Re: [ifwp] Re: Objections to a flat structure

[Kent Crispin <kent@songbird.com>]

On Thu, Jan 14, 1999 at 06:59:53PM +1200, Joop Teernstra wrote:
> 
> That you do not believe that (popular) democracy is a good system is your
> privilege.

Popular democracy, without protection for minorities, is simply
institutionalized discrimination.  It's great for the majority, lousy
for the minority.  History abounds with examples, but it is obvious 
from first principles.

> I am glad you spell it out, at least.

Do you actually disagree?  Do we have to go through a historical 
review of the cases where popular democracies -- even some *with* a
"Bill of Rights" -- have abused the rights of minorities?  

> Indeed, most systems do have "some kind of control" by a minority over the
> majority.

That's because it is absolutely required if the rights of the 
minority are to be preserved.

> >> With consituencies, arguably 50 registries, 150 registrars and 10 TM
> >> interests could outvote
> >> 1000 DN holders. 
> >
> >But, arguably, the 210 here have *far* more at stake than the 1000:
> >We vote on whether a gladiator will live or die.  It's entertainment
> >to the crowd; life or death to the gladiator; everybody gets one
> >vote.  As a potential gladiator, would you agree to that decision 
> >procedure?  As a registry, would you put your business in a position 
> >where the crowd decides how you run your business?  Of course not.  
> >Nobody who has ever run a business would *ever* agree to such an 
> >arrangement, and, believe me, the registries are not.
> >
> Charming analogy. Yet, most utilities operate under contraints of democratic
> (government) supervision to a degree that is a consequence of their natural
> monopoly. Arguably , they too may have more at stake than their customers,
> yet, the public interest prevails.

That's because the government intervenes.  ICANN is not a government,
and has no power to force the current registries to do much of
anything [except possibly in the case of NSI, because NSI is a
special case where a government could potentially intervene on
ICANN's behalf.]

[...]

> >It is appended to this message.  I used the term "Constitutional 
> >Protections", as the "Bill of Rights" terminology is, I think, 
> >somewhat US-centric.
> 
> No, Kent, you used the term constitutional protections, because you mean
> "constituency protections".  They have nothing in common with what I think of
> as a Bill of Rights.

Let's not quibble over definitions.

In general a constitutional protection is a set of clauses added to a
constitutional document that guarantees certain rights to the parties
being governed by the constitutional document.  A "Bill of Rights" is
a set of constitutional protections.  The term "constitutional
protections" is broader than "Bill of Rights".

In all cases they are just some rules that are designed to be harder to 
change (require some kind of supermajority).

[...]
> It is more like we are talking from totally different dimensions, when we use
> the word Bill of Rights.
> Orthogonal indeed. You single out the "at large" constituency to have no
> constitutional protection and you reserve the CP for the others, so that they
> will agree to a smaller number of reserved votes.

We did build in some "CP's" for the at-large, as it turns out -- the
at-large membership has a guaranteed low membership fee, and has the
unique character of being exclusive -- no member of any other
constituency can be a member of the at large. 

> The BoR that I think of, goes like this:
> 
> 1. A DN holder shall have legal title to his Domain and shall enjoy all rights
> and obligations thereof, without hindrance or interference, unless mandated by
> Law.

It's a little hard to understand what you mean by that, but I 
suspect that 1) it is completely out of scope for the bylaws 
of the DNSO; and 2) it is a legal tautology.

> 
> 2. A DN holder shall have the right of representation in international bodies
> where regulations are proposed that may affect his ownership.

So the DNSO will order the World Court to hear DN cases, of course.

[...]

> >Initially, ICANN will have very little control over registry
> >policies.  It may grow with time, but only if a relationship with 
> >registries is established to begin with.  
> >
> If ICANN will have so little influence over registry policies, are you
> suggesting that the DN holders are wasting their time here? The
> "relationships" will rule the day, in the end?

I'm suggesting that you have almost totally unrealistic 
expectations about what can and cannot be done, especially in the 
short term.  There is absolutely no way that a powerful governing 
body can be created at this point in time.

The best we can do at this point is to create a weak body, and grow
it into a more powerful role. 

Grandiose statements about unenforcable DN holder rights may make you
feel good, but they have no relationship to what can be concretely
accomplished at this point.

[...]

> >(*) It is inevitable because, when you think about it, very 
> >unbalanced representational models create a strong force for some 
> >kind of guarantees for the rights of those not so well represented.
> 
> On this point we agree. Pity that you relegate it to a footnote.

I take a long term view.

-- 
Kent Crispin, PAB Chair				"Do good, and you'll be
kent@songbird.com				lonesome." -- Mark Twain