Prefatory note:

It is out of place for a trademark group to submit such a DNSO application -
which includes, among other things, criteria for membership and mechanisms
for determining "legitimate" interest in the DNS - since it is questionable
whether trademark associations themselves have an interest in the DNS that
justifies their inclusion in a DNSO since they represent companies and
corporations which themselves form a DNS constitutency that is represented.
(Also, see for example the study by M. Mueller
[http://istweb.syr.edu/~mueller/study.html] and comments to WIPO of the DNRC
[http://wipo2.wipo.int/process/eng/processhome.html]).

Viewed in this light, the INTA's proposal for a DNSO may be little more than
an attempt on its part to preempt the raising of doubts as to the INTA's own
claim to having an interest in the DNS; and any definitions by the INTA of
what constitutes legitimate interest in the DNS are therefore suspect, since
those definitions will naturally admit the INTA while excluding entities
which are in opposition to the INTA on domain names and trademark issues, or
which do not recognize a justification for the INTA's participation in the
DNSO, or the appropriateness of an application from it.

Therefore, while not recognizing the validity of this proposal as such, the
following comments are offered on specific articles in it (enclosed between
dotted lines below) in order to indicate their incorrectness and
perniciousness, because the DNSO might mistakenly consider them in the
drafting of its own application.

....................................................................
ARTICLE II. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this organization shall be to generally protect and
promote the interests of all users of the Internet, and more particularly to
disseminate information and make recommendations and policy regarding (1)
TLDs; (2) the operation, assignment and management of the domain name
system; and (3) other related subjects, including the relationship between
trademarks and domain names. The objectives of the DNSO shall be carried out
in via means that are open, transparent, and non-discriminatory.
.....................................................................

Comments:

1) The first sentence should be changed so that it stops at the word
"Internet". As it presently stands, purposes 1, 2, and 3 take precedence
over the protection of the interests of all users.

2) Neither the DNSO nor ICANN should have the authority to regulate the
relationship between trademarks and domain names, a relationship which is
artificial and properly left, in those instances in which a conflict may
arise between trademark holders and domain name holders, to the civil courts
to decide, as they have always done in such cases.

The efforts of the INTA and other organizations representing trademark
holders to fabricate an identity between trademarks and domain names is an
attempt to appropriate domain names for these organizations' commercial use,
a purpose for which domain names were never intended and are not properly
designed.

The phrase "including the relationship between trademarks and domain names"
would define the DNSO as an organism for regulating trademark issues, which
the DNSO should not be. The DNSO cannot replace the legal instances already
in place for this purpose, since it has no mandate from any legislative
authority to do so. Such a usurpation of the prerogatives and jurisdiction
of the civil authorities constituted for the purpose of trademark
controversy resolution would not only put the DNSO in jeapordy of legal
action against it but waste its resources unnecessarily, to the detriment of
its legitimate, necessary, and urgent functions. The phrase should therefore
not be included in an application for a DNSO.

...................................................................
ARTICLE III. MEMBERSHIP

1.Classes

The Domain Name Supporting Organization ("DNSO") shall be composed of
representatives from (1) name registries, (2) registrars of top-level
domains ("TLDs") and country code domains ("ccTLDs"), (3) businesses, (4)
other entities that are users or have "legitimate" interests involving the
Internet, and (5) trademark and anticounterfeiting Interests.
...................................................................

Comment:

The word "legitimate" should be struck from number 4 of this section as it
implies that there are illegitimate interests in the DNS and that one group
or sector (in this case, the writers of the proposal) has authority to
decide which are those interests.

Classes 3 and 5 should not be comprised of the same persons or entities (see
Art.IV,1,a below)

...................................................................
ARTICLE III. MEMBERSHIP

1.Classes (cont'd)

Other Entities that are Users or Have Legitimate Interests Involving the
Internet

An individual, firm, association or corporation that uses the Internet or
has a legitimate interest in the objectives of the DNSO, excluding Name
Registries, Registrars, Businesses, and Trademark and Anticounterfeiting
Interests, and including, but not limited to, Internet Service Providers,
consumers, and consumer groups.
....................................................................

