[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Stef's 10 constituency DNSO proposal

My intention here is to open the public discussion of the lastest
melding draft exercise from a cross group effort including
participants from ORSC, AIP, IATLD, and taking iseads from CENTR,
DNSO.ORG, and from individual comments on public land provate lists.

I believe the single most controversial contentious issue is that of
membership and constituencies.  Our problem is not a lack of knowledge
asbout who are the constituents, but a lask of ability to figure out
how to afford tham all proper representation and gove them a voice in
the affairs of the budding DNS industry and its place in the ICANN
spondored competition for a winning proposal.

This is evidenced by a last minute split in the drafting team over
publishing the latest meld draft (*Draft* New Draft, 01/30 15:10EST).
The team decided to get the draft out for public review rather than
hold it in private with the hope of resolving the issue before
release.  It is my firm belief that the team's job is to package
controversy for public debate, rather than to bottle it up with
internal arguments to select the one right choice. 


The current editing effort is intended to build the winning consensus
by finding resolutions for all the critical outstanding controversies.
So, here is an attack on what I think is the key crustial controversy.

To cover the issues, I am including the recent discussion of my
proposal as it occurred among the members of the editing team.  I
believe that this kind of discussion should be exposed to the public,
so I am exposing it here, without permission;-)...  My hope is that by
exposing it, you will see some of what has been happening inside the
team, and that this is an expeditious way to get the ideas on the
table for discussion.

Enjoy!!!...\Stef




For myself, I still think it is a good idea to set up contituencies
(though I seem to be heavily outvoted here).  My variation on
constituencies is to have lots of them, like 10, so none of them can
control things with a single voting alliance.

My logic is that with majority rule, and with a 50% quorum rule, any
25% block has 100% of control (in a bare quorum meeting), and that is
exactly what we call "capture"!

So, set up 10 constituencies so none have more than 10% of the vote,
and the result is to have represenation of at least 10 idenifiable
constituencies.  This may not be totally democratic, but it does deal
with things in a democratically representative mode, ala the US or
parliamentary systems.

My candidate constituencies for a DNSO are:

1.  Root Service Providers (mostly ignroed by all other drafts)

2.  ccTLD registries

3.  gTLD  registries  (ccTLDs and gTLDs are in fact different!)

4.  Registrar Service Providers (includes ISPs and others)

5.  DNS Zone Administrators at any level (TLD admins will be swamped)

6.  TM Interest Organizations

7.  Public Interest Organizations

8.  ISPs (ISPs will be wswamped in the Registrar Constituency)

9.  General Public Individuals

10. Other Commercial Interest Organizations.

These ten constiuencies than elect the Names Council Chair from
outside their membership, or find an 11th consituency and let them
elect from inside.  We need an odd number couting the chair who only
votes in case of a tie.

Now, with this much fragmentation, it would require that three
constituencies form an alliance in order to have 30% of the BoD votes,
and so none of these constituencies can seriously control the BoD.

So, it does not seem to me to matter too much whether voting power is
in fact distributed absoultely equally, as long as all constituencies
have a voice in the Board Room.

Now, to deal with the problems of GeoPolitical representation which is
frequently rearing its ugly head in these discussions, we should
mandate a "Regional Fair Hearing Panel" directly advising the BoD,
with panel members drawn from all regions that want a voice for their
regions.  The purpose of the panel is to listen to comments and
complaints and proposals and such based on regional issues, and advise
the BoD on how to deal with them.

Otherwise, we wind up overlaying the whole election process with a
need to assure regional equity in represntation through regional
apportionment within each constituency so we wind up with a two
diensional constituency definition problem.  (This is how DNSO.ORG
came to want 21 members (3 each for 7 constituencies).

And, with only one general class, any small region must clearly see
that it has no voting power what so ever.  So, I advocate this more
structured constituency representation membership scheme, with a fair
hearing panel to give voice to regional concerns that need to be
placed on the BoD table.

Yes, this is a compromise, but all schemes so far are compromises of
one kind or another, including "Approval Voting" as defined below,
which does nothing to protect or represent small regional
constituencies, or minor interest groups with good ideas.

