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[ga] Re: [ALSC-Forum] Re: [ncdnhc-discuss] The Nominating Committee
Jefsey and all,
jefsey wrote:
> Dear Jeff,
> the ICANN staff is doing the same thing ...
> as the DoC is doing with the ICANN and Govs
> as Joop and others are doing with Vittorio and other @large
> as Denise is doing with Joop, Thomas and icannatlarge.com
> as BoD is doing with NC
> as Marilyn is doing with the BC
> as the NC is doing with everyone
> as Thomas is doing with the GA
All the above is very true and indicative of ICANN's woes or
serious problems (Pick your own term here)...
>
>
> keeping them talking about what they should have told them themselves,
Good point. A wise man once said, "one who know others is
wise, but one who knows oneself is enlightened"...
>
>
> so they save time, preserve statu quo, may steal an idea or two to show
> "above" they worked hard on the matter and make sure that the one who got
> the idea and knows what to do will never show up.
>
> Only Stuart was galant enough to spek up on behalf of the Member. That is
> life.
>
> But sometimes in the life you are circumvented. You can fool people on few
> matters but you cannot fool everyone on everything.
How very true here Jefsey! And it seem astonishing to me amongst
a growing number of other stakeholders/users that trying to fool
everyone is precisely what Stuart Lynn and most of the BOD
seems to be attempting to do.
> The ICANNs problem is
> territory creep: because they see that they have to address too many topics
> (the mission creep is in part legitimate, but mostly due to the way they
> addressed the key ones) they think that they should address them for everyone.
This is only one of ICANN's problems Jefsey, but it is a big one I must
admit. Thinking that only a very few have the "Enlightenment" to
address issues and determine ALL of them for every stakeholders/user
without their consent or acceptance is pure folly...
>
>
> Too bad. Instead of explaining what they do internally, they should have
> explained what they are useful for externally. What they think should be
> provided, which is not. They think as a bureaucratic lawyer firm, not as a
> network service provider.
Also a very good observation here as well Jefsey! I agree...
>
>
> Too bad, and I do not really see who could help them understand and lead
> them. I still hope Vint could. May be the guy who managed the LA Olympic
> Games?
This is precisely why the ICANN BOD and staff have failed as leaders,
much like Yassar Arafat has done. This is precisely why a rebid
motion on the GA is being considered...
>
>
> Jefsey
>
> PS. I would not discriminate among BoD Members. Let imagine you would be
> one of them, what would you actually say/do.
I would abide by the MoU and the White paper exclusively.. That
means that any and all issues must be publicly vetted, discussed,
debated, and than voted on by the stakeholders/users if those
Stakeholders/users believe that the issue is central enough for
them to do so...
> The structure's mechanic makes
> it very complex. ICANN is a single member corporation and we all know who
> the Member is. Their real problem is that a part from Vint, Alejandro and
> Karl and only a few times Andy and in the past Stuart, who is talking? Who
> does accept to show if he/she has ideas by his/her own and to validate them
> with the real world. On the GA or in the press?
Both...
>
>
> At 11:03 10/05/02, Jeff Williams wrote:
>
> >Jamie and all assembly members, stakeholders or interested parties,
> >
> > From:
> >http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-structure-09may02.
> >htm
> >
> >"II. The Nominating Committee Concept
> >
> >The Lynn proposal suggested a fifteen-person Board, with five ex officio and
> >ten At Large members - with five of the At Large members to be selected,
> >somehow, by governments. The rationale was two-fold: (1) a less directly
> >representational Board would likely be a better Board in the long run, and
> >(2) the government-selected At Large trustees would provide a voice for the
> >general public interest, and thus respond to the accountability/legitimacy
> >issues that generated much of the motivation for At Large online voting. The
> >Lynn proposal further suggested that the five At Large trustees not selected
> >by governments (and about half of each Policy Council Steering Committee) be
> >selected by a Nominating Committee (NomCom) made up of three Board members
> >and four other persons selected by the Board."
> >
> >=======
> >
> > This clearly shows that Stuart Lynn is not listening and has not
> >been listening or just plain ignoring the huge numbers of stakeholders
> >and interested parties.
> >
> > There is no justification in this leading statement that advocates a
> >less representative Board... When will the ICANN staff and
> >BoD pay attention??? I say they will not unless or until
> >a Rebid of the ICANN Contracts ( MoU and White Paper )
> >is effected or the present ICANN BoD and staff are
> >abruptly removed except for those that were elected
> >by the now defunct At-Large...
> >
> > To many, this very questionable attitude from Stuart Lynn
> >and other staff and Board members has been a catalyst
> >for a call for a Rebid vote by the DNSO GA members
> >as well as other stakeholder groups. Such an attitude
> >and total disregard for Transparency and openness
> >as well, shows that this ICANN BoD and staff with
> >two exceptions ( Karl A. and Andy M-M. )
> >cannot be trusted...