Comment:

1) Strike the word "legitimate" (for the reasons given above).

2) Change "the objectives of the DNSO" to "the Domain Name System", because
the objectives of the DNSO may not be sufficiently broadly defined, and
anyone with an interest in the Domain Name System should be able to join the
DNSO.

3) Change "... including, but not limited to, Internet Service Providers,
consumers, and consumer groups." to "including, but not limited to, Internet
Service Providers, not-for-profit Internet users, independent Internet
users, and consumers and consumer groups." The original definition is
clearly an attempt by the INTA to exclude the public sector from
participation. Furthermore, every independent Internet user who has a domain
name thereby has an interest in the Domain Name System. Indeed, it is they
who are the foremost users of the Internet and maintain the predominant
activity of the Web.

..................................................................
ARTICLE III. MEMBERSHIP

1.Classes (cont'd)

Definition of Legitimate Interest

Any individual, firm, association or corporation having gross revenues of or
spending at least $xx in connection with Internet-related activities shall
be deemed to have a legitimate interest in the DNSO. The Names Council shall
be responsible for determining whether this criterion is met.
..................................................................

Comments:

Why does this section come after that on "Other entities"? Does the INTA
pretend that the "other entites" isn't a legitimate category? If this
section, which should not be allowed in any case, had a place in this
document, it should come before or after the entire article and not be
included as a modification of a particular class. It could just as well be
placed after the section on trademark interests, to question their
legitimacy.

In brief, this is merely another transparent attempt by the INTA to exclude
the public sector and the independent users from participation in the DNSO.
The whole paragraph should be deleted.

Regarding membership selection, see my proposal for a membership Committee,
below.

..................................................................
Trademark and Anticounterfeiting Interests

An individual, firm, or association, excluding name registries, registrars,
and businesses, whose primary interest is the protection of trademarks or
the effort to stop trademark counterfeiting and infringement. Each Trademark
and Anticounterfeiting Interest shall have the right to one vote at the
Annual Meeting of the DNSO.
..................................................................

Comments:

As stated above, lawyers and others who represent business clients having
domain names, whether they be trademark law firms or trademark associations,
or any other entities who represent domain name holders in legal disputes,
have no right to voting participation in the DNSO. Giving it to them would
be tantamount to giving my lawyer voting privileges, or the lawyers who
represent ISPs, registrars, registries, and other DNS interests membership
and voting privileges in the DNSO. Certainly businesses having domain names
and who use the Internet have an interest in the domain name system, but
under no justification can the lawyers and others who represent them, and in
particular who represent them in trademark disputes, also be granted
membership. These persons and legal businesses have no interest in the DNS
other than their clients', and therefore it is their clients who should be
members, not they. This is an effort by brand-name businesses to stack the
DNSO with their people and control it, and should be stopped.

...................................................................
ARTICLE III. MEMBERSHIP

2. Method of Election

Each application for membership in the DNSO shall be submitted in writing on
a form approved by the Names Council. The application shall require each
applicant to submit a statement clearly and concisely documenting the
applicant’s (a) involvement with respect to the objectives of the DNSO, and
(b) legitimate interests in these objectives. The Names Council shall give
prompt consideration to each applicant’s qualification for membership in the
class designated and vote upon the application. An applicant must receive
the affirmative vote of a majority of the Names Council to be elected to
membership. Any applicant not receiving favorable action by the Names
Council shall be submitted to the Board of Directors for ICANN for final
action.
...................................................................

Comments:

Strike out the entire section and replace it with the following:
 

Proposal for the Formation and Function of a DNSO Membership Committee.

A Membership Committee of the DNSO shall be formed, comprised of one
member of the Names Council, who will also act as the Committee's
Chairman and report on Committee activities to the Names Council, and
one member of each of the Constituencies. The Membership Committee's
function will be to review applications for voting membership in the
DNSO.

