[ga] Re: [icann-europe] NAIS report and Joe Sims

[Jefsey Morfin <jefsey@wanadoo.fr>]

Dear Donald,
however I support you defending your positions against Joe Sims, there is 
absolutely no interest in doing it. Joe has fully shown now a) he does care 
b) his vision of the Internet has nothing to do with the nets reality but 
with the net result for Jones Days.

So let be it. He has made the ICANN a corporation without members, without 
customers and now without market and only surviving on its affiliates 
(registries and registrars) while its partners are hesitant (ccTLDs) to stay.

(I use upper cases below to underline, not to shout).

The Internet is OUR consensus to interconnect OUR machines the way WE want. 
WE conduct OUR governance of this consensus of OURS in two parallel ways: 
WE care about the "netwide" concerns through OUR specialized groups and 
constituencies and WE address OUR individual interests as @large 
participant to OUR Global, Registrant and Local Internet Communities.

This is it. Period.

Joe Sims and als. are at trying to build THEIR own *dominance* over OUR 
*governance*. Due to THEIR position, the ICANN history and the DoC 
confusion THEY were able to weave an unequal to all, complex and blocking 
network of rigid affiliation contracts with only one target in mind: let WE 
perish if THEY (ICANN Corp.) survive and pay Jones Days (and probably many 
others)..

Yet, data travel faster and better using datagrams than yellow sheets. 
Starting-up with lawyers as operators rather than with techies, created 
THEM problems. So THEY allied their e-legal vision with the merchants 
vision (Plan B) trapping these affiliates of THEM into paying THEM ("pay to 
show you were not stupid in paying to be permitted to pay for no return"). 
They think merchants will retain US.

They will not. For two reasons. Merchants start being fed-up paying THEM 
for no return. WE start being disinterested in the low grade proposition 
THEY impose on the merchants. The real Internet is in the source code: 
whatever is possible will be attempted by one of US. And if WE like it, we 
will USE it, all the more if THEY do not tax it.

Time is not anymore to discuss THEIR @large collapse but at using it to 
build OUR @large governance. I am only sorry for Carl, Pierre and others 
having been trapped into the ALSC make believe. Did they heard Joe Sims? 
Yes. Did they heard you? No.