> >
> >
> >
> >James Love wrote:
> >
> > > Alejandro,
> > >
> > > 1. What are you mixing up is both the nomination and the election process.
> > > The term "nominatng committee" is misleading if the committee nominates and
> > > elects.
> > >
> > > 2. I find it completely wrong to have the board members having any say
> > over
> > > who gets elected to the board. Here is just one reason. Suppose it is
> > > well known that the only way to get on the board, is to be selected by the
> > > board itself. Suppose then you have a choice of speaking out in favor of
> > > something the board is doing or opposed to what the board is doing. What
> > > are the odds you would ever be elected to the board if you criticized the
> > > board? Ok, where does this dynamic lead?
> > >
> > > 3. Every member of the board should be elected by non-board members, no
> > > matter who they are. This should be basic. This is not like a family
> > > trust, foundation or other non-profit organization that is run by self
> > > perpetuating boards, it seems to me. If Bill Gates wants to put up his own
> > > money to advance some charitable purpose, he gets to set up a self
> > > perpetuating board. If ICANNWatch, CDT, EPIC, EFF, CPTech or anyone else
> > > wants to create a self perpetuating board, that's fine too, this a basic
> > > right of association. But it isn't the right model for something that
> > > wants to be a global Internet regulator.
> > >
> > > 4. If the ICANN BOD wants authority, it has to give up control over the
> > > election of its members to others, who have some creditable basis for doing
> > > so. The process should not be designed to produce a board of persons who
> > > will not be critical or will not dissent.
> > >
> > > 5. I'd rather have SOs electing board members, including SOs that
> > represent
> > > user interests, than having the board elect itself. There may be other
> > > ways of doing things too.
> > >
> > > 6. Has the reform committee decided to junk the at large membership voting
> > > idea? I just want to have some clarity on this, since I was just
> > elected to
> > > some panel to organize such an at large membership (coming out of the ALSC
> > > process and the go forth and multiply Accra thing).
> > >
> > > 7. How about things like term limit or rotating chairs, to reduce the
> > > danger of empire building?
> > >
> > > 8. Who elects the board is closely related to what powers the board will
> > > have. If it can do literally anything in the name of Internet stability,
> > > then you need an election process that is quite representative of the
> > > public. If it coordinates six technical tasks and that is the end of its
> > > authority, then maybe all sorts of less representative structures are
> > > acceptable.
> > >
> > > Jamie
> > >
> > >
> > http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-structure-09may02.
> > > htm
> > >
> > > II. The Nominating Committee Concept
> > >
> > > The Lynn proposal suggested a fifteen-person Board, with five ex
> > officio and
> > > ten At Large members - with five of the At Large members to be selected,
> > > somehow, by governments. The rationale was two-fold: (1) a less directly
> > > representational Board would likely be a better Board in the long run, and
> > > (2) the government-selected At Large trustees would provide a voice for the
> > > general public interest, and thus respond to the accountability/legitimacy
> > > issues that generated much of the motivation for At Large online
> > voting. The
> > > Lynn proposal further suggested that the five At Large trustees not
> > selected
> > > by governments (and about half of each Policy Council Steering
> > Committee) be
> > > selected by a Nominating Committee (NomCom) made up of three Board members
> > > and four other persons selected by the Board.
> > >
> > > As indicated earlier in this paper, for purposes of this discussion we
> > > assume that governments will select no Board members in the relevant time
> > > frame. Thus, the NomCom on this assumption would be responsible for filling
> > > vacancies in the ten At Large Board seats, not just five as suggested
> > in the
> > > Lynn proposal.
> > >
> > > A. The Rationale for a Nominating Committee
> > >
> > > The major criticism of the NomCom idea to date has been that, since it was
> > > made up of Board members and Board appointees, it was too controlled by the
> > > Board, and thus formed a "closed circle" that was too self-reproducing,
> > > preventing needed renewal, corrections, and adjustments as the Internet
> > > evolves. This criticism appears to the Committee to have some merit, and
> > > thus we solicit comment on a modification designed to respond to that
> > > criticism while retaining the perceived benefits of a NomCom process.
> > >
> > > We would like to solicit comments on the following concept: a NomCom
> > > consisting of delegates from identified constituencies (possible examples
> > > would be such groups as registries, registrars, RIRs, large business users,
> > > consumer organizations, academic or other non-commercial organizations,
> > > etc.) Such a NomCom might have a non-voting chair appointed by the Board
> > > (possibly a Board member, possibly not), and it might also include one or
> > > more liaisons (IAB, GAC, etc.) that could either have voting rights or not.