The Names Council member of the Membership Committee will act to assure
that all applicants for membership in the DNSO fulfill the minimum
criteria for membership in the DNSO, for example that they possess a
domain name (if that is so decided). The other Committee members will
act to assure that applicants have applied with the appropriate
Constitutencies, and that they fulfill the Constituencies' minimum
requirements for membership.

The Committee will circulate applications for membership among its
members, or otherwise perform its function, with as little expenditure
of time and effort as possible and by employing Internet-based
communications. It is further understood that the Committee's function
is to include in the DNSO as many entities with an interest in domain
names as possible, rather than to exclude any entities or parties by
devising restrictive practices or by exerting personal prejudice, and
that cases of rejection of an application for membership in the DNSO
will be unusual, the onus of defending such rejections bearing on the
Committee. There will furthermore be no investigation of applicants
beyond the ascertainment of their personal identity, nor any other
measures restrictive to individual freedom and the right to privacy.
 

......................................................................
Article IV. Names Council.

(a) Composition.

The Names Council shall be composed of the same classes of membership as the
DNSO, and have the following composition:

xx members                      business
xx members                      registries
xx members                      registrars of TLDs
xx members                      users and others
xx members                      trademark and anticounterfeiting interests
.......................................................................

Comments:

As per the comment to Art.III, 1.Classes (above), if the business and
trademark interests classes have the same or predominantly the same members,
they would have a disproportionate number of representatives on the Names
Council. In effect, no interest should reasonably be able to choose members
of the Names Council from more than one Class, as this would give it an
unfair advantage in the Names Council. In order to prevent this, no business
or other entity should be allowed to vote for members of the Names Council
from more than one Constitutency.
 

.......................................................................
(b) Election

Names Council members shall be elected only at an Annual meeting of the
DNSO.
At least xx months prior to said Annual meeting, the Names Council shall set
a
xx day period in which DNSO members may be nominated for membership to the
Names Council, and shall give all DNSO members xx days notice of such
nomination period.  Only DNSO members from a designated class of membership
may be nominated for membership on the Names Council in such membership
class,
and only DNSO members of such membership class may nominate and vote on such
nominee.  No DNSO member may nominate more than one Names Council member
nominee.  All nominations must be submitted to the Board with a statement
clearly and concisely documenting the DNSO memberís (a) involvement with
respect to the objectives of the DNSO, and (b) legitimate interests in these
objectives.  Nominations which are either not timely submitted or which fail
to provide a legitimacy statement as set forth above shall not be considered
by the Names Council.  Upon the close of the nomination period, the Names
Council shall notify all DNSO members of the nominees for each class of
membership.  The nominees for each class of membership receiving the
majority
of the votes therefor shall be elected to such class membership.
...................................................................

Comments:

The wording of the first section suggests that it is the Names Council which
dictates to the members, rather than the other way round. This may seem
natural
to the INTA, imbued as it is with the corporate mentality, but is anathema
to a
Supporting Organization of the ICANN.

It is not, therefore, the Names Council who will set the nomination period,
nor
they who will give the membership notice of it. Rather, these logistics
should
be set in the bylaws or rules of the DNSO, for the Names Council to adhere
to
quite as well as the membership.

Sentence five, beginning "All nominations must...", is wholly inadmissible,
for one
thing because there is no "Board" (the INTA has made a "Freudian" slip
here), and
for another because nominations, in a democratic system, cannot be submitted
to a
council for the election of whose members they are intended, but rather must
be
submitted to an Election Committee specially designated for the purpose and
responsible to the membership. Furthermore, there can be no
inquisition of members as to their "involvement with respect to the
objectives of
the DNSO" or their "legitimate interests in these objectives", as the
language of
this paragraph calls for. If a person is a member of a constituency of
the DNSO, his or her credentials for nominating and voting are already
satisfied.
This language of the INTA's is not just an insult to the Constitution of the
United
States and to the character of Internet domain name interests, but is a
transparent
ploy of the INTA to whitewash their own lack of justification for
participating in
this process.

