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Re: [ga] WLS reply
I support this document.
Nice job.
--HJW--
At 08:19 PM 3/9/2002 +0000, Abel Wisman wrote:
>Assembly,
>
>Just a few short hours or a few hours late, still we have not reacted in
>full to the VGRS proposal which we should.
>
>Don prepared this document and I had some input to, based upon all prior
>discussion, without to much objections we propose to send this document
>of asap (say tonight) to VGRS.
>
>let us know.
>
>abel wisman
>
>
>
>
>This document represents the final feedback from the DNSO General
>Assembly (GA) to VeriSign Global Registry Services (VGRS), with
>respect to the VGRS proposed Domain Name Wait Listing Service (WLS).
>More specifically, this document is responsive to, and consistent with
>the Procedural Guidelines contained in, VGRS's revised WLS proposal,
>dated January 28, 2002.
>
>
>
>Background
>On December 30, 2001, VGRS submitted to the Registrar Constituency its
>WLS proposal (http://www.icann-registrars.org/pdfs/VeriSign_wls.pdf).
>
>On January 18, 2002, the Registrar Constituency submitted its timely
>response to the VGRS proposal
>(http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/registrars/Arc01/msg01907.html).
>
>On January 28, 2002, VGRS posted to the GA list, its revised WLS
>proposal along with the "Justification for a Registry-based Wait
>Listing Service" document
>(http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/ga/Arc09/msg00773.html). This proposal
>requests questions from the GA by February 8, 2001 and final feedback
>from the GA by March 1, 2002, pursuant to the "procedural guidelines"
>presented in it.
>
>On February 9, 2002, the DNSO General Assembly submitted questions to
>VGRS regarding the WLS
>(http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/ga-full/Arc09/msg01085.html).
>
>On February 14, 2002, ICANN posted its "Discussion Paper: Redemption
>Grace Periods for Deleted Names"
>(http://www.icann.org/registrars/redemption-proposal-14feb02.htm) and
>invited comments and questions. ICANN's document, will hereinafter be
>referred to as "ICANN Redemption Grace," for the purpose of brevity.
>
>On February 15, 2002, VGRS posted their responses "VeriSign GRS
>Responses to Domain Name Wait Listing Service Questions"
>(http://verisign-grs.com/wls_responses.pdf). VGRS's document, will
>hereinafter be referred to as "VGRS Responses," for the purpose of
>brevity.
>
>Additional background information is available at
>http://www.byte.org/rc-deletes/ and
>http://www.icann-registrars.org/deletes.htm.
>
>
>
>Observations
>In considering the WLS proposal, various members of the GA made the
>following observations:
>
>1. Nothing in any of the various contracts specifically grants the
>Registry or any Registrar the right to sell an option (or future) to
>acquire a domain name, when that domain name is not available to the
>public.
>
> VGRS states that it is free to offer the WLS service under its
> existing contract with ICANN, (see VGRS Responses at B.7. and
> B.9.), although VGRS admits that to do so is subject to
> ICANN's approval, (see VGRS Response at B.20.).
>
> A current domain name registration may be sold by its current
> Registrant to another person or entity. The Registrant enjoys
> extended, post-expiration renewal rights (the length of which
> is currently at the discretion of the Registrar - See
> http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/ga-full/Arc09/msg01011.html)
> until the name is deleted and made available to the general
> public.
>
> The Registry and Registrars only have the expressed,
> contractual authority to register a name to the general public
> on a first come and first served basis. There is no expressed
> contractual authority to sell a future right to register a
> domain name, at the time when that domain name "may" expire
> and be deleted in the future. The spirit and intent of the
> contracts appears to assume that domain names will expire and
> be deleted and that those expired and deleted names will then,
> and only then, be available to the general public for
> registration.
>
> Additional services can be, and have been, "invented" by the
> Registrars as part of their marketing strategies, but no
> Registrar has been, or should be given, any unique rights with
> respect to domain name registration or after-market services.
> The same should apply to the Registry, as well.
>
> In addition to that it can be stipulated that the next step for
> the registry could be to "pre-register" all possible domains
> in accordance with a WLS to get a better profit margin and hence
> raise prices more then considerable.
>
>
>2. There is no explicit policy and procedure for the handling of
>expired registrations, as referenced in 3.7.5 and 3.7.11 of the
>Registrar
>Accreditation Agreement (RAA).
