RE: [ga] RE: DNSO Constituency Structure

["Gomes, Chuck" <cgomes@verisign.com>]

Ross,

Please note my comments below.

Chuck

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ross Wm. Rader [mailto:ross@tucows.com]
> Sent: Sunday, November 25, 2001 11:07 AM
> To: Gomes, Chuck
> Cc: [ga]
> Subject: Re: [ga] RE: DNSO Constituency Structure
> 
> 
> Chuck,
> 
> > that is why many people currently are trying to take
> > shortcuts with regard to consensus development (e.g., task 
> forces).  They
> > are easier and take less effort and it's not too hard to 
> convince some
> > people that they are legitimate, but in reality they are a 
> far cry from
> what
> > the bylaws and contracts between ICANN and registries demand.
> 
> Two things...
> 
> First, an observation - I'm guessing (based on some 
> extrapolations of mine,
> please feel free to correct me if I'm wrong) that Verisign's 
> position on
> "consensus policy" is directly tied to how preferential the 
> consensus policy
> is to Verisign? I mean, and feel free to call me a cynic, but I don't
> remember Verisign's having much concern for the sanctity of 
> the "process"
> during the renegotiation of your registry/registrar contracts 
> earlier this
> year.[1] The public record seems to indicate that the only element of
> consensus that touched on that deal was that of the Verisign 
> executive - "we
> must preserve our monopoly in the DNS".

VeriSign (Actually NSI at the time) negotiated very specific language into
the agreements to ensure that policy would not arbitrarily be implemented.
I strongly believe that that is a protection for registries and registrars
in general, not just VeriSign.  Our position has been consistent over the
last three years.  We will implement consensus spolicies but if there is not
consensus, let market forces work.  Let consumers speak through their
wallets.

With regard to the new agreements, contract negotiations occurred as they
should, between the parties of the contracts.   Under the terms of the new
agreements just like the old, there is opportunity for new policies to be
developed that we would have to implement.


> 
> Second, your characterization of the task forces as being somehow
> "illegitimate" are pretty shallow. The contracts and bylaws 
> are pretty clear
> that a task-force, and similar constructs, are indeed 
> legitimate mechanisms
> that facilitate the policy development process. They could be deemed,
> depending on the interpretation of the by-laws, a mandatory 
> part of the
> process.[2]

I don't think I said that task forces are illegitimate.  They are simply
just one small part of the process.  Task forces in and of themselves are
not enough.  They need to do a lot more than have a discussion and take a
vote.  They need to reach out to all stakeholders and document the outreach
process.  They need to demonstrate that key stakeholders are all
represented.  They need to document arguments for and against. etc.

> 
> Anyways, you've made some pretty sweeping indictments of the 
> structure,
> processes, policy and people that make up ICANN - do us all a 
> favor and
> quantify some of these allegations. Continuing this discussion without
> rooting it in fact doesn't seem, to me at least, to be a productive
> exercise. Unless of course the real exercise is to create the 
> foundation for
> an argument that will later attempt to discredit the policy 
> development
> process to Verisign's advantage - if that's the case, then 
> please carry on -
> and don't stumble over those pesky facts that somebody so 
> inconsiderately
> left lying around.
> 
> -rwr
> 
> 
> 
> [1] One of several the justifications given by Verisign for 
> the fast track
> process was to improve employee moral. None of these were "to 
> support the
> consensus conclusions of the ICANN process".
> [2] ICANN Bylaws, VI-B.2a,b,c etc.
> 
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