The rest of the paragraph is superfluous.

.......................................................................
(c) Term

The term of membership on the Names Council shall be three years, and a
member
from each class of membership will be elected each year, so that the
three-year terms will be staggered.  In the first two years, a random
drawing
shall determine which class of membership initially has members serving one
or
two year terms.
.......................................................................

Comments:

Why should this staggering of members' terms be done by classes or
constituencies?
Since three are elected from each constituency, they can initially be
elected for
one, two, and three years, respectively.

.......................................................................
(d) Meetings

The members of the Names Council shall be required to meet at least four (4)
times per year.  The time and place of this meeting shall be selected by the
Chairperson of the Names Council.  The place of each meeting shall change to
accommodate the international composition of the Names Council.  Special or
emergency meetings may be held at such times and places (1) as the Names
Council may decide, (2) at the call of the Chairperson, or (3) on the
written
requests of the majority of the member of the Names Council.
.......................................................................

Comments:

In the last sentence, numbers (1) and (3) are ambiguous. How, after all,
should the Names Council "decide" if not by majority vote? (1) should be
deleted.

A third condition for meeting should be added: (3) by majority vote of the
membership of
the DNSO.

.......................................................................

(e) Vacancies

In the event of a Names Council member's death, resignation, ineligibility
or
inability to perform the duties of a member of the Names Council, a majority
of the Names Council then in office shall have the power to designate a
successor to serve for the remainder of
the term of such Names Council member.  Only a person eligible to serve as a
Names Council member shall be eligible for such designation.
.......................................................................

Comments:

Names Council members should not be designated by the Names Council.
Furthermore,
there is no need for it. If a member of the Names Council can no longer
serve, a new
member can be elected by his or her constitutency or class. The Names
Council exists
to represent the membership, one would suppose, and not the other way round,
as the
INTA would have it.

.......................................................................
(g) Selection of DNSO Representatives for the ICANN Board

Pursuant to Article V, Section 4 of the ICANN By-laws, the DNSO is accorded
three (3) seats on the ICANN Board.  Selection of the DNSO representatives
for
the ICANN Board shall rest with the Names Council.  The Names Council shall
ensure that all candidates have a significant understanding of the
relationship between the Internet and  business practice, intellectual
property, free-speech, and consumer protection.  Approval of a candidate for
the ICANN Board shall require a 2/3 majority vote by the Names Council.
.......................................................................

Comments:

Selection of the DNSO's representatives on the ICANN Board may be nominated
by
the Names Council, but their selection should be put to ratification by the
DNSO membership in order to ensure a democratic, bottom-up procedure.

The whole third sentence should be struck out, as being nothing other than
more
of the INTA's KGB-like tactics to ensure compliance with their views. What
does
it mean, after all? That only those members of the Names Council who are in
agreement with the policies of the INTA can be designated for the ICANN
Board?
The INTA will perhaps pardon the DNSO participants for having a certain
skepticism as regards the INTA's commitment to free speech and consumer
protection.

.......................................................................
(i) Task Force

The Names Council shall appoint a special task force to research,
investigate,
and interview potential candidates for the DNSO seats on the ICANN Board.
Members of the Task Force shall be selected from the membership of the DNSO.
Upon completing a list of candidates, said list shall be forwarded by the
Task
Force to the Names Council.
.......................................................................

Comments:

This is more top-down corporatism. If candidates for ICANN Board seats need
to
be searched out, that job should be alloted to an ICANN Board Nominating
Committee,
not any "Task Force". As to "investigating" potential candidates, perhaps
the
INTA would like to entrust that to the FBI?