> > > These could serve to provide insights about particular needs on either the
> > > Board or a Policy Council Steering Committee, and about the strengths or
> > > weaknesses of particular people being considered based on prior
> > knowledge or
> > > experience. Another way to accomplish this goal is to have some ex officio
> > > members (voting or non-voting) on the NomCom from the Board.
> > >
> > > We use the word "delegate" intentionally. For ICANN to be the most
> > effective
> > > organization it can be, its Board should be as neutral and objective,
> > and as
> > > capable, as is possible under the circumstances. We do not believe that a
> > > Board composed primarily of representatives of specific interested
> > groups is
> > > the best way to reach this goal. By contrast, we believe that a Board
> > > composed of persons with diverse skills and perspectives and the right
> > > personalities, that can act collegially and effectively to make decisions
> > > that are grounded in the best interests of the overall communities affected
> > > would serve both the public interest and the long-term interest of all
> > > direct participants in ICANN. This view suggests that on the NomCom, the
> > > general public interest could be represented by those delegates selected by
> > > consumer organizations and user groups, while the providers would also
> > > supply delegates to the NomCom. We do believe it is both appropriate and
> > > useful to have those constituencies that are directly and consistently
> > > involved in ICANN to have an important role in the selection of Board
> > > members, but we respectfully suggest that it is more consistent with the
> > > goal - a consistently high-quality, effective Board - that all constituency
> > > representatives on the NomCom (whether from providers, consumer groups, or
> > > users) think of themselves as "delegates," not as "representatives" - in
> > > other words, as bringing a particular perspective and knowledge to the
> > joint
> > > process of selecting good ICANN Board members, rather than "representing"
> > > the narrow interests of the particular constituency that brought them
> > to the
> > > NomCom.
> > >
> > > This is not, in our view, metaphysical semantics. The only way that an
> > > ICANN-type entity can be effective is if it advances the common good. Now,
> > > this is of course a composite of the legitimate interests of all
> > > participants (as well as non-participants), but it may in any particular
> > > case not directly reflect any one of those interests. What is needed in
> > > ICANN, not only at the Board level but also in the policy-development
> > > bodies, is less political log-rolling and more genuine efforts to find
> > > consensus solutions. This effort will be advanced if we establish a culture
> > > and tradition of looking for the common good of the community, even if this
> > > occurs through the perspective of a particular interested party or group.
> > >
> > > B. Specific Issues on Which Comments are Invited
> > >
> > > Q24. Comments Requested: We invite comments on this general
> > > articulation of the NomCom concept. This approach basically seeks to move
> > > from a Board made up of representatives to a Board made up of capable,
> > > interested, effective persons, who may or may not have a direct involvement
> > > in the day-to-day activities of those entities most involved in ICANN. We
> > > seek to accomplish that by pushing direct representation away from the
> > Board
> > > itself to the body that selects a majority of the Board, creating a buffer
> > > (the representational NomCom) between particular interest groups or
> > > constituencies and the Board itself.
> > >
> > > Q25. Comments Requested: We also invite comment on the specific
> > > identities of the groups or constituencies that should be represented on
> > > such a NomCom, in addition to the question of whether and how new groups or
> > > constituencies would be allowed to gain participation on the NomCom.
> > >
> > > Q26. Comments Requested: We also invite comment on exactly how the
> > > NomCom would function. We envision that that particular self-organized
> > > groups (whether called forums or constituencies or some other name), as
> > well
> > > as the general public, could recommend persons to the NomCom, which would
> > > then through a process of discussion and debate generate nominations that
> > > had broad consensus support throughout the community.
> > >
> > > Q27. Comments Requested: Another point on which we solicit comment is
> > > whether NomCom members should be prohibited from themselves being nominated
> > > for at least their tenure on the NomCom and perhaps for a short period
> > > afterwards. This would reduce fears of self-dealing, but potentially at the
> > > price of diminishing the available pool of candidates.
> > >
> > > Q28. Comments Requested: Another issue on which we solicit
> > comments is
> > > whether, and if so what, particular criteria or standards should apply to
> > > the process by which the NomCom makes selections. In the ICANN context,
> > > these could include (at least for the Board and probably for the Steering
> > > Committees as well) geographic diversity, functional diversity, etc. Such
> > > standards should probably be measured in the aggregate, not for any
> > > particular opening, so that some but not necessarily all would be relevant
> > > to any given nomination cycle. In addition, there could be specific
> > > perceived needs in any given cycle, either for the Board or for a
> > particular
> > > Steering Committee, that could be communicated to the NomCom by the Board,
> > > perhaps through the non-voting Chair, and/or decided by the NomCom itself,
> > > based on inputs from its members and/or any liaisons. Any comments on these
> > > ideas are welcome.
