Re: No Need For "At Large" DNSO membership (Was: Re: "constitutional protections")

[Jeff Williams <jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com>]

Bill and all,

  Yeah, we have some thought and comments on this matter, as I am sure you
expected.  >;)  ( see below your comments/questions for ours)

J. William Semich (NIC JWS7) wrote:

> Hello;
>
> This is an interesting proposal and worthy of consideration. However,
> before taking it to the next step of discussing how to implement it and
> what those DNSO "Constitutional Protections" might best be, I'd like to
> reopen discussion on the issue of At Large participation on the DNSO.
>
> You are proposing 9 "At Large" members in the governing committee of
> DNSO.
>
> I propose zero "At Large" members.
>
> An excellent proposal and argument *against* including At Large
> participation in DNSO was made just prior to the Barcelona meeting and
> I'd like to put it back on the table here.
>
> The thinking is, that since there will be a *whole other SO* for "At
> Large" participation and representation on ICANN, our including another
> At Large mechanism in DNSO would be redundent and confusing.

  We don't know that there is going to be a membership organization yetand we
certainly don't know what form it may take.

>
>
> Lot's of questions and problems arise, not least of which is, how would
> you differentiate between the "At Large" participants in DNSO and the
> "At Large" participants in ICANN? How would their interests differ? How
> would their make up (their members and participants) differ?

  At large members may or may not differ.  How and why is this important
unlessthere is some interested parties that the DNSO wished to "Filter" from
being
members.  At any rate this really isn't a matter of discussion or consideration.

There MUST be At Large members as the ICANN Bylaws and the WHite Paper
already require it.

>
>
> By definition, the actual nature of an "At Large" constituency would
> leave *both* groups open to participation by anyone - meaning each could
> (and would) have the same members, more or less.

  Right.  So?  Is this bad?  IF so, why? Or is there and interest in creatinga
"Closed " organization?  IF so that would be in violation of the White
Paper and the ICANN november 6th bylaws.

>
>
> I do not think this would be a good idea. I hope this inbred problem in
> the ICANN bylaws is discussed in the meetings with ICANN, its board
> members, and its president during the next several weeks.

  It is being discussed all over the world, you can count on that!

>
>
> Any one else have opinions on this matter?
>
> Bill Semich (NIC JWS7)
> bsemich@mail.nu
> .NU Domain (Niue)
> Memberships: ISOC, ISP/C, APIA, APTLD, IATLD, PAB, Internet Users
> Society - Niue
>
> In reply to 12 Nov message from Kent Crispin <kent@songbird.com>:
>
> >At the Barcelona meeting Bernard T.  (representing ccTLD
> >interests) proposed the following numbers for representation of
> >constituencies on the Governing Committee:
>
> >       Registries:  8
> >       Registrars:  3
> >       Network connectivity etc:  3
> >       Commercial users:  2
> >       Trademark interests:  0 (ex officio standing committee)
> >       At large:  3
>
> >The primary motivation for the obvious unbalance expressed in
> >Bernard's proposal, as he expressed it, is a fear that the
> >competing interests would essentially gang up on the registries.
> >That is, (to put it in egocentric terms) the intent of having such
> >a large representation is not my desire to control others, but
> >rather my fear what the others might do to me.
>
> >The problem identified here is commonly known as "the tyranny of
> >the majority".  It is the major problem with popular democracy.
>
> >Bernard said that an alternative that would perhaps be acceptable
> >would be to have a smaller representation, but to also have some
> >kind guarantees built in that that would prevent the majority from
> >running roughshod over registry interests.  These guarantees might
> >be called "constitutional protections (CPs)".
>
> >There are several substantial advantages to a CP model.  CPs are:
>
> >  - Well-modulated: CPs can be constructed to exactly fit the
> >issues
> >  of interest to a particular constituency.
>
> >  - Not a zero sum game: protecting constituencies by adjusting
> >  representation is intrinsically zero-sum -- every
> >representational
> >  unit added is a unit subtracted from someone else.  Adding
> >  constitutional protections for one group, on the other hand,
> >doesn't
> >  necessarly reduce the power of another group.
>
> >  - Flexible: There are mechanisms for changing CPs -- super
> >  majority votes, and so on.  These mechanisms are much more
> >  difficult to engage than usual decision making processes, and
> >are
> >  seldom employed.  But they are available in the case where there
> >  is very widespread agreement that something needs to be changed.
>
> >There are a couple or relatively minor disadvantages to a CP
> >model.
>
> >  - First, it enables what has been called "the tyranny of the
> >  minority", where, through the power granted by a CP, a minority
> >  blocks some change that a large majority wants.  For example,
> >if,
> >  through a CP, a constituency were given a veto power on budget
> >  decisions, that constituency could hold the rest of the
> >  organization hostage and get its way in matters not related to
> >  budgets.  This problem can sometimes be dealt with by careful
> >  construction of the CPs, but probably cannot be totally
> >eliminated.
>
> >  - Second, a CP model adds complexity to the decision process --
> >  perhaps a lot of complexity.  Without a CP you take a vote, and
> >if
> >  the vote meets the quorum and majority requirements, the
> >decision
> >  is made.  But CP's require enforcement and interpretation, and
> >this
> >  additional mechanism could be considerable.
>
> >On balance, however, the advantages seem to me to far outweigh the
> >disadvantages, so I would like to propose that we work from the
> >premise that we will have a CP model.  More than that, I would
> >argue that some form of CP model is actually inevitable, and we
> >would probably be better off starting with that explicitly in
> >mind. (*)
>
> >Presuming that we start from a CP model, I would further propose
> >that we adopt a "constituency-blind" representational model, where
> >every constituency gets the same number of seats.
>
> >Concretely:
>
> >       Registries: 2
> >       Registrars: 2
> >       Network connectivity etc: 2
> >       Commercial users: 2
> >       Trademark interests: 2
> >       At large: 9
>
> >Each of the 5 defined constituencies will potentially have a set
> >of CPs associated with them -- certain issues about which they
> >have special powers or protections.  The apparent unbalance with
> >the At Large group is really an illusion -- the At Large group
> >represents every other possible constituency, but at the same time
> >has NO specific CPs (**) associated with it -- it can't, because,
> >by definition, it doesn't represent any *particular* constituency.
> >Furthermore, the At Large group is large enough so that meaningful
> >geographical constraints can be applied.
>
> >This model hinges on the Constitutional Protections involved.  If
> >we decide to go this route, the debate should shift from the
> >"number of representatives" to "what special rights and powers
> >should be assigned to each constituency".
>
> >This would, in my opinion, be a healthy development.  It would
> >force us to look at specific policy areas and concerns, and take
> >us away from thinking in terms of power politics.
>
> >-------------------------
>
> >(*) It is inevitable because, when you think about it, very
> >unbalanced representational models create a strong force for some
> >kind of guarantees for the rights of those not so well
> >represented.
>
> >(**) There may be general CPs that apply to every member,
> >regardless of further membership in a constituency.
>
> >--
> >Kent Crispin, PAB Chair                        "No reason to get excited",
> >kent@songbird.com                      the thief he kindly spoke...
> >PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65
> >55 http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html

 Regarrds,

--
Jeffrey A. Williams
CEO/DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java/CORBA Development Eng.
Information Network Eng. Group. INEG. INC.
E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
Contact Number:  972-447-1894