[registrars] Blueprint for Reform

["Michael D. Palage" <michael@palage.com>]

In preparation of tomorrow's meeting, I would encourage registrars to read
the following document
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/blueprint-20jun02.htm.

For those registrars that have limited bandwith, I tried to cut and paste
the relevant sections listed below.


ICANN, today, inevitably has a global policy role. (p3); In the view of the
ERC, there is not any more a legitimate debate over whether ICANN has a role
in policy development and implementation. It does. We also believe that role
should be limited to those policy areas that are reasonably related to
ICANN's technical mission. The dividing line will not always be clear. (p3);
The ERC does not attempt in this Blueprint to define those boundaries
precisely. There is much room for follow-on work in this regard. But we do
emphatically reject the notion that ICANN should not be involved with policy
development at all, or that its Mission boundaries are limited to policies
that only address narrow technical operational issues. (p3).

For example, ICANN responsibility for coordinating unique parameters can
lead to the granting of exclusive control over an Internet resource, namely
a top-level domain. It is reasonable to ask under what conditions such
exclusive control should be granted, for how long, under what constraints,
and with what degree of oversight.(p3); What is critical is that ICANN
addresses these questions with the full participation of those affected by
its decisions in a manner that is reflective of those interests and the
public interest. (p3).

5. Where feasible, depend on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a
competitive environment. 6. Introduce and promote competition in the
registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial in the public
interest. 7. Employ open and transparent policy DEVELOPMENT (emphasis added)
mechanisms that (a) promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice,
and (b) ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy
development process. (p5)

The composition of the Nominating Committee has been established to be
representative of both particular interest groups and the broader public
interest. The structure of the GNSO has been more clearly stated, and the
role of the TAC more clearly described. Government involvement has been
strengthened in various respects to reflect the public interest but without
sacrificing the essential private sector nature of ICANN. (p6)

The Board shall be composed of 15 voting Directors. Additionally there shall
be 5 non-voting Liaisons as specified below who may participate in Board
discussions and deliberations like Directors but shall not cast votes (and
as such, do not count towards quorum counts of the Board) The 15 voting
Directors shall be selected as follows:

8 Directors selected by the Nominating Committee (NomCom)
2 Directors selected from each of the three Supporting Organizations
The President of ICANN

The 5 non-voting Liaisons shall be selected as follows:
1 by the TAC
1 by the IAB/IETF 4
1 by the RSSAC
1 by the SAC
1 by the GAC

(p6/7)

Constituencies: The GNSO would initially be composed of the following six(6)
voting (see below) constituencies:

Provider constituencies:
l The gTLD registries constituency
l The gTLD registrars constituency
l The ISP constituency

User constituencies:
l The business constituency
l The intellectual property constituency
l The non-commercial domain name holders constituency

(p8)

GNSO Council: The business of the GNSO should be coordinated by a GNSO
Council (for affectionate historical reasons this could also be called a
Generic Names Council) composed of (initially):

Six (6) voting members elected by the provider voting constituencies (2
each);
Six (6) voting members elected by the user voting constituencies (2 each);
Three (3) voting members elected by the NomCom (according to similar
criteria as used to selected members of the Board).
l One non-voting liaison appointed by the GAC. (p9)

Each member of the GNSO Council, including those selected by the NomCom,
shall serve for renewable two-year terms, with these terms staggered so that
no more than approximately half of the membership turns over each year.
(p9 - Emphasis - no term limits)

The GNSO GA is not a forum for making decisions or recommendations, or
taking formal positions. As such, the GNSO GA should take no votes, although
working groups under the direction of the GNSO Council can provide advice as
a group. (p9)

Composition and Selection
The CNSO is not intended to be just an elevated ccTLD constituency, but is
rather a policy-development body. As such, its voting membership (such as in
voting for CNSO Council members – see below) should include representatives
of those ccTLD registries – and only those ccTLD registries – committed to
global policy development through the ICANN process (evidenced through
signed agreements or by other means, such as full funding support). (p10/11)

Nominating Committee (NomCom)

Purpose

The purpose of the Nominating Committee is to select Directors and other
individuals as otherwise described in the applicable sections of this
document, and who conform to the criteria in those sections. The purpose of
NomCom selections is to balance the representative selection of other
Directors and positions to ensure that ICANN can continue to benefit from
participants in the ICANN process (Directors or otherwise) of the highest
integrity and capability who place the public interest ahead of any
particular special interests., but who are nevertheless knowledgeable about
the environment in which ICANN operates.

This implies a NomCom composed both of persons deeply involved with the
various constituencies of ICANN and also of persons knowledgeable but less
directly involved. One of the underlying principles of the NomCom is that
its very functional and geographic diversity would tend towards selection of
Directors and persons filling other positions who are broad in outlook,
individually and as a group, and not beholden to particular interests.

Composition

The NomCom would initially be a 19-member body composed of delegates(not
representatives) appointed by the following constituencies:

gTLD registries (1)
gTLD registrars (1)
ccTLD registries (1)
Address registries (1)
Internet service providers (1)
Large business users (1)
Small business users (1)
IP organizations (1)
Academic and other public entities (1)
Consumer and civil society group[s (1)
Individual domain name holders (1)
IAB/IETF (1)
TAC (1)
GAC (1)
Unaffiliated public interest persons (4)

In addition there would be a Chair appointed by the Board and 2 non-voting
liaisons, one from each of the RSSAC and the SAC.

(p13)

NomCom members should serve non-renewable two-year terms that are staggered
to ensure that half of the NomCom "turns over" each year. A NomCom member
could, if selected, serve another two-year term provided there is at least a
two-year hiatus in between. Members of the NomCom should be ineligible to
serve as Directors of ICANN for at least one-year following their term of
service on the NomCom.

(14)


Policy development through bottom-up consensus processes should be
encouraged. To be presumptively binding, any policy developed must reflect a
true consensus, that is, a policy acceptable to the great majority of those
affected, with no strong and reasoned opposition. Any such policy
recommended to the ICANN Board, if not acceptable to the Board, should be
returned to the policy development body with a clear statement of the
Board's concerns. If and when such a recommendation is returned to the Board
as a true consensus policy recommendation, the Board may reject or modify
such a recommendation only by a 2/3 vote. In the absence of true consensus
being achievable, the Board will act according to its own best judgment
accounting for community principles, needs, and desires as best it can
interpret them. In contrast, any recommendations made by ICANN's policy
development bodies on matters other than policy as defined above should have
only whatever persuasive merit is
inherent in the recommendation. (p15)

None of the above is intended to inhibit the Board from making policy
decisions as appropriate in the absence of the ability of the community to
reach consensus. (p16)

The Board should pursue a funding mechanism that requires those registries
and registrars with whom ICANN has an agreement to forward to ICANN a
per-name fee (estimated to be about $0.25) adequate to meet the needs of
ICANN as reformed, including the building of adequate reserves. This fee is
collected by registrars and/or registries as appropriate on behalf of all
beneficiaries of the ICANN process. (p 18)