Re: [ga] Negative outreach norms, board claims regarding consensus in favor of "reform" efforts

[Thomas Roessler <roessler@does-not-exist.org>]

On 2002-05-08 16:09:40 -0400, James Love wrote:

>1.  What is the argument for not having people vote in a GA ballot 
>measure, if they care about an ICANN issue?

The argument, which has, by now, been repeated ad nauseam is that  
the GA, as a body, is not the appropriate channel to make the  
statement you are asking it to make.

>2.  One reason to have this vote is that the ICANN board and staff 
>are telling governments (everywhere) that they have a consensus in 
>the "Internet community" on the reform process.  And if they say  
>so, who is to say otherwise?  Unless, for example, you have  
>something like a vote.  Right now a GA vote will be a data point. 
>I think a useful data point regarding the degree of consensus on  
>the Lynn/Board "reform" efforts, and it would be more interesting  
>if there was larger participation, going even beyond the  
>hyperactive GA-list posting community.

You're mixing a couple of things which should, for the sake of  
clarity, be treated separately.  I'll try to rehash some arguments  
which have popped up before in various places.


You start by confusing reform process and the Lynn proposal. 

1. Reform process: It's quite evident that ICANN is not functioning  
in the manner expected by many.  I'm deliberately saying:  
"expected".  Because one of the sources for the problems we are  
currently experiencing are vastly different expectations of what  
ICANN should do.  Let me give some examples: Verisign and their  
attorneys at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (in particular, Susan  
Crawford and David Johnson) are talking a lot about what consensus  
means.  David coined the phrase of the "consent of those governed."  
The ICANN they imagine could by the very definition of that  
consensus not make any policy which is detrimental to the economical 
interests of Verisign.  This expectation is mirrored when Verisign's 
Cochetti talks (on behalf of the whole gTLD registries'  
constituency!) about ICANN as a cooperative effort in Names Council  
calls.  In the other end of the spectrum, user constituencies (like  
the business and non-commercial constituencies) and the at-large  
activists likewise expect that ICANN safeguards their interest  
against self-interested activities of registries and registrars.  It 
should be pretty obvious that these expectations are not compatible  
in any manner, and that an ICANN which tries to fulfill both of  
these just has to break.  (Likewise, a discussion process on reform  
which does not address this conflict, but hides it under layers of  
rhetoric for the sake of a simulation of consensus, is doomed to  
fail.) Of course, this is not the only source of problems.

Also, the very idea to push for a re-bid of functions implies that 
you do believe that ICANN needs to be reformed quite urgently,  
doesn't it?

2. Reform proposals: I've certainly seen better pieces of English  
literature. I see better logic from other mathematicians on a daily 
basis.  I have seen more realistic ideas about government 
involvement with ICANN.  I have also seen ideas for ICANN which 
actually respect public participation instead of just talking about 
it.

That said, there is one benefit with the Lynn proposal: It falls  
clearly on one side of the expectations above.  And that's the  
users' side, not the suppliers'.  In particular, the ICANN  
envisioned by Lynn's propsoal is supposed to have the teeth  
necessary to safeguard user interests.  It is designed in a way  
which could balance the registries' and registrars' interests.  This 
is worth keeping in mind.

Bad enough, there have been very few realistic ideas about ICANN  
reform at all.  Note, BTW, that the R&E commitee's policy-making  
paper is one of the better documents in this area - in particular, 
it's some orders of magnitude better than the "mission and core 
values" article published a day earlier.  


For these reasons, I believe that it's actually safe to state that 
there is consensus in the larger Internet community (including both 
James Love and Stuart Lynn) that "something has to be done about 
ICANN." ICANN's response is the "reform process."


The next question you don't address clearly is: What could happen  
after a re-bid?  (Whatever that means, in detail...)

The obvious options are: Another private entity pops up, ICANN  
remains in charge, but is reformed, and the USG (or some  
international government-backed organization, such as the ITU) may 
take over.

Of these, the first option (a different private entity) seems to be  
the one least likely.

Of course, some of you folks may be dreaming about the ORSC 
administrating the DNS root for the public benefit, ideally without 
any involvement from the IPC and business communities.  That may be 
a nice dream for some, but it's unlikely to become true.  The key 
aspect to understand is that the interests in DNS policy are not 
going to change.  The trademark lobby is there to stay (they 
wouldn't even have a problem with a USG takeover - that's why they 
are called "lobby," after all).  Business interests are there to 
stay.  The GAC is there to stay.  Verisign is there to stay.

Why should all these parties start to build an entirely new  
structure when they can just as well build on the framework  
(including all the contracts!) established by the current ICANN?   
Why should any of these interests go for a different private entity  
for the administration of the DNS - when they can just as well
force the current ICANN into a reform process?

Thus, the only options which remain realistic are: (1) A reformed  
ICANN, and (2) an end of the privatization experiment.  You folks  
don't seem to like the first option.  I find the latter one even 
less desirable.


Put into other words, a "successful" re-bid would mean public-sector 
control over Internet policy.  Do you want THAT?  If so, please say 
it openly.



Finally, you seem to say that someone has to say something about  
ICANN reform.  I agree.  However, I believe that such a statement  
should try to point out perspectives for private-sector control over 
Internet policy.  What you suggest leads, if investigated closely,  
just to the opposite result: To a declaration of bankrupcy of the  
very idea of private-sector control over ICANN's areas of activity. 
Since the very idea of having a General Assembly like this one is  
essentially based on the concept of private-sector control, the  
declaration of bankrupcy would include the GA.  Yes, it would be  
collective suicide - but not because we'd say something "they" don't 
like, but because we say that the structure we are part of is  
fundamentally wrong.  

(In fact, one may even argue that Jamie's suggested statement would  
inevitably lead to the dissolution of the GA in a little cloud of  
logic, as punishment for producing a textbook example of a paradox:  
Being part of ICANN structure, the GA would say that this structure  
is fundamentally corrupt, and should not be relied upon.  Respecting 
this recommendation would imply to ignore the GA.  It would, thus,  
mean that the recommendation should be ignored.  "The present  
statement is not true." That's very similar to: "The entity which  
makes the present statement should not be relied upon.")

Of course, there's a lot of fine statements the GA could reasonably 
make on reform process:  The GA could outline a framework of 
principles.  It could try to address the contradiction in 
expectations stakeholders have in ICANN - that contradiction is 
hidden behind rhetoric once again in the E&R committee's "core 
values and mission" paper.


To re-iterate my recommendation: Don't even try to use the GA as a  
channel for calling for a re-bid.  Do that through outside channels, 
which are surely available to organizations like the Consumer  
Project on Technology. Try to use the GA as what it is: As a channel 
by which additional input can be directed into ICANN's processes.

-- 
Thomas Roessler                          http://log.does-not-exist.org/
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