[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [dnso.discuss] Re: do we want to have constituency meetings in singapore next month?
- Date: Fri, 12 Feb 1999 21:47:09 -0500
- From: Michael Sondow <msondow@iciiu.org>
- Subject: Re: [dnso.discuss] Re: do we want to have constituency meetings in singapore next month?
Joop Teernstra a écrit:
> > and let ICANN decide what to do about it.
>
> My problem with that is, that the choice would be (another) major
> policy decision by an ICANN without a membership.
> It is the DNSO that has to drive ICANN policymaking.
> If there is "the" DNSO, this DNSO with have a strong authority
> and the legitimacy to do so.
That makes good sense.
> Please consider that the drafts for the DNSO bylaws should not be
> about some personalities imposing their philosophies on others
> (at best) or interests trying to gain an advantage (at worst)
They should not, but unfortunately they are, in some matters. The
Paris draft exists, in great part, because of an unwillingness on
the part of many contingents to accept the imposition by certain
others of an advantage. It wood be counter-productive, now, to
accept that imposition and their advantage. A defeat, in essence,
for the Paris draft, which has removed the last trace of favoritism
in its own proposal by altering the registry clause. Should it then
accept favoritism in the Washington draft, in the name of
compromise?
> but about creating a fair
> and workeable structure
Unfortunately, it seems that what is fair to some is unfair to
others. Trademark lawyers, on the grounds that they have been
slighted in the past - a situation, if it existed, that was more
likely due to their own abstentionism - now ask for favorite
treatment in the form of a special constituency and voting rights
separate from, and duplicating, those of the businesses they
represent. Is this fair? Is it workable for the future? Will the
Paris draft accept it, together with a constituency structure that
permits and fosters such favoritisms? That will be a poor
compromise, in my opinion.
> A structure to outlast the present division of powers and > personalities.
The only one that can do that is a structure without pre-defined
constituencies.
> A public vote can later endorse the compromise.
I don't see this. What public? There are only the current players to
vote. They will endorse their draft, or the one that the ICANN Board
hands them. The public will have no say in the matter. May we be
strictly honest here?
> Oh, and if I can't make it myself to Singapore to say so F2F, I would like
> to urge the Paris draft team and all its supporters not to yield on
> 1. No startup constituencies
> 2. the Center of Power lies in the General Assembly of members.
> 3. members are DN owners.
I strongly second this recommendation, Joop, and will militate for
it in Singapore.