.......................................................................
ARTICLE V.  OFFICERS, COUNSEL AND EMPLOYEES

Election and Duties

The officers of the DNSO shall be a President, who shall also be Chairperson
of the Names Council, an Executive Vice President, not more than xx other
Vice
Presidents, a Secretary and a Treasurer, each of whom shall be elected from
DNSO members at the Annual meeting by a majority vote to serve until the
next
Annual meeting or until a successor shall have assumed the duties of the
office.  No one shall be eligible to serve successive terms as President.
The
Names Council may likewise elect such other officers as it may from time to
time deem advisable, and they shall perform such duties as the Names Council
may prescribe.
.......................................................................

Comments:

This whole paragraph is not only superfluous but outrageous. The Chairperson
of
Names Council can simply be elected by the Names Council members. There
should
be no Vice Presidents, or any other officers with undefined powers for which
they have no responsibility to the membership. As to the Names Council
selecting
further undefined officers on its own without election by the membership and
prescribing duties to them, any right-minded person can see where that will
lead. All this is in total contradiction to the ICANN bylaws' transparency
and accountability rules.

.......................................................................
 2. President

The President shall preside at all meetings of the DNSO, and shall be the
executive head of the DNSO, directly responsible to the Board of ICANN for
the
conduct of all DNSO operations and activities.  The President shall have the
authority to delegate to Name Council members or Committee Chairpersons such
duties as seem appropriate for the administration thereof under the
Presidentís general supervision.  The President shall submit at each Annual
Meeting of the DNSO a report of the activities of the DNSO during the
proceeding year.
.......................................................................

Comments:

As was argued above, no President is needed, only perhaps a chairperson
selected
from the Names Council membership. But even were there to be a President,
why
in heaven's name should that person be responsible to the Board of ICANN,
and
how could they be, since they are not one of the ICANN Board members from
the
DNSO?

Regarding this superfluous President's authority, since when does anyone
have
the right "to delegate to Name Council members or Committee Chairpersons
such
duties as seem appropriate" to him? That is for the committees to decide, in
agreement with the Names Council members they have elected. If the INTA
wants
to experiment with authoritarian government let them go to South America and
see if they can find a dictator who will accomodate them, although there are
few left there or anywhere else, save perhaps in the INTA's dreams.

.......................................................................
3. Vice President

  (blah-blah-blah)
.......................................................................

Comment:

Strike out all references to Vice-Presidents and other top-down,
non-responsible,
non-accountable, authoritarian corporate manipulators and controllers.

.......................................................................
5. Treasurer

The Treasurer shall have the custody of all monies and securities of the
DNSO
and shall place same in appropriate financial vehicles and repositories in
accordance with guidelines established, at least on an annual basis, by the
Names Council.  The Treasurer shall keep proper books of account and sign
checks and give such surety bonds as the Names Council may require.  The
Treasurer shall make reports on the financial condition of the DNSO at each
Annual Meeting of the DNSO and, whenever called upon to do so, at other
meetings of the DNSO and the ICANN Board.  The Treasurer shall also perform
such other duties as may delegated by the Names Council.  All duties
performed
by the Treasurer shall be subject to the supervision and direction of the
Names Council.  All financial and other records in the custody of the
Treasurer shall be open to the Names Council  and the ICANN Board at all
times
for inspection or audit.  On ceasing to hold office, the Treasurer shall
surrender all records, files, books of account, monies, securities and other
property of the DNSO to a successor or to such other person as shall be
designated by the Names Council..

Counsel

Unless otherwise directed by the ICANN Board, the Names Council shall retain
a
Counsel to serve as legal adviser to the Names Council and to hold office
until the next Annual Meeting of the DNSO.  Counsel shall give such legal
opinions as may be requested by the President or the Names Council.
.......................................................................

Comments:

What are the "financial vehicles" that the INTA is referring to here? Is the
INTA prepared to speculate on the stock market with the DNSO's treasury?

