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[wg-c] Re: [wg-c-1] Compromise
This is the most intelligent and constructive proposal I have seen yet.
I urge everyone in the working group to look it over. I cannot endorse
it yet, or propose modifications, because I am still studying it and
sending it about to people I respect for consultation.
I will say this, however:
I agree with the primary goals stated here: elimination of artifical
scarcity, and discouragement of the temptation to use domain delegations
as a form of content control.
I also agree with the basic approach. What we have in the domain name
space are competing property rights claims and the most intelligent and
constructive thing to do is to face them head on and attempt to resolve
them in constructive fashions.
This can form the basis for real progress.
--Milton Mueller
Craig Simon wrote:
> A Plan to End the DNS War
>
> 1. Scope
>
> The proposals in this document are offered for consideration
> by the Internet community and particularly by ICANN's DNSO
> Working Group C, Drafting Committee 1. This committee has
> been tasked to make recommendations concerning new gTLD
> deployment in the IANA-approved root zone.
>
> 2. Concepts
>
> 2a. Compromise
>
> It is time to reunify and strengthen the Internet's name
> space. Rapid and broad expansion of the number of IANA-
> approved gTLDs should be pursued. I propose starting with a
> compromise aimed at integrating certain non-IANA zones into
> the legacy Internet name space.
>
> The plan to increase the number of gTLDs may be summarized
> as follows: Settle disputes with operators of zones which
> have been the subject of divisive contests. Begin gTLD
> service for those zones first. Follow by adding the TLD
> candidates suggested to the IANA in 1995 and 1996.[1] Then
> continue to augment the IANA root with suggestions offered
> by a broadly-based and informed Internet community.
>
> 2b. Goals
>
> Such expansion is intended to accelerate the commodification
> of domain names in ways that would preclude any artificial
> scarcity of names. This approach should expedite the reduction
> in price of domain name registration for the consumer. It is
> safe to expect that price competition and market
> differentiation will become more pronounced at the registrar
> level as the number of commodity gTLDs proliferates.
>
> To reduce the likelihood that any future regime of Internet
> administration might seek to impose speech or content
> control through DNS management, and to guarantee the
> abundant availability of names in all gTLDs, ICANN should
> avoid models of gTLD differentiation which restrict second
> level domain name registrations within particular gTLD
> suffixes. This does not preclude the construction of
> specialized zones elsewhere in the Internet's name space,
> under ccTLDs or under SLDs at the 3LD level and below.
>
> 2c. Strategy
>
> The first gTLD added to the listing of the IANA-defined
> legacy root should be .web.
>
> I propose that verifiably current SLD registrations now
> listed in any non-IANA .web zones will be "grandfathered"--
> enfranchised in the IANA-approved .web gTLD. The .web zones
> operated by IODesign and Name.Space are apparently the only
> such zones currently offering commoditized service. I
> further propose that incentives be provided to encourage the
> non-IANA zone registry operators to join the ICANN-
> administered system as registrars.
>
> This model should be followed in good faith for domain name
> holders in other publicly-offered non-IANA zones so that the
> Internet's name space will be as unified as possible before
> augmenting the legacy root with more gTLDs.
>
> 3. Commentary
>
> 3a. Coherence and Commodification in the Internet Name Space
>
> The thrust of this proposal is to reunify the Internet's
> public name space by settling outstanding claims to gTLD
> zone authority.
>
> Resolution of the controversy surrounding .web must be given
> priority. The issue has been a recurring source of
> political tension because the zone is unusually attractive,
> offering a very high potential for popularity and market
> success as a gTLD. The .web suffix was among the very first
> and most frequent new gTLD requests submitted to Jon Postel
> after NSI commodified domain name registrations in September
> 1995 (These requests came separately from, in order, Scott
> Adams, Mike Lester, Chris Ambler, and Craig Harkins[1]). It
> was one of the seven new gTLDs designated by the IAHC in
> early 1997. And it has been the subject of an unsuccessful
> law suit by IODesign and a long public campaign waged by
> Chris Ambler, an officer of that corporation. Name.space and
> Paul Garrin have also undertaken litigation demanding rights
> to sell registrations in .web and other zones.
