Re: [ga] Re: A Question for the Candidates

[Jeff Williams <jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com>]

Barbara and all former DNSO GA members or other interested parties,

Barbara Simons wrote:

> Sigh....  I'm sure that others on this list understand what it means to have
> a life in which one has other responsibilities in addition to ICANN related
> dialog.

  Indeed I am also glad that others do as well.  I know I sure do.

>  In addition to this thread, there have been multiple conference
> calls relating to the election, and believe it or not, there are other
> issues in this world that are important.  Indeed, some are even more
> important than ICANN.

  Very much agreed.  However if one manages one's time well one
can involve themselves effectively in many different areas.  Most
of us have to as a matter of job or professional responsibilities.


>
>
> I have one correction to make to my previous posting.  When I was talking
> about voting costs below, I mistakenly referred to email voting.  My remarks
> were intended for computerized voting.  As I said in another posting, Santa
> Clara County, which is the home of Silicon Valley, is about to spend $20
> million to purchase computerized voting machines with NO voter verifiable
> paper ballots.

  Paper ballots are too easily forged and therefore are not always good
examples for verification these days...  Hence this part of your argument
is weak...

>  This is a lot of money in normal times, and it's a huge
> amount of money when state and local governments are being starved by a
> combination of economic hard times and a federal government that is
> redirecting funding from social needs to tax cuts and military expenditures.

  $20m US is not allot of money even given the tax cuts, military expenditures
and economic down turn of the past 3 years.  Allot of private funding is
available for good causes, business ventures, ect...

>
>
> I don't know how to respond to Jeff's comments, since they ignore the basic
> issue, which is there is absolutely no way to know what is going on inside
> of a computer.

  Sure there is Barbara.  That is one reason logging capabilities were
developed for some 20+ years ago for computer systems.

>  Even if the voting companies allowed us to see their
> software, which they don't, computer scientists are well aware of the
> difficulties of finding bugs or trap doors in software - which is the
> primary reason why there is so much buggy software floating around.

  I have seen many source codes for evoting systems, although in most
instances I had to sign a nondisclosure non circumvent agreement.
IN fact the real danger and security problems occur when source
code for an existing evoting system is made public, as than hackers
can much more easily circumvent the that software in it's
operation and while in operation or use...

>
>
> But even if there were a miracle and we were given the software by these
> companies that are running our elections and even if we could verify that it
> does precisely what it is supposed to do, we would have no way of knowing
> that the software running in the machine is identical to the software that
> has been verified.

  Also not so either here as well.  With proper and available logging
processes built into the evoting software and/or monitoring by
humans, we can know precisely what you are seemingly concerned
about.

>
>
> I don't care what kind of voting and tabulation algorithm one claims to use.
> The bottom line is that there is no way of knowing what the machines are
> doing.

  Again, incorrect.  See my brief above comments.

>  That is why hundreds of computer scientists, including some of the
> most prominent members of our profession, have signed David Dill's petition
> on computerized voting.

  David is right up to a point true.  With DRE touch screen systems
there are design problems with those type systems.  But that is as
far as it goes.  So to his specifics on that TYPE of evoting system
I agree with him.

>  If folks on this list are interested in signing
> (David is also taking signatures from non-computer scientists, including
> attorneys), you can find a link to the petition at David's website at
> http://verify.stanford.edu/evote.html.
>
> The only solution that we have come up with that provides the protection one
> must have to prevent the incorrect reporting or outright theft of an
> election (and is not too complicated for the voter or election official to
> deal with) is a voter verified paper ballot.  The ballot should be printed
> out behind a window, the voter given the opportunity to read and verify that
> the ballot accurately represents the person's vote, and then the ballot
> should be automatically deposited (so that the voter can observe this) into
> a ballot box.

  How do we know, like in Florida that those ballot after being deposited
in the ballot box are the very same ballots that are later counted?  The
answer is we don't know that.

>
>
> The paper ballots then become the definitive count.

  No they don't.  See again my above comments and review the
investigation in Florida that was made quite public.

>  Given the existence of
> such ballots, it doesn't matter how buggy the computer code is nor if
> someone attempts to steal the election.

  Elections are often tampered with, and rarely stolen.  This happened
in 1960 as I recall.  But Nixon did not protest as the margin was too
slim to be sure...  And those were paper ballots...

>
>
> Another benefit of the system I've just described is that it makes it very
> difficult to sell votes, since there is no "certificate" that the voter can
> show to prove that he or she voted as paid.  This is also true of
> computerized voting machines with no ballots, but it is not true of machines
> that allow the voter to handle the ballot.

  Also incorrect.  Dead people have been registered to vote for as long
as I can remember, for example.