Cheers...\Stef

>From Joop's message Wed, 06 Jan 1999 14:21:26 +1200:
}
}At 13:17 5/01/99 -0600, Eric Weisberg wrote: 
}
}>
}> I am interested in a system of proportionate representation resulting 
}> from a membership vote.  You get the biggest spectrum of interests 
}> represented if all board members are elected at the same time.  
}> If there are 19 seats, they should all be up for election each time 
}> there is a vote so that 1/19th the members can elect a representative.
}> If only 6 members are elected in a given year, you may need 1/6th the 
}> vote to get elected, etc.  You would still have stability under a 
}> proportionate system since most incumbents would be re-elected even 
}> if their relative standing in the vote dropped.  This is especially 
}> true with a system such as  STV or "single transferable vote."   
}> The effect is upon the candidates with the least support. 
}>
}> To me, this is a very significant issue. 
}>   
}
}Eric , Mikki and all,
}
}In the on-line voting procedures (for Chair and Vice-Chair) I proposed 
}another voting system that does away with some disadvantages of the 
}traditional proportional representation systems.
}
}I realise that we have to bring consistency in our election system.
}
}FYI, I will give you Mike Saari's argumentation for the "rated"
}approval voting system below.
}If we end up not following it, it should be edited out of my proposal. 
}However, it is worth considering seriously.
}
}RATIONAL GROUP DECISION-MAKING    (by saari@aol.com)
}
}Suppose a group of rational, intelligent people is trying to make a 
}choice amongst several alternatives.  Will their voting system give 
}them a consistent (and good) outcome?  For virtually every voting 
}system in use today, the answer is, sadly, NO.  This paper 
}demonstrates this simple but startling conclusion. 
}
}Fortunately there is a solution (which I will also describe). 
}
}Let's construct a simple voting scenario.  Suppose the choice is 
}between two viable candidates/propositions/flavors "A" and "B". 
}Using a particular voting system and assuming only A and B are on 
}the ballot, suppose that A consistently wins each election.  
}Now let's repeat the very same vote, but with additional 
}alternatives "X, Y, Z, etc." on the ballot as well. 
}
}If a case can be demonstrated where B wins over A, then I assert 
}that that voting system is fatally flawed, because it is not 
}accurately recording the preferences of the voters. 
}
}[Two classes of additional candidates that easily stress any voting 
}system are any numbers of "Bozos" and/or "Twins".  A "Bozo" is any 
}mediocre candidate.  A "Twin" is a candidate which is identical and
}indistinguishable from another particular candidate.  Given a choice
}between two Twins, assume that voters will choose randomly, since 
}either "Twin" outcome is equally good.]
}
}To demonstrate a typical flawed voting system, take the common "simple
}plurality" method (vote for one candidate, and the highest total wins). 
}For the simple A vs. B case, assume that A consistently wins (A=60%,
}B=40%).  Now we add an indistinguishable, identical twin (A') to the
}ballot and re-vote.  The likely outcome is that B wins (A=30%, A'=30%,
}B=40%).  Thus, this system is flawed. 
}
}Adding a "runoff" stage to the previous "vote for one candidate" 
}system (the other common "solution") doesn't work either!  The proof, 
}you say?  For the same scenario as before (A wins 60%- 40%), let's 
}add nine "A" Twins and one "B" Twin.  Each version of A will get 6% 
}of the vote, and each B twin will get 20%.  The runoff will be 
}between B and B', and the result is again flawed. 
}
}Various more complex schemes are often proposed, and most have been 
}tried.  But the same flaw can be demonstrated with every other 
}"ranked"-type voting system. 
}
}I invite the reader to try out the "Twin/Bozo" stress test against 
}their favorite "other voting system".  Here is an excellent 
}"Litmus test" example to work with: 
}
}Suppose that all voters in the group rate (subjectively, but honestly)
}candidate B as "Very, Very Good".  60% of the group rate candidate A 
}as "Excellent", but a large 40% minority rate candidate A as "Awful". 
}(Which candidate is really "best" is ambiguous but that's not the 
}issue here; only whether adding choices could alter the outcome under 
}a given voting system.)
}
}For the simple one-vote system (with or without runoff), the flaw is
}demonstrated as described above. 
}
}Take ranked "Borda Voting" as another popular suggestion.  (Borda 
}Voting means that, with 5 candidates, everybody ranks their choices 
}first, second, third, fourth, fifth.  Each "first" vote earns 5 points 
}for that candidate; each "second" vote earns 4 points, etc.) A wins in 
}the simple case, but adding several Bozos to the ballot will shift the 
}result to B. Borda is therefore flawed. 
}
}Every other proposed system of ranked voting (such as successive-
}elimination and other even-more-hopelessly-complex schemes) can also 
}be shown to be flawed in a similar manner. 
}
}THE ONLY VOTING SYSTEMS WHICH DO NOT HAVE THIS BASIC FLAW ARE "RATED" 
}(not"ranked") systems. 
}
}"Approval Voting" (vote yes or no for each candidate, then a simple 
}tally) is the simplest voting system which is not fundamentally flawed.  
}My personal favorites are "Offset Approval (vote each candidate with a 
}number between +10 and -50)" and "Rational Approval (vote yes or no for 
}each candidate, and divide the yes count by the no count)". 
}
}Let's see how basic "Approval Voting" holds up against the "Litmus 
}Test".  Clearly, the 40% minority that hates A will probably vote 
}A=NO/B=YES for the simple A-B case. 
}
}The other 60% will vote either A=YES/B=YES ("They're both quite
}qualified.") or A=YES/B=NO ("B isn't good enough for me.") 
}Depending on the overall distribution of these votes (which depends 
}on the sense of the group as to whether or not "Very Good" is good 
}enough for the task at hand), either A or B could win this contest. 
}
}However, seeing lots of Bozos is unlikely to change any particular 
}voter's vote, whatever it was!  And if the voter used to vote yes 
}for A and now there are five indistinguishable "A" Twins on the ballot, 
}they will simply vote yes for all of them.  Result: NO FLAW. 
}
}CONCLUSION: "Approval Voting" (or its variations) will produce 
}consistent, rational results for any situation of group decision- 
}making.  ANY OTHER "RANKED" VOTING SYSTEM IS SUBJECT TO MANIPULATION 
}(by the "nominating committee") AND/OR IS SUBJECT TO RANDOM 
}DISTORTIONS (depending on the chance distributions of candidates).
}
}        
}On Eric's other argument (one year, 2 years, staggered) in the 
}current flux of happenings, "responsivenes" definitely has my 
}preference over "stability".  What stability? We have to try 
}out what works and with whom. We can vote on-line with minimal 
}expense. One year's a long time already. The original 3 years 
}for the NC were simply meant to make a power grab durable.
}
}--Joop--
}http://www.democracy.org.nz/ 