>
> My judgment as a long standing observer of these events[2]
> is that Mr. Ambler's claims to have been granted authority
> over .web by the IANA in July 1996 do not hold up.
> Nevertheless, it is possible that the officers of IODesign
> may reinitiate litigation if a .web zone registry other than
> theirs is added to the IANA-approved root. ICANN must be
> prepared for such a contingency in the event this proposed
> compromise is not accepted.
>
> A suitable compromise must be both practical and principled.
> ICANN must confront this issue and seek an amicable
> resolution that is mutually satisfactory to all parties for
> the following reason: A coherent name space is essential to
> the integrity and stable operation of Internet-based
> communication.
>
> Responsible administration of the Internet therefore
> requires integration of .web and other existing publicly-
> offered non-IANA zones into the legacy root. The zone is
> strategically valuable because of its ready memorability as
> a public Internet identifier. Nothing is to be gained if it
> were to be ignored or left idle, while countless more months
> or even years of dispute over its authority would be costly
> and unnecessary. Settlement of these disputes will fortify
> confidence in the strength and stability of the IANA system
> and will punctuate the transition to a new era of reliable
> and responsive Internet management.
>
> Below I offer two scenarios for compromise. Two are
> necessary because another outstanding policy matter must be
> settled first: ICANN's endorsement of a proprietary or a
> shared registry model.
>
> 3b. Option 1: Implementing .web as a Proprietary TLD
>
> Reunification of the Internet's name space deserves higher
> priority than preference for the non-profit SRS business
> model over the proprietary gTLD model. It is better to see a
> monopolized for-profit .web in the legacy root rather than
> no .web at all.
>
> If a properly constituted ICANN board deems a proprietary
> gTLD model to be acceptable, there would be no principled or
> practical reason to deny existing non-IANA zone
> proprietorships admission into the legacy root. Moreover,
> it would be inappropriate and unfair to focus on creating
> new gTLD proprietorships in a market where existing
> proprietorships are still being denied visibility in the
> legacy roots. The proper course would be to resolve disputes
> for primacy between proprietorships which claim authority
> over identically named zones. If competing parties can not
> be reconciled, ICANN should establish the sort of Fair
> Hearing Councils which have been suggested elsewhere.
>
> 3c. Option 2: Engineering the Transition to Shared gTLDs:
>
> I have stated some arguments in support of shared not-for-
> profit TLDs elsewhere.[4] Regardless of my own preference
> for it, I do not believe a broadly-based and informed Internet
> community has yet endorsed or rejected this model. Nor would
> I argue that the White Paper mandated one model over the
> other.
>
> Yet it is clear that if a properly constituted ICANN board
> adopts the CORE type of non-profit registry / distributed
> registrars model, the transition period is bound to be
> politically more complex and technically less familiar than
> simply expanding the number of monopoly proprietorships.
> NSI's legacy of rapid growth and high profitability will
> continue to tempt other businesses into running their own
> zone registries, even if this means offering service outside
> of the legacy root and undermining the coherence and
> operational stability of the Internet's name space.
>
> If ICANN commits to the shared registry model, I propose
> that ICANN should offer what might be called a double
> enfranchisement to the operators of contended zones: 1)
> Offer the zone proprietor an expedited application to become
> an ICANN-approved registrar, a generous discount on any fees
> required to attain registrar status, and a temporary (30-60
> day) opportunity to function as the exclusive initial
> registrar for that gTLD, and; 2) Offer holders of domain
> names within the zones at issue a free year of inclusion the
> IANA-approved shared registry.
>
> The domain name holder's enfranchisement can be referred to
> as "grandfathering." In practice, this funds the amount any
> registrar would have to redeem to the IANA-approved shared
> registry for each domain name record. This covers the
> standard cost of maintaining the domain name record as well
> as any additional fees that might be required by ICANN.