Cheers.
Jefsey



On 21:51 25/09/01, Donald Simon said:
>I am writing as a member of the NAIS team (ANGO and Academic ICANN Study")
>in response to the lengthy analysis of our study that Joe Sims posted during
>the recent ICANN meeting in Montevideo.
>
>We certainly appreciate the close scrutiny and careful attention that Joe
>gave to our lengthy study (which is posted at www.naisproject.org for anyone
>who is not familiar with it).
>
>Joe=s analysis, however, contains so many mis-characterizations of our work
>that I can only conclude he either willfully distorted our arguments, or we
>just haven't explained our reasoning with sufficient clarity.  Since I know
>that Joe would not do the former, I will assume that the fault is ours, and
>try to remedy the problem by addressing his points through further
>clarification and explanation of our arguments.
>
>Let me first review the bidding.  As founded, ICANN was to have a board
>balanced between nine directors chosen by the supporting organizations
>representing the various technical, commercial and organizational interests
>in ICANN, and nine directors chosen "At Large" by some conception of the
>Internet public.  This was the original bargain made by those involved in
>the creation of ICANN (including Joe) with the U.S. government and the
>Internet community.  The promise is contained in numerous founding documents
>of the organization, including its original bylaws.
>
>The promise has yet to be fully realized.  ICANN struggled for its first two
>years over how to replace the initial nine At Large directors who were
>appointed by the corporation's founders, and who were to serve until elected
>At Large directors could be chosen for those nine seats.  Even as
>mechanisms were established by the three supporting organizations for
>selection of the nine SO directors and as those seats were filled, the
>original appointed At Large directors remained on the board.
>
>Pursuant to the so-called "Cairo compromise" struck in March, 2000, an
>experimental direct election for five of the nine seats was held last year.
>The other four At Large seats remain filled by the original appointed At
>Large directors whose terms have been extended through by- law changes.
>
>In the wake of the elections last year, the Board commissioned an At Large
>Study Committee (ALSC) chaired by Carl Bildt to conduct a review of not only
>how best to select At Large directors, but whether to have any At Large
>directors at all, and if so, how many.   The Board expressed a hope that
>other studies would be conducted as well, and we organized the NAIS project
>as an international collaborative effort in response to this request.
>
>As we noted repeatedly in the discussions of these two studies at the
>Montevideo meeting, there are many important similarities in the findings of
>the ALSC and NAIS reports.  Both find that the work of ICANN extends beyond
>the realm of technical coordination, and accordingly that there is a public
>interest in the work of ICANN that must be reflected in the structures of
>internal governance of the organization.  Both call for the creation of an
>At Large membership, with similar structures for allowing the membership to
>participate in the policy development of ICANN.  Both call for the
>membership of ICANN to elect At Large directors to the ICANN board through
>direct elections.
>
>There are, however, two major areas of disagreement between the ALSC and
>NAIS.  In our study, we urge ICANN to maintain a balance between the number
>of board seats elected by the At-Large membership, and the total number of
>seats selected by the various supporting organizations B in other words, the
>current nine-nine representation.  By contrast, the ALSC study calls for
>cutting the number of At Large seats from nine to six, effectively shifting
>three seats from the At Large community to other as-yet unspecified
>interests within ICANN.
>
>The second difference relates to the issue of who can become a member of
>ICANN. Because of the nature of the public interest in ICANN's work
>discussed by both studies, we believe that barriers to entry for membership
>in ICANN should be kept low, and that any adult Internet user with an email
>address should be able to join as a member and participate in the policy
>development process of ICANN and in the selection of At Large board members.
>By contrast, the ALSC says that membership should be limited to "individual
>domain name holders," although its preliminary report leaves major questions
>unanswered about how to differentiate between individual domain name holders
>and the much larger group of domain name holders consisting of commercial
>interests and organizations.
>
>Joe is clearly contemptuous of our call for broad public participation in
>ICANN.  Although he also doesn't seem to much like the ALSC's more modest
>recommendations for achieving the same ends, he grudgingly endorses their
>conclusions, presumably as the lesser of two evils.
>
>What is most striking about his lengthy analysis is less the words than the
>music B an insight into the mindset of this important ICANN insider toward
>the very idea of the At Large membership.  Although Joe says he is writing
>in his "individual" capacity, he is in fact the longstanding counsel to
>ICANN, who expresses little other than hostility toward the need for an At
>Large membership and the role that the public could or should play in ICANN.
>Given the views of such a key inside player, it's no wonder that ICANN has
>been so grudging in fulfilling the original promise of a robust At Large
>membership, or that the concept of the At Large is now under concerted
>attack and may be dramatically weakened.
>
>Joe has a particular insensitivity to the notion of ICANN's legitimacy - a
>concept which we discuss at length in our report and which he criticizes as
>undefined and unclear.  To the contrary, we make quite clear our reasoning:
>given that ICANN has engaged - and will almost certainly continue to engage
>- in decision-making on a broad range of public policy issues that extend
>well beyond narrow questions of technical coordination - matters such as
>competition policy, protection of intellectual property, and the
>functionality of the Internet to users around the globe  - there is need for
>public participation and representation in the internal governance of ICANN
>to make decisions that will and ought to command the adherence and respect
>of users, governments and businesses worldwide.  Joe may not agree with this
>perspective, but it's just not correct to say we don't explain our argument.
>
>In this regard, Joe should re-read Stuart Lynn's recent paper on the
>"Authoritative Root," ICP-3.  That paper repeatedly stresses the fact that
>ICANN is to serve "a public trust" to administer the DNS "in the public
>interest," and to carry out the Internet's central coordination functions
>"for the public good."  Indeed, that is, in the view of this paper, "ICANN's
>reason for existence."  According to Lynn,  "it is essential" that ICANN's
>coordinating functions "be performed in the public interest," and "for this
>reason" ICANN was founded as a "public benefit organization, accountable to
>the Internet community." (emphasis added).
>
>And Joe ignores the fact that, at least on this issue, the ALSC agrees with
>us.  In its report, it said in language that is similar to ours:
>
>                                 Because there is a "public interest"
>responsibility vested in ICANN (which operates for the benefit of the
>Internet community as a whole), a role for individuals (as well as
>non-commercial public interest organizations, etc) is appropriate.  In
>essence, ICANN needs to be accountable not just to governments and members
>of its existing Supporting Organizations, but also to those who are affected
