Re: [ifwp] Re: Individual DNSO Membership

[Jeff Williams <jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com>]

karl and all,

Karl Auerbach wrote:

> > > Any individual can always listen to some sort of "leader" and direct
> > > his/her vote in accord.
> > >
> > > When one gives votes to organizations, one necessarily removes all or
> > > some of the ability of the interested and motivated individual to act as
> > > that individual sees fit.
> >
> > That's false.  The interested and motivated individual can
> > participate as an individual.  It's always individuals who do the
> > participation, anyway -- when an organization joins it designates a
> > representative -- who is an individual.
>
> That is an entirely anti-democratic notion.
>
> Let's take a simple example -- let's say there are 10 people.
>
> Under my scheme, there are 10 votes, each person gets one.
>
> Under your scheme, there are 10 votes plus an indeterminate number of
> "organizational" votes.  The net result is that each individuals no
> longer has 1/10th of the franchise -- each person has been diluted.
>
> And guess where the weight that the individuals did have goes -- right
> into the hands of the managers of the organizations.

  By nature, managers don't like to answer to, or be held responsible by,
any group of individuals directly.  Most corporation in one way or another
structured so as to limit or prevent this from occurring.  What we all are trying
to build here in the "NewCo or ICANN" is an organization that IS answerable
to ALL of the Stakeholders/users.  As such, Kents suggestion is inconsistent
with the White Paper in this regard to the extreme.  So Karl is correct in his
conclusion here....

>
>
> In addition, if those organizations are given an arbitrary weight (which
> is what happens when one creates categories of voters) then the degree
> of individual disenfranchisement is greater, potentially to the extent
> where a single organization can outweigh all the individuals combined.

Yes.  And this is inconsistent with the White Paper.  But it seems that Kent is
still in the gTLD-MoU mode of thinking.

>
>
> You say that an organization can have its own membership -- sure.  It is
> a wonderful technique through which one divides and conquers and
> excludes a majority which is fractured into groups which form a minority
> of each organization.  When done on a geographic basis, this is called
> "Gerrymandering".

Excellent observation by Karl here on Kents comments and thoughts as expressed.
Any form of Gerrymandering, as Kent would suggest should be, is NOT in
the best long term interest of any "Special" interest group or the ICANN
in the mid or long term.

>
>
> I need not address the sillyness that because an organization casts its
> vote through a designated representative human (who is nothing more than
> an automoton) that this somehow anthropromorphises an organization.

Sure does Karl.

>
>
>
> > > If there are lazy individuals, then they will either not vote or will
> > > vote in accord with some instructions from some leader -- the latter
> > > being essentially equivalent to an "organization" but without the need
> > > to cast such into inflexible concrete.
> >
> > The constituencies range widely in how flexible they are.  The At
> > Large constituency is open to any natural person or legally
> > constituted organization.  Membership in the "registry" constituency
> > requires that you be an entity with write authority over a zone
> > referenced directly from the root zone.
>
> Why should there be any registry consitutency whatsoever?
>
> Why not simply let registries be represented by the degree to which they
> can convince the voting population of the merit of the registries
> position.

  Good point here Karl.  There cannot be a honest registry constituency
unless all of the employees of those registries or at least the majority
of them share the same position as the management of those specific
registries or registrars.  This is possible in some cases, but not likely.

>
>
> That's called democracy.  It is practiced in some parts of the world --
> like the State and country in which both of us live.
>
> You want oligarchy by special interests -- registries being such a
> special interest.

  Of course Kent does.  As do all of the PAB/POC/CORE supporters.

>
>
> What you are advocating is nothing different than a system in which
> General Motors and Ford and IBM could all vote *directly* for US
> Senators, the President, the Governors, the members of Congress, etc.

Yes, that is what it appears that Kent, and others on the ICANN "Initial" and
Interim Board seem to prefer.

>
>
> > >> Of course, we can have some form of "proxy", but doesn't this lead to other,
> > >> well-known, problems of "capture"?
> > >
> > > A permanent proxy is called an "organization".
> > >
> > > Temporary proxies -- usually for a fixed period of time or for a single
> > > election seem to work fairly well in corporate elections.
> >
> > They work miserably, from my experience, and almost invariably lead to a
> > "self-perpetuating board".
>
> I guess you never tried to exercise your powers.  Try it sometimes.  You
> might have to spend some time and money to get your point across to the
> other shareholders.

  Good suggestion.  I personally have done this myself with respect to
IBM back in 1989 time frame myself.  We eventually convinced enough
of the big stock holders that certain board members needed to be removed.
Of course that is now a matter of corporate history.

>
>
> On the other hand, I guess you feel that because it takes work to
> exercise an power, that the power should simply not be allowed.

This is most likely a good guess on you part here Karl.  We have had
this suspicion for some time now.

>
>
> In other words, you are asserting that the normal individual is too
> stupid, too lazy, too disinterested to be given even the possibility of
> exercising a voice in his/her life.