Stef,

I don't think it's bad.  I agree that it nicely solves the capture problem,
and I agree completely with separating ccTLDs and gTLDs.  The FHP for
regional diversity is a bit of a fudge, although I don't have a good answer
either.

Antony

> -----Original Message-----
> From: stef@nma.com [mailto:stef@nma.com]
> Sent: Saturday, January 30, 1999 2:09 AM
> To: Mikki Barry; Jay Fenello
> Cc: Antony Van Couvering; Andrew Q. Kraft, MAIP, Executive Director;
> Bret A. Fausett; Stef@nma.com; dstein@travel-net.com;
> djohnson@wilmer.com
> Subject: My 10 constituency proposal, again...
>
>
> For myself, I still think it is a good idea to set up contituencies
> (though I seem to be heavily outvoted here).  My variation on
> constituencies is to have lots of them, like 10, so none of them can
> control things with a single voting alliance.
>
	      [snip...repeated text removed by Stef]...



I too have no problem buying into the 10 constituency concept.  I can
easily live with minor tweaks to the numbers or titles as well.

Antony Van Couvering wrote:
> 
> Stef,
> 
> I don't think it's bad.  I agree that it nicely solves the capture problem,
> and I agree completely with separating ccTLDs and gTLDs.  The FHP for
> regional diversity is a bit of a fudge, although I don't have a good answer
> either.
> 
> Antony
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: stef@nma.com [mailto:stef@nma.com]
> > Sent: Saturday, January 30, 1999 2:09 AM
> > To: Mikki Barry; Jay Fenello
> > Cc: Antony Van Couvering; Andrew Q. Kraft, MAIP, Executive Director;
> > Bret A. Fausett; Stef@nma.com; dstein@travel-net.com;
> > djohnson@wilmer.com
> > Subject: My 10 constituency proposal, again...