> Grandfathering can play out in one of two ways: 1) The
> credit would be used to offset the ex-proprietor's (and
> newly constituted registrar's) cost of listing the domain
> name holder in the IANA-approved registry, or; 2) In case
> the proprietor is not willing to participate in the ICANN
> system, the credit would be used to enlist an existing
> ICANN-approved registrar to provide free service for one
> year to the domain holder. This encourages the alternate
> registrar to build a relationship with the domain name
> holder by effectively subsidizing the fees the registrar
> would be obliged to pay to list the record in an IANA-
> approved registry.
>
> In either circumstance the existing domain name holder will
> be granted visibility to hundreds of millions of users in
> the legacy root as soon as possible.
>
> The new gTLD would be introduced into the IANA root in a way
> that enhances coherence and operational stability. Care must
> be taken to avoid penalizing the holder whose domain name is
> being copied into the IANA-approved TLD. In the best case,
> if the existing zone proprietor becomes an ICANN registrar,
> the domain name holder would not be inconvenienced in any
> way. The holder can simply maintain its relationship with
> the registrar, or can choose a new registrar if desired.
>
> In the worst case, if the proprietor balks, there might be
> some confusion experienced by the domain name holder as the
> new circumstances become clear. In such a case it would be
> necessary to add the domain name record and any available
> contact information to the list of one of the ICANN-approved
> registrars. Then the domain name holder would be notified
> that one year of free service within the IANA-approved gTLD
> is being provided by way of that registrar. The domain name
> holder would then face the choice of sustaining the
> relationship with one or both of the zone registrars. It is
> safe to assume that the registration which guarantees
> visibility in the legacy root would be more attractive.
>
> This grandfathering strategy is designed to smooth the
> transition to a unified root. If successful it will help
> migrate as many as 40,000 registrants from non-IANA zones
> into gTLDs within the legacy root. It intends no prejudice
> or penalty against domain holders whose zone proprietors in
> the worst case may refuse to join the legacy root, despite
> being encouraged to join as registrars under generous
> circumstances. In other words, the compromise is structured
> to forge coherence in the Internet's domain name space, so
> that new gTLDs can be added under the most auspicious
> possible circumstances
>
> Since the number of domain name holders in non-IANA zones is
> small, this registrant-subsidization and registrar-discount
> strategy will have a negligible impact on the shared
> registry's and ICANN's revenue streams. The greatest cost
> to all participants involves learning the art of compromise.
> It is a cost that must be widely dispersed. Nevertheless, it
> is clear that the potential benefits of unifying the Internet's
> name space far outweigh the costs of sustaining the present
> conflict.
>
> 4. Contingencies:
>
> If any of the suggestions introduced here are ultimately
> incorporated in the final product of this drafting group,
> their implementation should be deferred pending ratification
> by a fully constituted ICANN board. I believe it is
> necessary to first decide the question of proprietary vs.
> shared gTLD registries before determining which compromise
> to pursue, and that ICANN's interim/initial board is
> not yet sufficiently representative of the Internet
> community to set this policy.
>
> Craig Simon
> 14 July, 1999
> cls@flywheel.com
>
> Notes
>
> [1] Jon Postel. "The IANA's File of iTLD Requests."
> http://www.gtld-mou.org/gtld-discuss/mail-archive/00990.html
>
> [2] Craig Simon, Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Miami's
> School of International Studies. A page relevant of links and
> writings is available at http://flywheel.com/ircw/overview.html .
>
> [3] Pending the satisfaction of technical criteria pertaining to
> the connectivity, interoperability, and scalability of the
> registry, and perhaps social criteria pertaining to security and
> inclusivity. These parameters are fundamental to the scope of
> this proposal to Discussion Group C.
>
> [4] Craig Simon. "My Response to the Green Paper."
> http://www.flywheel.com/ircw/gpsubmit.html
--
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syracuse university http://istweb.syr.edu/~mueller/