[ga-roots] A note on draft-crispin-alt-roots-tlds-00.txt.

[Thomas Roessler <roessler@does-not-exist.org>]

Kent's ID on multiple roots lists a lot of examples why multiple 
roots and multiple instances of the same TLD just don't work in 
practice.  Most of these examples are indeed valid.

However, I believe there is one crucial economical argument he 
leaves out of the discussion (in fact, it kind of appears in a side 
note on Verisign's possibilities to shut down New.net): Assume that 
an established instance of, say, .web exists.  Assume that someone 
else creates a competing .web.  In this case, three things can 
happen:

- The second .web is perceived as nonfunctional for all the reasons 
   Kent lists, but does not strongly affect the operations of the 
   first one.  This would probably lead to a shutdown of the entity 
   which offers the competing .web, resolving the issue.

- The situation is the other way around:  The new .web is launched 
   with a large base of possible users, say, as a new TLD in the 
   ICANN root.  In this case, it's extremely likely that the earlier 
   .web would be put out of business - just like what's probably 
   going to happen with Leah's .biz.

- Finally, both players may have similar strength in terms of users 
   which access the respective root servers.  In this case, all the 
   problems Kent lists in his ID will occur in the worst and 
   strongest way possible.
   
   This effect would mean that both instances of the TLD are 
   preceived to be non-functional.  Given the alternative of other 
   TLDs (such as the traditional gTLDs) which don't have these 
   problems, registrants will most likely go for these TLDs (Kent 
   neglects this argument when he talks about the Standards war - and 
   indeed this is a critical point because it means that an extended 
   standards war would be unattractive for players). The competing 
   TLDs wouldn't be economically interesting any more for any of the 
   parties.

   (Why go for .biz with all its problems when you can as well use 
   .com?  I'd expect that this consideration would even override 
   political preferences for, say, English and French .biz'es.)

To summarize, this means that the introduction of competing 
instances of the same TLD by weak players would ruin these players, 
that the introduction of competing TLDs by extremely strong players 
would ruin their competition, and that the introduction of competing 
TLDs by several players of similar strength will ruin all of them, 
and make the TLD unusable.

In particular, we can conclude that plans of weak players to 
introduce new TLDs when they know that strong competition may come 
in the future (or even exists) avail to economical suicide, and can 
most probably be neglected.  (Sorry, Leah, but you don't have a 
chance.)

Thus, only the strongest players could reasonably offer "alternative 
TLDs".  However, even for them it would be extremely risky to 
introduce TLDs which compete with others' offers.

Assuming that the strongest players are of similar strength (and 
they would be after a probably short time of chaos and destruction 
;-), you actually arrive at an argument which is quite close to the 
one which underlies the Mutually Assured Destruction doctrine (US 
and USSR each need the potential to destroy the other one, so none 
of them can afford to attack): Give all the strong players the 
opportunity to introduce competing instances of the same TLD, and 
they won't do this because they'd risk ruining themselves, or being 
ruined by the competition.

As a consequence, it seems highly unrealistic that competing 
instances would actually become reality in a way which would pose 
all the problems Kent lists.  Hence, it seems likely that, with an 
uncontrolled root market, players would quickly agree on a common 
ICANN-like organization.  Hence, it is likely that some kind of a 
natural monopoly would occur at some point of time on the root zone 
and TLD market.

It seems unlikely that this monopoly would be broken as long as it 
does its job reasonably well - that is, at least satisfies all 
strong players on the root zone market, and the large customers 
among the ISPs.  The fact that new.net seems to be gaining momentum 
(although it looks like, quacks like, and is a "search" statement in 
/etc/resolv.conf) may indicate that ICANN is not doing its job in a 
way which satisfies powerful players and customers.  Indeed, it may 
indicate that ICANN is about to lose its monopoly.

 From this point of view, the Lynn paper and even Kent's draft may be 
looked at as ammonition in an upcoming political war between ICANN 
and new.net over the root zone market.

The question should be allowed whether it wouldn't be more prudent 
on ICANN's side to use the economical weapon of creating customer 
satisfaction instead of doing politics.  With the DoC root, ICANN 
certainly has better weapons on the economical battlefield than 
new.net can ever get.

-- 
Thomas Roessler                      <roessler@does-not-exist.org>
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