Re: [ga] Re: ICANN & Stability

[Karl Auerbach <karl@cavebear.com>]

On Mon, 16 Sep 2002, M. Stuart Lynn wrote:

> .. Three of the ccTLD requests for migration have not yet been completed
> because the ccTLD operators have (despite repeated requests) failed to
> cooperate in allowing the IANA to perform technical checks as provided
> by longstanding IANA policy.  See the FAQs at
     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> <http://www.iana.org/faqs/tld-zone-access-faq.htm> for a description
> that we recently posted summarizing for ccTLD managers the policy, its
> longstanding basis (documented back to RFC 1591 in March 1994), and the
> means by which those seeking to change the policy should proceed.

Longstanding? No. By-ICANN fiat? Yes.  Technical foundation: Absent.

This so-called "longstanding" policy appeared as if by magic from
ICANN/IANA (can you tell the difference? I guess is that the ICANN label
means that there is a least a pretense, albeit usually merely a pretense,
of public comment.)

RFC 1591 says nothing about requiring zone transfer access so that
ICANN/IANA may dredge to an unlimited degree in the subsidiary zone's
data.

The extremely limited validation that is needed to check that a DNS
delegation works can easily be done by running actual DNS queries rather
than by demanding the right to rummage through a ccTLD (or gTLD's) entire
database.

It inconsistent for ICANN to claim on one hand that net stability (a term
never defined by ICANN) requires that ICANN intrude into the zone files of
ccTLDs to evaluate the "quality" of that zone data while on the other hand
that that apparently long delays (such as have occurred with .nz) have no
such impact on net stability.

I would like to know the *precise* techical basis for the assertions made
in http://www.iana.org/faqs/tld-zone-access-faq.htm that flaws in
subsidiary zones (such as a ccTLD) can have a negative impact on the
parent zone.  (A variation of this same assertion has been made with
regard to the euphonically named NTEPPTF report.)  As far as I can tell,
such claims are specious and without merit.

If DNS were as feeble and weak as ICANN asserts then the net would be open
to a vast denial of service attack - bad people could bring down the net
simply by building incorrect zone files.  But for more than a decade
people have been building bad zone files, creating lame delegations, and
pointing NS and glue records into never-never land.  Yet DNS and the net
still run.  Why?  Because in DNS, the flow of control is from the top down
(the way ICANN likes) rather than from the bottom up.  Errors in
incorrectly configured subsidiary zones do not propogate upwards.

The limit to ICANN's needs for quality in root data is merely to ensure 
that the delegation records for a subsidiary zone (e.g. a ccTLD) are 
correct and that any glue records are valid.

As usual, ICANN looks for reasons to tread where ICANN ought not be
treading - ICANN is like a telephone repairman who insists that repairing
your home telephone requires that he have unlimited ability to inspect the
bedroom and other private living quarters.

To withhold updates to ccTLD delegation information because the ccTLD
operators refuse to acceed to unjustifiable and excessive intrusions from
ICANN is improper.

		--karl--



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