		[SNIP - repeated text removed by Stef]
-- 
Dan Steinberg

SYNTHESIS:Law & Technology
35, du Ravin
Box 532, RR1		phone: (613) 794-5356
Chelsea, Quebec		fax:   (819) 827-4398
J0X 1N0			e-mail:dstein@travel-net.com



Is it possible to frame this in the balanced dns supplier / dns consumer 
model proposed by CENTRE. -- Bret

Einar Stefferud wrote:
>My candidate constituencies for a DNSO are:
>
>1.  Root Service Providers (mostly ignroed by all other drafts)
>
>2.  ccTLD registries
>
>3.  gTLD  registries  (ccTLDs and gTLDs are in fact different!)
>
>4.  Registrar Service Providers (includes ISPs and others)
>
>5.  DNS Zone Administrators at any level (TLD admins will be swamped)
>
>6.  TM Interest Organizations
>
>7.  Public Interest Organizations
>
>8.  ISPs (ISPs will be wswamped in the Registrar Constituency)
>
>9.  General Public Individuals
>
>10. Other Commercial Interest Organizations.



Well, let's see:

Service Providers:  1, 2, 3, 4, 8

Service consumers:  5, 6, 7, 9, 10

So, it looks more or less balanced to me;-)...  (See revisions below.)

NOTE: I think this should be surfaced as a comment to the current
      draft, which needs to be put oput ASAP, with the constituency-
      membership issues packaged as too controvesial to resolve on
      this round.

Now, remember, the use of Fair Hearing Panels takes care of the "worst
nightmare" fear of lots of people who fear not having a voice.  A
voting representative on the board is not the same as a voice that is
guaranteed to be heard and given a fair hearing.

	My motto is simple: "A VOTE is not A VOICE!"

So, geo-political divvying of the NC votes will not solve the
voiceless nightmare problem, which is what drives the entire
membership and constituency boundary problem, in 4 dimensions of
Geography, Industry, Markets and Politics.

We need to find a solution at the Meta Levels to frame the lower level
issues that are in dispute,

So, my 10 constituency scheme is designed to solve the meta problems,
which I believe are best cast as sources of worst nightmares.  When we
line up the worst nightmares of all the constituencts, the one that
stands out most is fear of not having a hearable voice.

So, lets focus on ending the fear of this nightmare.  
And then see what comes next.

Cheers...\Stef

PS: Further, this is actually a compromise between no constituences
    and a very few constituencies, but oddly, it is found outside the
    box formed by either of those choices.  This is because increasing
    the number of constituencies makes it look and behave more and
    more like a general population of diverse entities.  

    And it gains the advantage of staving off capture.

    This just reinforces my belief that we need to look outside the
    box for compromise solutions.

    I hope this can and will be carried over to the ICANN Membership
    Problem which suffers from the exact same issues.

    ...\s

>From your message Sat, 30 Jan 99 11:38:21 -0500:
}
}Is it possible to frame this in the balanced dns supplier / dns consumer 
}model proposed by CENTRE. -- Bret
}
}Einar Stefferud wrote:
}>My candidate constituencies for a DNSO are:
}>
}>1.  Root Service Providers (mostly ignroed by all other drafts)
}>
}>2.  ccTLD registry Service Providers
}>
}>3.  gTLD  registry Svc Providers  (ccTLDs and gTLDs are different!)
}>
}>4.  Registrar Service Providers (includes ISPs and others)
}>
}>5.  DNS Zone Administrators at any level (TLD admins will be swamped)
}>
}>6.  TM Interest Organizations (Deals with users and consumers)b
}>
}>7.  Public Interest Organizations  (User and Consumer Intersts)
}>
}>8.  ISPs (ISPs will be wswamped in the Registrar Constituency)
}>
}>9.  General Public Individuals (Users and Consumers) 
}>
}>10. Other Commercial Interest Organizations.  (Users and Consumers)