>
> It is clear, after reading the ICANN Redemption Grace
> document, that ICANN intends to modify the procedures
> surrounding expired and deleted domain names (possibly by
> adopting a policy and procedure as referenced in 3.7.5 and
> 3.7.11 of the RAA) in order to reduce complaints from
> businesses and consumers. ICANN has called upon the Internet
> community for questions and comments during the time leading
> up to, and at, the meeting on March 10-14, 2002.
>
> The ICANN Redemption Grace document states, in paragraph 3
> under "Effects of Unintentional Deletions," that a
> "significant portion of the demand for registration of deleted
> domains involves domains that the former registrant did not
> intend to have deleted" and that "the registry operator
> involved is forced to cope with extraordinary re-registration
> demand from domain-name speculators for the rights to domains
> that were mistakenly or unintentionally deleted." Although
> VGRS has acknowledged the existence of the ICANN Redemption
> Grace document, it never-the-less wishes to push forward with
> implementation of WLS (See VeriSign Responses at A.3., B.8.,
> B.22.c. and D.12.).
>
> It seems to be generally accepted that all Registrars will
> drop/delete domain names within 45 days following expiration
> and it is recognized that Registrars have the latitude to
> delete a name the day following expiration, if they chose to
> do so. Maintaining the expired registration during the 45 day
> period is capital intensive and, therefore, expensive for the
> Registrar (see
> http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/ga-full/Arc09/msg01011.html),
> which actually encourages a Registrar to delete the domain
> name sooner than later.
>
> In addition to the foregoing, there is no authority in the
> current procedure for addressing potential abuses, i.e.
> nothing explicitly denies a Registrar the right to auction, or
> otherwise sell, an expired domain name during the grace
> period, to otherwise hoard expired domain names or to charge
> the Registrant more, simply because they renewed during the
> post-expiration grace period. In fact, there have been
> frequent complaints on the GA list about the hoarding of
> domain names by Registrars.
>
>
>3. There is consumer demand for deleted domain names.
>
> According to Chuck Gomes,
> (http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/ga/Arc08/msg04010.html),
> potential domain name holders have requested some sort of a
> wait list service since 1996.
>
> In fact, in the Spring of 2001, VGRS temporarily shut off
> Registrar' connections and temporarily closed the process of
> deleting expired names, to address the load problem on VGRS
> systems. This load problem was due to the demand for deleted
> names. Thereafter, VGRS implemented a solution of relegating
> batch requests for deleting names to one of three pools and
> rate limiting to prevent this high volume traffic from
> overloading its systems.
>
> Further, the concept of a VGRS/SnapNames system was introduced
> by VGRS, as a result of the increased load on VGRS systems, in
> Montevideo, Uruguay in September 2001. However, VGRS now
> states that WLS is not a solution (see VGRS Responses at
> B.1.).
>
> Today, however, there are several entities providing some sort
> of deleted name registration service, including, but not
> limited to: SnapNames, eNom, NicGenie, IARegistry, AWRegistry,
> Signature Domains, INWW, OnlineNic, AddressCreation,
> AllDomains, EastCom, PayCenter, ExpireFish. Others may also
> offer competitive and differing services, in response to
> market demand, in the future.
>
> VGRS was specifically contracted by ICANN to maintain a
> registry free of commercial and possible monopolistic
> marketing and, as such, has no marketing tasks. The WLS would,
> in fact, replace the diversity of products which already serve
> this market leaving the consumer with no alternative choices.
>
> VGRS and Snapnames base their proposal now on "market demands"
> however they do not bring any evidence that there is such a
> thing as market demand, nor do they give any thesis upon which
> this demand should be based.
>
> Pricing is determined by "what the market can bare", whilst any
> proof of cost for such a system is denied based upon confidentiality
>of such data, yet in order to ascertain the
> value of a product, cost-price is an important "given".
> To determine consensus on the new product without all relevant
> data is impossible.
>
>4. WLS and VGRS System Load Problem.
>
> The WLS proposal dated 12/30/2001 suggested that WLS would
> solve the VGRS system problems which were brought about by
> demand for deleted names. The revised WLS proposal also speaks
> to the VGRS system in section 7. However, according to Chuck
> Gomes,
> (http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/ga/Arc09/msg00301.html), WLS
> "could make" a positive impact, but it "won't solve" the
> problem. However, VGRS states that WLS is not a solution, at
> all (see VGRS Responses at B.1.).
