Re[2]: [wg-c] Separating the Sheep from the Goats

["William X. Walsh" <william@dso.net>]

Finally, we get to some substance.

Thank you Kevin for putting out a starting point for us.

Friday, August 20, 1999, 1:17:25 PM, Kevin J. Connolly <CONNOLLK@rspab.com> wrote:

> I agree this is a legitimate linkage.  For instance, it doesn't do a whole lot of
> good if ICANN adds 18 new GTLDs, all administered by NSI :-0

> So . . . let me try a second cut:

> Three-phase rollout:

> (A) Proof of concept phase.  

> Anticipated duration: six weeks

> Domains to be added: .per, .nom, and at least one other non-commercial
> domain.

> Registries: Iperdome, CORE, and one other (ideally, a for-profit registry allowing
> multiple registrars write access to the zone file).

> Qualification Criteria: outside the scope of question one, but should include, at
> a minimum, the registry's agreement to "surrender the domain" if it does not
> meet objective criteria for customer service, reliability, survivability.  (I.e., for
> immediate purposes, let us agree that there will be objective conditions,
> stipulated in advance, under which the proof of concept operator will lose the
> domain; such operator should be "reimbursed" by the successor in some way,
> but not necessarily at once and not necessarily 100%; again, we defer these
> details in the interest of sketching the big picture now.)

> (B) Controlled RollOut Phase

> Anticipated Duration: Six Months

> Domains to be added: Those elected by the qualifying registries (not more than
> three each in addition to the proof of concept domains), subject to certain
> qualifications:

> (1) The registry must articulate a plan for preventing it from reaping monopoly
> profits during the controlled rollout phase.  These could include (but other
> possibilities are invited) (a) CORE-paradigm shared registration with registry
> operated on strict cost-recovery regime, (b) Informal tariff-filing under which
> compensation of registry/registrar is fixed during the Controlled RollOut Phase.

> (2) The TLD must not be one which is the same as or confusingly similar to any
> famous trademark, unless the holder of the trademark assents irrevocably to
> the delegation of the TLD.

> (3) In the event of a conflict over delegation of TLDs (e.g., .web) the TLD will
> not be delegated unless the ICANN Board determines that the adverse claims
> to the TLD are not bona fide or otherwise without merit.  Note that California
> has an expedited method for court review of the determinations of corporate
> boards.  There is one legal trick to making this work: ICANN will need to waive,
> by amendment to its certificate of incorporation, the right to assert that the
> decision to add a TLD to the root falls within its exclusive business judgment. 
> This change will make it possible for adverse claimants actually to be heard in
> court on the actual merits of their claims to the TLD in question.

> (4) All domains delegated prior to the full competition phase are subject to
> reallocation and re-award on the basis prevailing during the full competition
> phase.

> Number of Registries: up to nine.  Qualification of registries to be based on
> stable, objective criteria established at the outset of the program.

> (C) First Stable Plateau

> This is the hard part.  Most of the problem will evaporate once entry into the
> domain name business becomes unrestricted.  For the most part, annual
> redelegation of domains based on bids will not be necessary, because a new
> registry can simply get a new TLD.

> However, there are always going to be some uniquely hot domains. .xxx, .sex,
> and .law come to mind most immediately.  These domains will generate
> monopoly profits for their operators, and some of us have a lingering discomfort
> about allocating this kind of economic power on a lottery or first-come basis.

Up until this point I agree with most everything in principle, subject
to minor modifications that have no bearing on the substance of your
suggestion.

> One idea: if a registry is operated on a strict cost recovery basis and allows
> write access to registrars without unreasonable restraint (and I reiterate that
> CORE does not meet this criterion because the price of the admission ticket to
> the club is unreasonably high) then the registry can keep the domain as long as
> it satisfies technical criteria and it remains subject to periodic audit (at the
> expense of the registry) to keep it honest.  If the registry is operated on a for-profit basis, then the domain will be re-awarded periodically on the basis of a
> bidding process.  What the period should be, we can work on (I'm thinking
> annual).  

You can so close here.

Strike this part, and you have agreement with me :

> If the registry is operated on a for-profit basis, then the domain
> will be re-awarded periodically on the basis of a bidding process.


Moving on....

> How we select the winning bidder is also debatable.  I'm thinking that ICANN
> should take into account not only the license fee proposed by the bidder for
> being delegated the domain, but also what commitment the registry makes with
> respect to end-user fees.  If the domain is reasonably expected to capture
> 1,000,000 SLD registrations per annum and the market will bear a charge of
> $50.00 per name-year, a bidder who offers $10MM up front should be treated
> the same as one who offers $5MM up front and agrees to limit charges to
> $45.00 per name-year.

I have to strongly oppose this part.  This does not take into account
the vast variety of business models that can be developed, including a
non-profit TLD operated by a volunteer group such as the dhs.org
project.  It also effectively sets a price line for domains, and sets
up an inherent entry barrier that is FAR beyond what is actually
required to operate a TLD.  Funding for ICANN should not be in this
fashion.  We can come up with a much better solution with more
accountability, and that doesn't place such an unfair burden on new
registries.  Set the technical limitations and other requirements
appropriate and you will have a fair entry barrier, that will result
in more diversity.

All this suggestion would do is propagate the "big commercial" model.
Come on, we all know that when competition is truly present, the real
money will not be made in domain registrations themselves.  It's just
not profitable that way.

The best way, both for the registries and the consumers, is to have a
much lower "financial" barrier and set up strict technical
requirements.

>>> HELLO?  There isn't going to be consensus about this issue.
>>> Let's stop kidding ourselves.
>>
>>GOODBYE? Don't give up yet....
>>

> This is not giving up.  It's a redirection away from the ongoing quest for the Holy
> Grail of Consensus and toward starting to produce the kind of report that CAN
> be produced, even if only five members of the WG sign it.

I fully support this, and would like to commend Kevin for getting the
ball rolling.  This is what I have been waiting for, and it is nice to
see someone really willing to discuss specifics and back up their
reasons for supporting/not supporting them.

This is the kind of dialog we need.

--
William X. Walsh - DSo Internet Services
Email: william@dso.net  Fax:(209) 671-7934
Editor of http://www.dnspolicy.com/

(IDNO MEMBER)
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