Note that the INTA does not say here that the financial records of the DNSO
shall be open to the membership of the DNSO, but only to the Names Council
(and the ICANN Board?). Whenever the books of an organization are not open
to
its members, it is because there's monkey business afoot. Take a look at the
example that Karl Auerbach provided to the IFWP of a non-profit in
California
whose Board took it completely away from the membership for their personal
benefit and advantage, and whose only recourse was to force open the books
thanks
to a bylaw giving the membership access to them.

No separate counsel ("lawyer") should be permitted the Names Council. If the
DNSO
has to employ lawyers, let these serve for the entire DNSO and not the names
Council or the membership separately. As the INTA has it, it is defining the
Names
Council and the membership as being adversarial. That may be what the INTA
wants,
but it's no good for the DNSO.

.......................................................................
 Executive Director

The DNSO shall employ a full-time [or part-time] executive with the title
Executive Director  who shall be the chief staff executive and who shall be
responsible to the President and to the Names Council.  The employment or
discharge of an Executive Director shall be by the Names Council.

The Executive Director shall participate in the recommendation, formulation
and implementation of policies and programs for the DNSO; shall be
responsible
for the development and implementation of administrative plans and
procedures,
for the administrative operation of the office and the supervision of all
staff personnel; and shall, in conjunction with the Names Council, develop
and
implement a budget for the DNSO.
.......................................................................

Comments:

More authoritarian, unaccountable power for the Names Council. This
individual,
were he allowed to exist, would, together with the President and
Vice-Presidents
(according to the INTA's plan), have all the power in the DNSO and be
accountable
to no one. No, there can be no authorities in any organization related to
ICANN
that are not elected by and responsible to the membership. This whole
paragraph,
together with those on the President, the Vice-Presidents, and other
superfluous
and unaccountable "officers", must be stricken from anything resembling an
application or bylaws of the DNSO or any other organism having to do with
the
ICANN or the Internet.

.......................................................................
ARTICLE VI.  COMMITTEES

Given the importance of having a global consensus on the policies and
procedures developed by DNSO, as well as expertise relating to the
objectives
of the DNSO, the Names Council may create committees for such terms and with
such powers and duties, as it shall deem appropriate.  The nomination of
members to each committee and their election by the Names Council shall be
conducted in the same manner as members of the Names Council are nominated
under Article IV, except that committee members shall be voted on by the
Names
Council rather than by DNSO members.  Each committee shall have the same
class
of membership requirements as the DNSO members set forth under Article III.

Once formed, each committee shall nominate and vote for a Chairperson from
within the committee.  The nominee with the most votes shall be elected
Chairperson for a term of one year.  A Chairperson shall be eligible for
re-election for another one-year term, but
shall not again be eligible for election as Chairperson for a period of one
year thereafter unless nominated for an additional term by a unanimous vote
of
the committee.  The members of each committee shall be appointed for a term
of
one year, and shall be eligible for re-appointment for two successive
subsequent terms of one year each.  All committees shall be responsible to
the
Names Council for the performance of their duties, unless the Names Council
shall otherwise direct.  The duties of the committees shall be those
indicated
by their titles or as may be otherwise assigned to them by the Names
Council.

Regular meetings of each committee may be held without the giving of notice
if
a day of the week, a time, and a place will have been established by the
committee for such meetings.  A majority of the members of each committee
must
be present, either in person or by telephone, radio, television or similar
means of communication, at each meeting of such committee in order to
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.  The act of a majority
of
the members so present at a meeting at which a quorum is present will be the
act of such committee.  Each committee will maintain a record, which need
not
be in the form of complete minutes, of the action taken by it at each
meeting,
which record shall include the date, time, and place of the meeting, the
names
of the committee members present and absent, the action considered, and the
number of votes cast for and against the adoption of the action considered.

All action by each committee shall be reported to the Names Council at its
meeting next succeeding such action for a vote.
.......................................................................