>  In this later case, the first
> voter can mark the ballot but not deposit it.  He or she then takes the
> marked ballot out to the person who is purchasing votes and gets paid.  The
> next voter is given the previously marked ballot, creates a new marked
> ballot and deposits the old one.  The new marked ballot is then proof for
> payment, etc.  (If you don't follow this example, think about how you would
> steal an election if you were paying for votes).
>
> This is truly my final posting on this thread.
>
> Regards,
> Barbara
>
> On 3/12/03 4:17 AM, "Jeff Williams" <jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
> > However I am puzzled that if you don't have time for such
> > dialog, than why you sent this post, and why would you in your
> > earlier post on this thread, acknowledge that such dialog/communication
> > is important Barbara?
> >
> > ( Further comments below Barbara's )
> >
> > Barbara Simons wrote:
> >
> >> As I said earlier, I do not have the time to engage in further dialog.  I
> >> have only one comment to make, which is that computerized voting systems
> >> without voter verified paper ballots represent the greatest threat to our
> >> democracy that I've seen in my lifetime.  While is may be true that most
> >> email voting systems are simple to implement (I would not agree with Jeff's
> >> comment that they are moderate in cost vs return - in fact, they tend to be
> >> quite pricey), I strongly disagree with the statement that they are quite
> >> safe.
> >
> > Vote.com has offered to provide the service for ICANN for free.
> > We [INEGroup] have also offered our voting system to ICANN
> > for cost of implementation.  That's really cheap!
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> The bottom line is that computerized voting systems that do not have voter
> >> verified ballots make no sense.
> >
> > Very much agreed here.  Verification of ballots is not that difficult
> > to achieve and has been done in several systems currently in use.
> >
> >>  There is absolutely no way of knowing if
> >> your vote is appropriately counted, and there is NO BACKUP.
> >
> > Can you prove that?  I can prove the contrary...  Are you able to
> > except that challenge?  If not, than I would have to say that you are
> > simply opposed for other yet to be known reasons to evoting.  Yet
> > it is here, growing, and shall be more widely used.
> >
> >>  Think of what
> >> it means to do a recount in this environment.
> >
> > Not a problem with several systems presently being used.
> >
> >> You ask the computer what its
> >> counts are, and it responds "the same as what I told you last time, dummmy,"
> >> unless it is grossly broken.
> >
> > What!!??  ROFLMAO!  This is pure silliness here Barbara.  I also think
> > you know it is, or I hope you do anyway.  Rolling tally's is a mathematical
> > computation algorithm built into most good evoting systems.
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> This means that elections can be subverted by buggy software, hackers, or
> >> insiders, and no one will be able to prove that this has been done.
> >
> > Buggy software, yes in some instances, Hackers, also yes this too is
> > possible, but with good systems very improbable.  Insiders, sure, this too
> > is possible.  But there has to be some oversight during said elections.
> >
> >>  At
> >> least with butterfly ballots (incidentally, the Democrat who approved them
> >> was a Republican before the election and reverted to being a Republican
> >> after the election) we all could see what was happening.
> >
> > Oh we could?  What happened to the 18,000 ballots in the two northern
> > counties in Fl.?  No one to this day knows.  And in Dade county, what
> > about those ballots that were discarded before being reviewed or even
> > originally available for counting?
> >
> >>  While it's a nasty
> >> business to observe an election being stolen without being able to stop it,
> >> it's even worse if it is stolen and no one knows for sure.
> >
> > I agree completely with you here.  And that is much less likely with
> > good evoting systems.  ANd that is why in Florida, that several types
> > of evoting is being implemented to replace the butterfly balloting system
> > because it is SO much more reliable.
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> ICANN is important, but the computerized voting issue is far more important,
> >> as far as I'm concerned.
> >
> > Both as far as electing ICANN BOD members are intertwined and must
> > be dealt with unless ICANN chooses to become less relevant to Internet
> > governance than it has degraded to already...  This will be the challenge
> > to the new BoD members to step up to, or face becoming illegitimate.
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Jeff's comment that http://verify.stanford.edu/evote.html contains "scare
> >> tactics and being panned fairly broadly on some aspect" is absurd.
> >
> > Oh?  How so?  It was panned in several publications as you well know.
> >
> >>  The
> >> webpage was created by David Dill, a Stanford computer science professor who
> >> has no financial interest in any e-voting system and who is concerned only
> >> with trying to preserve democracy.  I urge anyone who is reading this email
> >> to check out the website.
> >
> > Yes you and I exchanged some ideas with David as I think you recall.
> > He does however have another agenda, as you also know.  He of course
> > is entitled to his opinion.  Other experts, including myself have a somewhat
> > different opinion.  I agree that "DRE" and touch screen voting machines
> > are a very weak and insecure evoting system.  Other evoting systems
> > are much different and better as David well knows...
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> I believe that computerized voting machines without appropriate backup
> >> represent an enormous threat to democracy in any country in which they are
> >> employed to elect governments.
> >
> > Very strong blanket statement here Barbara.  To bad it is a bad position
> > to take as it is broadly unsupported.
>
> --
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Regards,

--
Jeffrey A. Williams
Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 129k members/stakeholders strong!)
================================================================
CEO/DIR. Internet Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security
Information Network Eng. Group. INEG. INC.
E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
Contact Number: 214-244-4827 or 214-244-3801


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