>by its actions but whose daily focus is elsewhere.  Actions ICANN takes
>within its seemingly narrow technical and administrative mission can affect
>(and generate interest among) the world's individual Internet users in a
>myriad of ways.  They users hold a variety of values and represent interests
>that may be personal, political or economic.  They care about issues such as
>access to domain names in non-Latin characters, the potential use of IP
>addresses and domain names in identification or location of individuals and
>groups, competition and choice (or not) in the provision of various services
>provided by independent parties under contract to ICANN, domain name
>intellectual property issues, introduction of new gTLDs, practices of gTLDs
>and ccTLDs, etc.
>
>                                                                         ALSC
>Report at 11 (emphasis added)
>
>Again - that's not us talking; that's the Bildt Committee.  Although we
>disagree with the ALSC about how best to achieve legitimacy and
>accountability to fulfill these roles, both we and the ALSC - unlike Joe --
>recognize the importance of legitimacy as a goal for ICANN's internal
>governance.
>
>         At the heart of Joe's critique is a palpable disbelief that
>individual users of the Internet are, or could be, interested in the work of
>ICANN.  This is a curious conclusion from last year's experience, which
>demonstrated an outpouring of public participation in the elections that was
>so far in excess of the ICANN staff estimates that it overwhelmed the
>systems that they put in place. Had those systems actually functioned, there
>may have been many more than the approximately 140,000 registrations
>received - a number some 28 times greater than the original goal of 5,000
>members set by the ICANN staff.
>
>         If ICANN's initial plan last year set a threshold of 5,000 members
>as a sufficient basis for moving forward with a valid election for board
>seats, it is certainly odd for Joe to argue that an outpouring of support
>many multiples in excess of that number demonstrates that no one is
>interested in ICANN and therefore that elections are an unreasonable
>approach.
>
>Joe, of course, has a leave-it-to-the-experts approach to Internet
>governance.  It is only about the security of the DNS, he says, and that's
>best left to the pros.  Those pros presumably include all of the commercial
>interests making money off the DNS and all of the intellectual property
>interests who want to protect their profitable trademark rights, as well as
>the developers and technical experts.  Joe apparently doesn't see any role
>for the public here, because he just assumes the public doesn't care about
>ICANN and we're better off not worrying about it in any case.
>
>This kind of appeal to expertise is always a good argument to make against
>more inclusive and accountable forms of government - the "experts" usually
>will know more and better than the rabble.  That's fine if ICANN is to be
>little more than an industry trade association.  But if ICANN wants to have
>trusteeship over a vital global resource and to decide issues of public
>policy related to that resource, then some form of public accountability and
>legitimacy is required.
>
>Joe notes that "managers of perhaps even more important resources" such as
>national military forces or electricity and water systems - are "almost
>never elected by the public they serve."  True, of course, but such managers
>are almost always under the stewardship of governmental officials who are
>publicly accountable.  That's what is so extraordinary about Joe's position
>- he wants ICANN to have public responsibility without public
>accountability.
>
>         Joe also criticizes the NAIS report for never connecting the
>conclusions of our regional studies of last year's elections with the
>recommendations we make for elections in the future.  He says we "completely
>ignore" our research results.  (Sims, p.1)  This is just wrong.  Although we
>carefully document the many shortcomings and problems with last year's
>elections - no surprise, really, given their experimental nature, and the
>financial and time constraints under which they were conducted - the fact is
>that we conclude the elections were "a qualified success," (NAIS, p. 46) and
>"a first positive step towards public participation within ICANN. (NAIS, p.
>100).  We then make detailed recommendations as to how the elections can be
>improved. (e.g., NAIS pp. 121-132).  Joe simply ignores our recommendations
>and misreads our analysis by failing to see the clear connection between our
>evaluation of last year's elections and our detailed and practical
>prescription for how they can be improved.
>
>         Then there's the cost issue.  We propose, for reasons we explain at
>length, that ICANN bear the costs of elections out of its operating budget,
>which is funded by those commercial interests, such as registries and
>registrars, which conduct business based on the domain name system, and
>which benefit from a stable and legitimate ICANN.  We know this is a
>controversial proposition, unlikely to be welcomed by those who have to pay
>the bill, and Joe repeatedly derides our suggestion as resulting in a "tax"
>on Internet users (Sims p. 3), to whom may be passed on the ultimate costs.
>
>This is a nice rhetorical device.  But the costs of elections are, in our
>view, like any other overhead and operating costs for ICANN - the costs of
>staff, of meetings, indeed, of legal fees.  ICANN of necessity raises this
>money from its regulated community, which might view all of it as a "tax."
>Giving it that name really doesn't much advance the debate.  The point is
>that ICANN has to pay for the costs of its operations.  If ICANN aspires to
>serve a broad public interest by playing a pivotal role in management of the
>Internet infrastructure, but to do so as a non-governmental body, then one
>of its operational costs will be the costs of nurturing its own legitimacy
>which, we believe, includes holding elections for its board.
>
>         Ultimately, Joe views the NAIS report as calling for "the creation
>of global democratic mechanisms that can avoid national governments" (Sims
>p.7) and that we have some "broader strategy aimed at developing global
>democratic institutions dealing with Internet governance." (same).  Beyond
>that sweeping claim, he characterizes our motives even more broadly: "The
>goal of the NAIS authors is global democracy, not just public participation
>in ICANN."  (Sims p.8).
>
>         Again, Joe is just wrong.  We are not calling for global democracy.
>We are calling for ICANN to allow broad public participation in its
>mechanisms for internal governance.  Part of that participation is to allow
>those individuals who take an interest in the work of ICANN to have a voice
>in its decision making, and to vote for the At Large members of the Board.
>This is not "global democracy."  It is simply a means for ICANN to open
>itself to public membership, and to have those members choose directors to
>speak for them.
>
>         Joe and others in ICANN apparently view this position as deeply
>threatening.  Ultimately, the question facing ICANN is an issue of how power
>in the organization is shared and allocated.  And the point of view
>expressed in Joe's lengthy post once again demonstrates that, as is the case
>in many different venues, those who hold power are always reluctant to give
>it up.
>
>
>
>
>Donald J. Simon
>Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & Perry
>1250 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 1000
>Washington, DC  20005
>Telephone:  (202) 682-0240
>Facsimile:  (202) 682-0249
>
>
>
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