>
> Furthermore, VGRS states they have implemented changes which
> solved the VGRS system load problem (see VGRS Responses at
> B.2., B.3. D.3.a. and D.3.b.), and that a long range solution
> may never be feasible (see VGRS Responses at D.3.b.).
>
>5. It is one of ICANN's responsibilities, under its agreement with the
>Department of Commerce (DOC), to ensure a competitive market.
>
> ICANN has promoted and created competing Registrars. ICANN has
> promoted and created additional Registries. The TLD .org is in
> the early process of divestiture.
>
>6. The name space belongs to the public.
>
> Neither ICANN, the Registry or the Registrars have any right
> to any domain name, unless they have registered that name and
> paid the appropriate registration fee. This concept is equally
> applicable to expired domain names which have not yet been
> deleted and made available to the public for registration.
>
> VGRS seems to have a different position (see VGRS Responses at
> A.1.).
>
> Remains whether a clear deletion of a name should not be that
> what it pertains to be, a "deletion" :
>
> Pronunciation: di-'lEt, dE-
> Function: transitive verb
> Inflected Form(s): de·let·ed; de·let·ing
> Etymology: Latin deletus, past participle of delEre to wipe out,
> destroy
> Date: circa 1605
> : to eliminate especially by blotting out, cutting out, or erasing
>
> Once something is erased, can it be sold again as "still existing" or
>is it gone and can it only be sold as "new" hence upfront eliminating
>the option of a WLS.
>
>Concerns
>The GA has several concerns about the proposed WLS:
>
>1. VGRS is the Sole Authority
>
> The metrics and the determination of the success or failure of
> the WLS test is in the exclusive control of VGRS and not
> consensus based (see VGRS Responses at B.14.d.).
>
>2. SnapNames will Have an Advantage
>
> VGRS has devised a means to protect the existing business of
> its partner, SnapNames, but has not done the same for the
> other participants in the after-market (See VGRS Responses at
> B.18.a.)
>
>3. It is Not Just a 1 Year Test
>
> Subscriptions do not expire at the end of the test period (see
> VGRS Responses at B.23.) but continue until maturity.
> Consequently, a subscription taken on the last day of the 12
> month test period will not expire for another year. However,
> VGRS will not accept new subscriptions beyond the 12 month
> test (see VGRS Responses at D.4.).
>
>4. No Consumer Choice
>
> Today, the potential registrants have a choice of several
> diverse service offerings, with differing price structures.
> Implementation of the WLS guarantees that there will be no
> additional and differentiated offerings to enter the market. In
> fact, it absolutely guarantees there will be only one service
> offering.
>
> Price differentiation, if any is possible under the last
> proposed pricing structure, does not make a differentiated
> market. Even in the revised pricing structure, VGRS is clearly
> the benefactor.
>
>5. No Innovation or Service Differentiation
>
> Today, Registrars compete on the basis of price and service
> differentiation. Under the proposal, the lion's share of the
> revenue goes to VGRS, leaving a thin margin for Registrars
> and, effectively, no margin for Resellers. Consequently, it
> limits the capability of the Registrars and Resellers to
> innovate and differentiate their offerings.
>
> Further, since VGRS is in full control of the entire delivery
> mechanism, there is little opportunity, if any, for the
> Registrars to innovate, irrespective of the already
> substantial cost structure.
>
>6. Runs-Out/Kills the Current Participants
>
> The WLS will remove all competitors from an already thriving
> and growing market. WLS guarantees that there will be no
> competition and therefore, the consumers will have no
> competitive choice. This flies in the face of ICANN's
> responsibilities under its agreement with the DOC and
> contravenes the rudimentary principles of free enterprise and
> a competitive marketplace.
>
> Indeed, VGRS seems to have no concern for the already
> competitive market, to those entities already serving this
> market or to consumer choice (See VGRS Responses at B.14.a.,
> B.15., B.24. and D.2.).
>
>7. Expanded Monopolistic Powers
>
> This proposal extends VGRS's registry status to that of an
> active market participant, taking the lion's share of the
> revenue, eliminating all current competition and completely
> controlling an already thriving market. Although we recognize,
> and agree with, VGRS's rebuttal that the Registrar is not
> contractually limited to fixing their own price, price is not
> the only consideration and certainly not the major concern.
>
> It is ICANN's charter and responsibility to break-up monopoly
> power - not add to it.
