[wg-c] Comments on the Brunner proposal

[Milton Mueller <mueller@syr.edu>]

I want to point out that if the open-market, competitive model advocated in my
position paper is adopted, Brunner's proposed registry would stand the best chance
of being adopted. There are differences, which I discuss below, but for now let's
concentrate on the way in which our proposal would meet the needs suggested by
Eric's proposal.

Eric's philosophical and ideological discussions about the relative merits of
"chartered," private, and public registries, IMHO, are quite irrelevant to his
proposal. What we have here is a registry coming to ICANN with a proposal to run a
particular TLD, in this case, NAA.  The prospective registry operator(s) selected
the name and defined a set of policies. That is basically the model we (there are
now six signatories) advocate. That is, the initiative should come from the end
users and operators, not from the top down.

In an open market system, Eric and his council(s) could come to ICANN with a
technically valid proposal for registry at any time, and the policy and geographic
scoping applied to registration would be theirs to decide. ICANN would neither
endorse nor amend it. The presumption under our  system would be that Eric would
get his registry unless there was something illegal, technically unworkable or
financially suspect. There is no significant distinction between gTLDs and
sponsored TLDs. Indeed, that distinction is artificial. Nor does it matter a lot
whether Brunner's motives are commercial or non-commercial. Under an open system,
the needs of both commercial and non-commercial operators can be accommodated.

There are important differences, however, between the prospects of
minority-proposed TLDs under the open market system and the Crispin-proposed
regime which Brunner endorsed.

1. Perhaps the most important difference is that the grant of a TLD right under
our proposal is always open to competition, and would carry no special status or
any implication that the holder acted exclusively on behalf of some designated
community. Another group of native Americans could come along and start their own
TLD, using a different string, at any time. I submit that this is a far superior
model. If Brunner is sincere about this:

>      We differ. The decisions made by elites reflect the composition
>      of, and common motivations of the elites.

...then he will agree. Elites are elites, whether they are native American, ICANN,
or NSI-based. There ought to be the possibility of competition at any time.

2. In the Crispin regime, ICANN is selecting a "public trustee" for a specific
category. That means that ICANN must be prepared to evaluate the status of the
applicant with respect to the policy it intends to enforce and the community it
claims to represent. I submit that ICANN is in no position to do anything of that
sort, and indeed no one in their right mind *wants* a global corporation devoted
to technical coordination of the Internet to be in that position. Jon Postel
wisely refrained from getting into the business of deciding what is a country,
realizing that it would drag IANA into geopolitics in ways that could only be
destructive. Brunner and Crispin's approach to chartered TLDs pushed  seem to be
asking ICANN to decide, on a *global* basis, who is the proper representative of
the world's ethnic groups, who is the most appropriate agency to handle a "travel"
TLD, a "sports" TLD, and so on. I think the lunacy of such a policy is
self-evident, but I would be happy to elaborate on experiences with public trustee
licensing in the broadcasting sphere if anyone is interested.

3. Once a TLD becomes a grant of public trustee status, then the process of
assignment is politicized. That actually *decreases* the chance that minority
interests will be effectively exercised. Many political and ethnic groups will be
contending for status under such a regime and there's no reason why Brunner's
should be first in line.