Useful Comments Re: DNSO process and Drafts submitted to ICANN

[Einar Stefferud <Stef@nma.com>]

Good constructive and useful criticism as I read it;-)...

>From your message Sun, 7 Feb 1999 10:42:42 -0600:
}
}William X. Walsh wrote:
}
}> I call for a vote of participants on this list for which draft
}> they support.
}>
}> It is time to vocalize your support, and clearly indicate who you
}> represent.
}
}OK, I'll bite:
}
}There are number of problems with the Paris draft.  Section 2.1 leaves the
}issue of who is eligible for DNSO membership up to ICANN by making it
}coextensive with ICANN's membership.  It is not yet clear what the makeup of
}this membership will be or whether it would be appropriate for the DNSO.
}

I agree with this concern, and I suggest that the initial membership
be defined in some other more well defined way.  One suggestion that
makes sense to me is "Anyone with a DNS Zone file to administer" to be
used to elect an INITIAL Names Council that is defined to have rather
limited powers to decide on plicy matters, but has lots of power to
set in motion both Research Committees and Fair Hearing Panels to
comence the work of sorting out the mess that the DNSO will have to
resolve.  

}
}Section 3.2 requires the General Assembly to "self-organize into diverse
}constituencies" without providing any mechanism for doing so.  If
}discussions on these mailing lists are any indication, this is likely to
}generate endless squabbles about the proper number and type of
}constituencies that would likely not be resolved until ICANN stepped in to
}impose a solution.
}

This is one more reason to start with an Initial NC with limited
powers as suggested above.

}
}The real show-stoppers are in Article V, specifically Sections 5.8 through
}5.11.  The "Fair Hearing" provisions of Sections 5.8, 5.10, and 5.11 make it
}possible for any special interest or special interest group to delay almost
}indefinitely any policy that they disagree with.  Section 5.9 goes even
}further.  It elevates the particular special interest group of registries
}above all others by giving it veto power and by requiring an essentially
}unachievable 3/4 supermajority of registries for approval.  These
}provisions, taken individually and in toto, would make it nearly impossible
}for the DNSO to produce any substantive policy recommendations whatsoever.
}That is unacceptable to me.  It is my hope and expectation that it will
}prove to be unacceptable to ICANN as well.
}

Here I am in strong agreement that the whole concept of Fair Hearing
Panels has been subvertted by inavertant editing whcih converts them
into a mecahisim to be used to stop progress on any Research Committee
proposal that someone does not like.  In his us, Fair Hearing Panels
become a mecahism for objaingin cort-like injunctive relief.

My original concept was tht they would be a method by which DNSO (or
ICANN) would and could assure fair hearing and thus assure a hearable
voice to all concerned.  My proposal called for Fair Hearing Panels to
be created upon a petition to the NC or the BoD, which immediately
guanatees that the NC or the BoD must read it and act upon it, and
cannot claim they never knew anything about it.  Thus, guaranteeing
that any voice can at least be heard.

Behond that, there was no requiremtn that anything or action be
stopped because of sucha request.  It is my beleif that just exposing
the call for fair hearing and forcing the issue onto the table will be
enough to keep things from being done in secret where stakeholders
find themselves threatened.

This needs further refinement, but I strongly object to the curent use
of Fair Hearing Panels for providing court like injunctive relief.
There was never any intention to creat a new court-like system!

}
}The flaws in the Washington draft are relatively minor by comparison.
}Business interests are overrepresented, and there is no mechanism for
}individual users or domain holders to participate directly (Section I.B).
}It also fails to make clear whether Names Council members are elected by the
}constituencies they represent or by the entire membership (Section I.E).  I
}regard the former approach as necessary to prevent the Names Council from
}being captured by a special interest group or groups constituting a majority
}of the membership.
}

So, lets meld the good parts of the "Wahington Draft" into the Paris
draft and proceed from there.  I suggest that you propose how such new
or revised text might be applied!

}
}The Washington draft, however, would create a DNSO that is capable of taking
}action.  For that reason, I support it, albeit as the lesser of two evils.
}

I do not see it as so, but why not try to do a meld?

Cheers...\Stef