Comments:

These committees are another mechanism by which the INTA intends to
circumvent
any accountability to the membership. Notice, in the first paragraph, that
they
are elected by the Names Council and not by the membership. Notice further
that
they are not required to keep complete minutes of their meetings, and that
they
report to the Names Council, which is nowhere required to report on their
actions
to the membership. None of this can be permitted to occur.

.......................................................................
ARTICLE VII.  MEETINGS

3. Notice

Waiver by a member in writing of notice of a meeting, signed by the member,
shall be equivalent to the giving of such notice.  Attendance by a member,
whether in person or by proxy, at a meeting shall constitute a waiver of
notice of such meeting of which the member has had no notice, unless except
when the member attends the meeting for the express purpose of objecting, at
the beginning of the meeting, to the transaction of any business because the
meeting is not lawfully called or convened.
.......................................................................

Comments:

Perhaps the INTA could explain what they mean by this mumbo-jumbo.

.......................................................................
7. Action by Written Consent

Any action required or permitted to be taken at a meeting may be taken
without
a meeting if consent in writing, setting forth the action so taken, is
signed
by all necessary members.
.......................................................................

Comments:

Remove "is signed by all necessary members" and replace with "is signed by
all
members". We don't want a majority deciding not to have a meeting in order
to
disenfranchise a minority, do we? (By "we" I mean the DNSO participants, not
the INTA, which would seem to want nothing better.)

.......................................................................
ARTICE VIII.  REMOVAL, SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION

3. Suspension or Expulsion of a Member or Disqualification

A member may be suspended for a period or expelled for cause such as
violation
of any of the By-laws of the DNSO or for conduct prejudicial to the best
interests of the DNSO.
A member may be temporarily or permanently disqualified from serving as a
member for cause, such as violation of any of the By-laws of the DNSO or for
conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the DNSO.
Suspension, expulsion or disqualification of a member shall be by a
two-thirds
vote of the entire Names Council, provided that a statement of the charges
shall have been mailed to the member under charges at the last recorded
address at least fifteen (15) days before final action is to be taken
thereon,
accompanied by a notice of the time when and place where the Names Council
is
to take action.  The member shall be given an opportunity to be present at
the
time and place mentioned in such notice and to present a defense, including
the right of representation by counsel and the right of cross-examination.
.......................................................................

Comments:

More McCarthyism, or worse. The Names Council, according to the INTA, will
be
free to throw anyone out of the DNSO who doesn't agree with them. Also, the
language of these paragraphs is insulting and offensive. What does the INTA
mean by "charges" and "defense"? Not content with running the DNSO from
above
and giving all power to unaccountable "executives", here they want to act as
judge and jury. This is what comes of having lawyers in the employ of
reactionary
business interests write the rules for the Internet. This whole section
should
be eliminated, and replaced with either nothing at all or else some
mechanism
reflecting the democratic, bottom-up nature of these organizations, for
example
something similar to Einar Stefferud's Fair Hearing Panels.

.......................................................................
.......................................................................

Final note:

As stated in the prefatory note, the INTA document is inadmissable as a
proposal
for a DNSO application to ICANN because it comes from a special interest
group
which itself has no justifiable claim to being a constituency within the
meaning
of that term as it relates to interest in the DNS, and because the INTA is
no more
than a representative of the business interests which already have a
constituency.
Furthermore, the substance of this document is in such contradiction with
the spirit
and meaning of the ICANN bylaws, by its blatant refusal to adhere to the
rules of
accountability and transparency as well as bottom-up democratic process, as
to preclude
even its consideration as a basis for discussion by the DNSO.

In spite of these contradictions, the leadership of the DNSO and its
drafting
committee have seen fit to not only negotiate with the INTA but to "merge"
the
DNSO's own application proposal, arrived at through arduous discussion and
consensus-making at two international meetings, with the INTA's. The writer
of this
critique calls on all right-minded people interested in the success of the
DNSO's
claim to fairly represent the Internet's DNS interests, to refuse to accept
this
"merger" and to demand that the process of preparing an application
representing the
community's consensus be reinstated immediately.
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