Re: Relations with the ccTLDs (was Re: [ga] Re: Violations of the Bylaws?

["J-F C. (Jefsey) Morfin" <jefsey@club-internet.fr>]

Dear Patricio,
You point out that Jon Postel introduced that concern in Memo #1.

At 17:02 26/08/02, Patricio Poblete wrote:
>   Jon Postel admitted explicitly in the ccTLD News Memo #1
>    <http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-news1.htm> that this was a rule the
>    IANA started using after RFC 1591 was issued ("An additional factor has
>    become very important since RFC 1591 was written: the desires of the
>    government of the country.").

He also introduces another rule which is:

<quote>
Sometimes there are questions about what kind of names should be allowed 
(or outlawed).  The experience is that if there is to be some set of 
allowed (or outlawed) names in a particular situation the best approach is 
to use an existing list maintained by another long-existing, reputable, 
organization.  Just as we use the list of country codes determined by the 
ISO-3166 standard.
</quote>

This may be understood in different contexts. Let take the "worst" one. May 
I remind you that the ISO 3166 two letters codes where chosen in 1984 to 
avoid confusion with the use, since 1977, of the ISO 3166 three letters 
codes for State monopoly public services (not used anymore in 1997 when Jon 
Postel writes this: progressively replaced from 1983 by the ITU X.121 DNIC 
list - ie. another list by a "long existing, reputable organization").


This leads to the following remarks:

1. according to the jurisprudence of ICP-1 and added zone control, ICANN 
could introduce 3 letters TLDs, or other national TLDs following a 
convention of the Library of Congress for example.

2. the nature of the 2 letters codes and the initial legitimacy of the 
ccTLDs Jon Postel's agreement was *not to be government dependent", based 
upon a legitimacy born from the Local Internet Community support (the 
trustee of the local Internet community: nothing to do with government).

3. States have with the ISC 3 letters codes "an existing list maintained by 
another long-existing, reputable, organization" a total legitimacy to 
operate 3 letters national TLDs (except Comoros) - with the same 
international rules and protection as ccTLDs in term of international 
management and updates. This is a way to address the local monopoly issue, 
and to respond to the desire of some Govs to control a national naming plan.

Instead of destabilizing the network through treads on the ccTLDs, ICANN 
should stabilize it in asking ccTLD to help Governments to establish and 
run their own ISO 3166 three letters code TLDs.


As a general comment, this change in the understanding of the ccTLDs 
situation (dated 1997) is in direct relation with the (dated 1996) US 
doctrine globally redefined by the 1996 Act. If you look at the 47 USC 230 
(f)(1) definition of the Internet you see it clearly. That definition is 
now used in every US legal body/proposition (even when concerning 
supposedly domestic issues, such as sending someone in jail for false Whois 
identity) .

"(f) Definitions: As used in this section: (1) Internet. The term 
"Internet" means the international computer network of both federal and non 
federal interoperable packet switch networks."

This US definition (totally different from Vint's own "interconnection of 
technologies"):

1. justifies ICP-3's claim of rooting the international rights of (USG 
originated, through IANA sales agreement) ICANN in the 1984/85 RFC 921/920 
situation. At that time TCP/IP networks were not involved with 
international operations (and ccTLDs only planed), *but* worldwide packet 
switch services were probably a nearly one billion dollar yearly business, 
were internationally US centered, however with the largest public network 
in France (nearly 1.5 millions Minitel).

2. explains the difficulty of ICANN to address the positions of the 
governments in its scheme (and ERC).  This definition of the Internet puts 
ICANN in control of every packet switch system, worldwide, but concerned 
governments, industries and peoples have not yet understood it.

To enforce its rights ICANN needs the approval and the help of the local 
governments. This explains the patient effort to weave the "ContractNet", 
to give the dominance they purchased for less than $ 10.000 (IANA contract) 
from the USG, the perfume of an international concertance. This might (?) 
also explain the fear that @large or ITU might interfere before the 
status-quo is definitely locked (through the root management artificial 
complexity - what Joe names "DNS stability"). We all know the way an 
European GAC diplomat summarized this ("AmerICANN joke").

What is interesting is that the USG is in competition with Verisign: the 
competition ICANN is to foster is not about the registrars smoke screen, 
but about the USG recovering control from VRSN and from a few other 
Stakeholders - in enlarging the number of the "Internet Yalta" Members to a 
limited "netset" of US and International selected corporations.

We are not dealing here with commercial, technical, social, civil right 
issues - the reason why GA has no real weight, except when it calls for a 
rebid. We are dealing with the digital sovereignty of the USA, and of 188 
other governments, at a time the world becomes digital.

jfc