> > >
> > > Q29. Comments Requested: There is also the issue of whether the Board
> > > should be permitted to reject a nominee or a slate of nominees, and if so
> > > whether that should require a super-majority vote of some kind. While it is
> > > hard to imagine what entity other than the Board could reasonably ratify
> > > nominees, we welcome suggestions or comments on whether ratification of
> > > NomCom selections is desirable, and if so by what entity and under what
> > > standards.
> > >
> > > Q30. Comments Requested: We also invite comments on the terms of
> > > NomCom members. Assuming an appropriate transition and staggered terms, the
> > > NomCom in any given year would likely select 3-4 Trustees and 1-2
> > members of
> > > each Steering Committee. This seems a manageable task. Should each NomCom
> > > exist for a one-year or two-year cycle, and then be reconstituted with
> > > different members, or is there some value to continuity? If it was thought
> > > necessary to provide continuity, members could serve with staggered terms,
> > > so some portion were replaced each year. This may not be necessary if there
> > > are sufficient liaisons and/or ex officio members. Would the formation of
> > > new NomComs each year appropriately balance the need for renewal and
> > > inclusiveness with the need for continuity and stability? Can the
> > NomCom and
> > > its make-up be isolated from cumbersome and ultimately
> > > effectiveness-reducing politics? To what extent would a NomCom procedure
> > > isolate the Board from such politics? Comments are welcome.
> > >
> > > Conclusion
> > >
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: "Alejandro Pisanty - DGSCA y FQ, UNAM" <apisan@servidor.unam.mx>
> > > To: "NCDNHC list" <discuss@icann-ncc.org>
> > > Sent: Thursday, May 09, 2002 11:29 PM
> > > Subject: [ncdnhc-discuss] Evolution and Reform Committee Working Paper on
> > > the ICANN Structure and the Nominating Committee Concept (fwd)
> > >
> > > > Hi!
> > > >
> > > > the E&R Committee has just posted a new working paper. This one deals
> > with
> > > > structure and with the questions about the nominating committee.
> > > >
> > > > Input from our constituency most needed here.
> > > >
> > > > We need to move forward; deadlines for comments will be in about one week
> > > > from now.
> > > >
> > > > Yours,
> > > >
> > > > Alejandro Pisanty
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> > > .
> > > > Dr. Alejandro Pisanty
> > > > Director General de Servicios de Computo Academico
> > > > UNAM, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico
> > > > Av. Universidad 3000, 04510 Mexico DF Mexico
> > > > Tel. (+52-55) 5622-8541, 5622-8542 Fax 5550-8405
> > > > http://www.dgsca.unam.mx
> > > > *
> > > > ** 10 Aniversario de Internet Society - www.inet2002.org en
> > Washington, DC
> > > > ---->> Unete a ISOC Mexico, www.isoc.org
> > > > Participa en ICANN, www.icann.org
> > > > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> > > .
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> > > > Date: Thu, 09 May 2002 20:21:51 -0700
> > > > From: Louis Touton <touton@icann.org>
> > > > To: icann-board@icann.org
> > > > Subject: [icann-board] Evolution and Reform Committee Working Paper
> > on the
> > > > ICANN Structure and the Nominating Committee Concept
> > > >
> > > > To the Board:
> > > >
> > > > The Evolution and Reform Committee has posted a working paper on ICANN's
> > > > structure and the nominating committee concept
> > > >
> > >
> > <http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-structure-09may02>
> > .htm>.
> > > > The Committee is seeking public comment both generally on this working
> > > > paper and on sixteen topics for specific comment noted in the paper.
> > > > Comments received will be posted on the forum for evolution and reform
> > > > issues at <http://forum.icann.org/reform-comments/>.
> > > >
> > > > Louis Touton
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Discuss mailing list
> > > > Discuss@icann-ncc.org
> > > > http://www.icann-ncc.org/mailman/listinfo/discuss
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Discuss mailing list
> > > Discuss@icann-ncc.org
> > > http://www.icann-ncc.org/mailman/listinfo/discuss
> >
> >Regards,
> >--
> >Jeffrey A. Williams
> >Spokesman for INEGroup - (Over 121k members/stakeholdes strong!)
> >CEO/DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java/CORBA Development Eng.
> >Information Network Eng. Group. INEG. INC.
> >E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
> >Contact Number: 972-244-3801 or 214-244-4827
> >Address: 5 East Kirkwood Blvd. Grapevine Texas 75208
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >---
> >Incoming mail is certified Virus Free.
> >Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
>
Regards,
--
Jeffrey A. Williams
Spokesman for INEGroup - (Over 121k members/stakeholdes strong!)
CEO/DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java/CORBA Development Eng.
Information Network Eng. Group. INEG. INC.
E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
Contact Number: 972-244-3801 or 214-244-4827
Address: 5 East Kirkwood Blvd. Grapevine Texas 75208
--
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