN Board members, rather than "representing"
> the narrow interests of the particular constituency that brought them to the
> NomCom.
>
> This is not, in our view, metaphysical semantics. The only way that an
> ICANN-type entity can be effective is if it advances the common good. Now,
> this is of course a composite of the legitimate interests of all
> participants (as well as non-participants), but it may in any particular
> case not directly reflect any one of those interests. What is needed in
> ICANN, not only at the Board level but also in the policy-development
> bodies, is less political log-rolling and more genuine efforts to find
> consensus solutions. This effort will be advanced if we establish a culture
> and tradition of looking for the common good of the community, even if this
> occurs through the perspective of a particular interested party or group.
>
> B. Specific Issues on Which Comments are Invited
>
> Q24. Comments Requested: We invite comments on this general
> articulation of the NomCom concept. This approach basically seeks to move
> from a Board made up of representatives to a Board made up of capable,
> interested, effective persons, who may or may not have a direct involvement
> in the day-to-day activities of those entities most involved in ICANN. We
> seek to accomplish that by pushing direct representation away from the Board
> itself to the body that selects a majority of the Board, creating a buffer
> (the representational NomCom) between particular interest groups or
> constituencies and the Board itself.
>
> Q25. Comments Requested: We also invite comment on the specific
> identities of the groups or constituencies that should be represented on
> such a NomCom, in addition to the question of whether and how new groups or
> constituencies would be allowed to gain participation on the NomCom.
>
> Q26. Comments Requested: We also invite comment on exactly how the
> NomCom would function. We envision that that particular self-organized
> groups (whether called forums or constituencies or some other name), as well
> as the general public, could recommend persons to the NomCom, which would
> then through a process of discussion and debate generate nominations that
> had broad consensus support throughout the community.
>
> Q27. Comments Requested: Another point on which we solicit comment is
> whether NomCom members should be prohibited from themselves being nominated
> for at least their tenure on the NomCom and perhaps for a short period
> afterwards. This would reduce fears of self-dealing, but potentially at the
> price of diminishing the available pool of candidates.
>
> Q28. Comments Requested: Another issue on which we solicit comments is
> whether, and if so what, particular criteria or standards should apply to
> the process by which the NomCom makes selections. In the ICANN context,
> these could include (at least for the Board and probably for the Steering
> Committees as well) geographic diversity, functional diversity, etc. Such
> standards should probably be measured in the aggregate, not for any
> particular opening, so that some but not necessarily all would be relevant
> to any given nomination cycle. In addition, there could be specific
> perceived needs in any given cycle, either for the Board or for a particular
> Steering Committee, that could be communicated to the NomCom by the Board,
> perhaps through the non-voting Chair, and/or decided by the NomCom itself,
> based on inputs from its members and/or any liaisons. Any comments on these
> ideas are welcome.
>
> Q29. Comments Requested: There is also the issue of whether the Board
> should be permitted to reject a nominee or a slate of nominees, and if so
> whether that should require a super-majority vote of some kind. While it is
> hard to imagine what entity other than the Board could reasonably ratify
> nominees, we welcome suggestions or comments on whether ratification of
> NomCom selections is desirable, and if so by what entity and under what
> standards.
>
> Q30. Comments Requested: We also invite comments on the terms of
> NomCom members. Assuming an appropriate transition and staggered terms, the
> NomCom in any given year would likely select 3-4 Trustees and 1-2 members of
> each Steering Committee. This seems a manageable task. Should each NomCom
> exist for a one-year or two-year cycle, and then be reconstituted with
> different members, or is there some value to continuity? If it was thought
> necessary to provide continuity, members could serve with staggered terms,
> so some portion were replaced each year. This may not be necessary if there
> are sufficient liaisons and/or ex officio members. Would the formation of
> new NomComs each year appropriately balance the need for renewal and
> inclusiveness with the need for continuity and stability? Can the NomCom and
> its make-up be isolated from cumbersome and ultimately
> effectiveness-reducing politics? To what extent would a NomCom procedure
> isolate the Board from such politics? Comments are welcome.
>
> Conclusion
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Alejandro Pisanty - DGSCA y FQ, UNAM" <apisan@servidor.unam.mx>
> To: "NCDNHC list" <discuss@icann-ncc.org>
> Sent: Thursday, May 09, 2002 11:29 PM
> Subject: [ncdnhc-discuss] Evolution and Reform Committee Working Paper on
> the ICANN Structure and the Nominating Committee Concept (fwd)
>
> > Hi!
> >
> > the E&R Committee has just posted a new working paper. This one deals with
> > structure and with the questions about the nominating committee.
> >
> > Input from our constituency most needed here.
> >
> > We need to move forward; deadlines for comments will be in about one week
> > from now.
> >
> > Yours,
> >
> > Alejandro Pisanty
> >
> >
> > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> .
> > Dr. Alejandro Pisanty
> > Director General de Servicios de Computo Academico
> > UNAM, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico
> > Av. Universidad 3000, 04510 Mexico DF Mexico
> > Tel. (+52-55) 5622-8541, 5622-8542 Fax 5550-8405
> > http://www.dgsca.unam.mx
> > *
> > ** 10 Aniversario de Internet Society - www.inet2002.org en Washington, DC
> > ---->> Unete a ISOC Mexico, www.isoc.org
> > Participa en ICANN, www.icann.org
> > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> .
> >
> >
> >
> > ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> > Date: Thu, 09 May 2002 20:21:51 -0700
> > From: Louis Touton <touton@icann.org>
> > To: icann-board@icann.org
> > Subject: [icann-board] Evolution and Reform Committee Working Paper on the
> > ICANN Structure and the Nominating Committee Concept
> >
> > To the Board:
> >
> > The Evolution and Reform Committee has posted a working paper on ICANN's
> > structure and the nominating committee concept
> >
> <http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-structure-09may02
> .htm>.
> > The Committee is seeking public comment both generally on this working
> > paper and on sixteen topics for specific comment noted in the paper.
> > Comments received will be posted on the forum for evolution and reform
> > issues at <http://forum.icann.org/reform-comments/>.
> >
> > Louis Touton
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Discuss mailing list
> > Discuss@icann-ncc.org
> > http://www.icann-ncc.org/mailman/listinfo/discuss
> >
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> Discuss mailing list
> Discuss@icann-ncc.org
> http://www.icann-ncc.org/mailman/listinfo/discuss
Regards,
--
Jeffrey A. Williams
Spokesman for INEGroup - (Over 121k members/stakeholdes strong!)
CEO/DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java/CORBA Development Eng.
Information Network Eng. Group. INEG. INC.
E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
Contact Number: 972-244-3801 or 214-244-4827
Address: 5 East Kirkwood Blvd. Grapevine Texas 75208
--
This message was passed to you via the ga-full@dnso.org list.
Send mail to majordomo@dnso.org to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga-full" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html
<<<
Chronological Index
>>> <<<
Thread Index
>>>
|