>
>8. Consumers Pay, but May Not Receive Any Value
>
> The WLS requires payment, regardless of whether the consumer
> receives the value of actually being able to register the
> name. In contrast, the current market includes services which
> only require payment in the event the consumer actually gets
> to register the name.
>
> Some consumers may not mind taking the risk of paying for a
> WLS subscriptions, but other consumers are likely to take
> issue and seek out an alternative. Alas, however, WLS will be
> the "only game in town" and the consumer will have no
> alternative.
>
> Further, all of the financial risk, with respect to credit
> card charge-backs and similar disputes, is placed solely on
> the shoulders of the Registrars, with no indemnification from,
> or participation by, VGRS, although VGRS is clearly the
> benefactor of the lion's share of the revenue (See VGRS
> Responses at B.6., B.12..
>
>9. No Solution to VGRS System Problems
>
> As cited above, the initial WLS proposal of 12/30/01 and the
> revised WLS proposal of 1/28/02 speak to the benefit of WLS to
> the VGRS system problems. However, as also cited above, WLS is
> not a solution to the VGRS problems in the short or long term.
> Furthermore, as also indicated above, VGRS now states that the
> problems are solved and that no other longer range solution
> may ever be feasible.
>
> However, it seems that WLS is intended to decrease demand, by
> narrowing the market to one service, one provider, one
> delivery mechanism and by increasing the price, in order to
> deal with the load problem, instead of dealing with it
> appropriately, at a technical level. The only obvious
> benefactors of this approach are VGRS and its partner,
> SnapNames. There is no merit in it for the rest of the
> universe.
>
>10. Increased Costs to Potential Registrants
>
> VGRS bases the pricing of WLS upon the concept of "what the
> market will bear" and not based upon cost (See VGRS Responses
> at B.11.). VGRS and SnapNames have presented several
> arguments, and unsubstantiated data, on the GA list in support
> this pricing model. Further, VGRS and SnapNames have argued
> that the system costs are substantial, but have not presented
> any credible facts to support these assertions. Although, the
> VGRS contract with ICANN is on the basis of "cost-related"
> pricing, VGRS now to seeks to introduce a very different price
> model and to obtain consensus for it.
>
> There is no denying the fact that the current participants in
> this market (including VGRS) need to make a profit, in order
> to survive and to flourish. Considering the high wholesale
> cost of this service to Registrars, as compared to a normal
> registration, we speculate (as does VGRS and SnapNames,
> speculate to the contrary in prior rebuttals), that the
> service is over-priced. Therefore, we conclude it is not
> reasonably calculated to benefit anyone except VGRS and its
> partner, SnapNames.
>
> The consumer's cost to register a deleted domain name will be
> roughly 500% more than registering a deleted domain name in
> the current market. We fail to see how this increased cost
> benefits the consumer. This is particularly troublesome when
> considering that some, maybe most, consumers will pay a high
> fee, but never actually receive the right to register a
> deleted domain name.
>
> Cost, however, is not the only major point of concern, when
> objectively evaluating WLS in light of domain name customers
> and potential Registrants.
>
>
>
>Position
>The GA discussed many concerns with respect to the WLS proposal and
>cited the major, but not all, concerns, above.
>
> Respectfully, and due to the major concerns cited above, the GA
> does not support or endorse the WLS proposal in any manner.
>
>
>
>Alternatively
>The GA's submits the following alternative ideas for consideration:
>
>1. That we now turn our attention to the ICANN Redemption Grace
>document and work with dispatch to achieve consensus which results in
>a policy and procedure to be adopted for 3.7.5 and 3.7.11 of the RAA.
>In particular, the policy and procedure should safeguard the rights of
>Registrants during the post-expiration grace period and it should
>contain specific language designed to prevent potential abuses by the
>Registries and Registrars.
>
>2. That ICANN should enforce the RAA with VeriSign Registrar and other
>Registrars, as may be appropriate under the circumstances, with
>respect to dropping all of the hoarded domain names and discontinuing
>the practice of hoarding domain names.
>
> Respectfully submitted,
>The DNSO General Assembly
>
>--
>Abel S.H. Wisman
>
>Scottish Provident House
>76-80 College Road
>Harrow Middlesex
>HA1 1BQ
>UK
>+44 20 8424 2422
>+44 78 1214 1916
>
>www.able-towers.com
>www.url.org
>www.grid9.net
>www.telesave.net
>
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Harold Whiting
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