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Re: [wg-c] WG questions
David urged, a couple of days ago, that we need to think about a ICANN
mechanism for determining which individuals or companies get to run which
gTLDs. Along somewhat the same lines, Kent's suggested a process for
getting gTLD/registries approved:
>1. Someone is motivated to have a new TLD, or perhaps a set of
>TLDs. For example, Todd Cohen could propose a set of TLDs to mimic
>TM classifications.
>2. That entity proposes a WG on the subject to the NC, following
>roughly the IETF procedures. Under normal circumstances, given that
>the proper homework has been done, the WG charter is reasonable,
>that there appears sufficient interest, etc etc, the WG is approved,
>and goes off to try to work. As with any WG, participation is open
>to anyone.
>3. The positive outcome of the WG would be a policy document
>specifying the TLDs in question, defining any special conditions or
>TLD charters, describing special restrictions that may exist on
>registries or registrars, and so on. A negative outcome would be a
>failure to produce such a document.
>4. The document would then go to the NC for review and possible
>iteration.
>5. Upon final approval by the NC, the policy on the specific new
>TLDs would be passed on to the ICANN board.
I can imagine a variety of different approaches we could take here, and it
seems to me that they fall on a continuum between two polar extremes. On
one extreme, we might have a decision-making process taking into account
the particular facts of every proposed gTLD, including its operator, name,
charter, etc., and applying broad, informal, ad hoc, situationally
sensitive policies to determine whether, on balance, the world would be a
better place if the proposal were approved. Kent's suggestion lies fairly
close to this pole. (I don't know, under his proposal, if different
entities all wanted to run the same new TLD, whether their differences
would be reconciled in a single WG or what.)
At the other extreme, we might have an approach under which the
decision-maker would do its evaluation by looking to a set of simple,
hard-edged, black-letter rules, so that the results turned mechanically on
the answers to specific factual questions. For example, ICANN might
establish a set of objective, published rules (1) setting qualifications
designed to weed out the incompetent, undercapitalized, irresponsible,
fly-by-night and/or criminal; (2) designating strings that may not be used
to identify a TLD; (3) limiting any registry operator to __ TLDs; and (4)
requring that a registry {must, must not} be non-profit and/or shared.
Having done that, it could select a predetermined number of applicants
meeting these criteria by FCFS or lottery.[*]
An advantage of the first approach is that no relevant factor would be
off-limits to the decision-makers; they could do their best to choose who
they thought the *really best* entity to run a given TLD would be. That
question, though, in this sort of context, is commonly insufficiently
determined, and effectively unanswerable. An advantage of the second
approach is that it would simplify the decisionmaking process, making it
more difficult for the decisionmaker to engage in biased or arbitrary
decision-making, and making results more predictable. (That's true of
hard-edged rules in general. Think about the rule that one can vote in the
U.S. at age 18. The rule isn't perfect — some 17- year-olds are very
capable and mature, and many 22-year-olds aren't -- but using a rule is
obviously much better than having a bureaucrat examine each person
individually, regardless of age, and decide ad hoc whether he's mature
enough to vote.)
I'd like to suggest that we lean towards the second approach. Requiring
every new TLD and its affiliated registry to go through a WG, the Names
Council and the ICANN Board, I suspect, will be a slow process that, in the
highly politicized and contentious gTLD context, will maximize
opportunities for lobbying, political considerations, obstruction, and
hidden bias and arbitrariness. If we want it to be easy to accredit new
gTLD/registries, it seems to me, ICANN should set out the governing rules
at the outset so that its actual approval process can be largely mechanical
rather than discretionary. Am I wrong about this?
-----------------------------------------
[*] In the first round, as Craig points out, we need to address the
equitable claims of folks like the ORSC registry operators and CORE, who
have an argument that they have a special claim to get into the ICANN root
in the first round. I don't mean to deal with that issue here.
Jon
Jon Weinberg
Professor of Law, Wayne State University
weinberg@msen.com
At 11:59 AM 7/14/99 -0700, Kent Crispin wrote:
>On Wed, Jul 14, 1999 at 04:24:33PM +0100, Ivan Pope wrote:
[snip]
>> What should be the mechanism for developing new gTLDs after all these are
>> deployed?
>> - Aha, this is the 64,000 dollar question. Though I would hope that we can
>> define a mechanism that will deploy all gTLDs from the beginning, not just
>> the 'next set'. There is no presumption that there is any first set of
>> gTLDs.
>
>May I suggest that the mechanism, at least in embryonic rough
>outline, is before our eyes, and that we are participating in it? To
>be more explicit, here is my viewof the process:
>
>1. Someone is motivated to have a new TLD, or perhaps a set of
>TLDs. For example, Todd Cohen could propose a set of TLDs to mimic
>TM classifications.
>
>2. That entity proposes a WG on the subject to the NC, following
>roughly the IETF procedures. Under normal circumstances, given that
>the proper homework has been done, the WG charter is reasonable,
>that there appears sufficient interest, etc etc, the WG is approved,
>and goes off to try to work. As with any WG, participation is open
>to anyone.
>
>3. The positive outcome of the WG would be a policy document
>specifying the TLDs in question, defining any special conditions or
>TLD charters, describing special restrictions that may exist on
>registries or registrars, and so on. A negative outcome would be a
>failure to produce such a document.
>
>4. The document would then go to the NC for review and possible
>iteration.
>
>5. Upon final approval by the NC, the policy on the specific new
>TLDs would be passed on to the ICANN board.
>
>I deliberately did not say "gTLD" in the above description. I
>expect that the same process could be used for chartered TLDs, or
>other special purpose TLDs.
>
>--
>Kent Crispin "Do good, and you'll be
>kent@songbird.com lonesome." -- Mark Twain
>
>