That is what it seems that Kent is desiring or believes.  In addition, it
appears from Kents comments that any individual that does want to
exercise their voice needs to be squashed or made insignificant by
structural design so as to make that voice appear in other than the
manner in which is is intended or should be determined.

>
>
> > > > I guess the only solution (in my opinion, of course) is to have both a
> > > > "general Membership" and some established groups of interest.
> > >
> > > By bifurcating the votes, one gives multiple votes to those who are both
> > > individuals and leaders of organizations.
> >
> > Nope.  If you are a member of any other constituency, you can't be a
> > member of the At Large constituency.
>
> Good, that means that registry operators, RIRs, and such, because they
> are also users of the net and hence at-large members, can't join the
> special interest groups.
>
> Good, that means that they will all be empty.
>
> What?  You want to let some privileged people have bigger votes than
> others?  Of course you do -- by letting some privileged people opt out
> of the at-large class into special interest classes, you give them the
> ability to elect which course gives them the bigger vote.  That's
> unfair.

  Unfair and another attempt at "Capture" or gerrymandering.

>
>
>   But multiple membership in
> > other constituencies is allowed.  So IBM (for example) might be a
> > member of the registrar, ISP, general business, and Trademark
> > constituencies.  But it can't do that and also be a member of the
> > "at large" constituency.
>
> That is one of the most undemocratic mechanisms I've ever seen proposed.
>
> Let's let big business be even bigger.
>
> Why should those who hold trademarks have more votes than those who
> depend upon trademarks to help them identify and distinguish goods and
> services, i.e. the consumers?

  Agreed.  They should not.

>
>
> Why should a registrar get more votes than its customers?

  They shouldn't.  In fact customers should get more votes than any registrar.

>
>
> > > And how does one measure the appropriate weight to build in for a
> > > "special interest group"?
> > >
> > > There are two ways?  Guess (usually wrong) or let the weight reflect the
> > > number of members who agree with the group.  The latter, of course, is
> > > best measured by simply letting individuals vote and see how many accord
> > > with the policies of the special interest group.
> >
> > The latter simply institutionalizes the "tyranny of the majority".
> > A special interest group that is in the majority is, by definition,
> > not really a special interest group.
>
> You are writing utter nonesense.  You are saying "we must destroy the
> system in order to save it".
>
> It seems that you simply do not trust the individual.  You are simply
> trying to build into the system a mechanism by which corporate interests
> can dismiss the interests of the general population.

  That is our read of Kent & company's comments.

>
>
> You are creating a tyranny of the minorities.

  Exactly right assessment here Karl.  Balance is what must be the goal.

>
>
> > This discussion is somewhat moot, in any case.  We are trying to
> > engage in a bottom up development process, and the weight of opinion
> > seems to favor a combination contituency/open membership model.
>
> Perhaps you should widen the forum in which you engage in discussions.
>
> >  My
> > personal preference is for half the representation to come from a
> > set of constituencies, and half to come from an open membership body
> > -- that bicameral approach is essentially the senate/house
>
> I have not heard you utter anything even similar to the house/senate
> balance in the US -- which is that of mutual veto power.
>
> In the US a bill can not even reach the president until it passes *both*
> houses.
>
> I have not heard you say that in this membership structure that an
> proposal must be passed by *all* of the interest groups.
>
> I could be persuaded, perhaps, to accept the notion that a proposal in
> an SO could pass muster if it was accepted by a majority of the at-large
> membership, but not otherwise.  That way the at-large has a veto over
> the special-interest groups.

  And having the "At Large" membership having veto power over
special interest IS by definition a "Bottom-up" stakeholder/user
structure which is required in the White Paper.

>
>
> > The problem is this is really probably all overkill.  The overall
> > model that is emerging, I think, is that ICANN will have several
> > classes of membership
>
> Perhaps
>
>  -- a general, at-large membership, and various classes
> > of membership associated with the SOs.  To simplify things there
> > probably should be one basic membership mechanism throughout ICANN
> > -- otherwise the complexity will be insane.
>
> To follow your argument -- if all the membership structures are the
> same, then they should be merged into one overall membership, leaving
> the SOs merely as advisory bodies, like they should have been at the
> outset.
>
>         --karl--
>
> __________________________________________________
> To receive the digest version instead, send a
> blank email to ifwp-digest@lists.interactivehq.org
>
> To SUBSCRIBE forward this message to:
> subscribe-IFWP@lists.interactivehq.org
>
> To UNSUBSCRIBE, forward this message to:
> unsubscribe-ifwp@lists.interactivehq.org
>
> Problems/suggestions regarding this list? Email andy@interactivehq.org.
> ___END____________________________________________

Regards,

--
Jeffrey A. Williams
CEO/DIR. Internet Network Eng/SR. Java/CORBA Development Eng.
Information Network Eng. Group. INEG. INC.
E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
Contact Number:  972-447-1894
Address: 5 East Kirkwood Blvd. Grapevine Texas 75208