Re: [wg-review] 3. [Constituencies]

["Rod Dixon, J.D., LL.M." <rod@cyberspaces.org>]

Milton,

I certainly agree with you that adding one new constituency to the DNSO is
insufficient to make the DNSO more productive and reflective of a democratic
process. The individual domain name registrants constituency is only one
example of how the DNSO lacks true representation of Internet stakeholders.
I think we can agree on modifications that would alter the voting power on
the NC, and the problem of multiple memberships in the constituencies. I
would hesitate to sign on to an agenda to radically alter the DNSO structure
since that is almost certainly the death knell to the influence of the work
product from this WG.  In other words, we would be wasting our time. Or, am
I off base? Is there consensus to take on an ambitious program like the one
Karl and Milton suggest?

Rod

----- Original Message -----
From: "Milton Mueller" <Mueller@syr.edu>
To: <wg-review@dnso.org>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2000 12:27 PM
Subject: Re: [wg-review] 3. [Constituencies]


>
> >>> "Rod Dixon, J.D., LL.M." <rod@cyberspaces.org> 12/29/00 09:32AM >>>
>
> I suggest we start with threshold questions. For example: Is the DNSO
constituency structure representative of Internet stakeholder interests?
>
> Rod and all:
> The problem is deeper, much deeper, than the simple fact that there is no
individual's constituency.
>
> The real problem is that the existing constituency structure has been
deliberately gerrymandered to augment the power of some groups and diminish
or eliminate the influence of other groups.
>
> Under the current structure, all you need are ten solid votes on the Names
Council. If you have that, it doesn't matter at all what other
constituencies think, nor what the "consensus of the Internet community" is.
You can just block anything you like, or ram through anything you like.
>
> It is a travesty to call the current DNSO a "consensus management"
process. I think Bret Fausett's earlier comments were saying something
similar. It is a political process in which control of votes counts, nothing
else.
>
> I will go a bit further and indicate who controls the votes. There is a
longstanding axis composed of the IP, B&C, Registrar and Registry
constituencies. The ISP constituency is also basically part of it. These
groups have worked out a "consensus" among themselves as to what will and
will not happen.
>
> The current constituency structure makes this possible. It basically gives
the businesses who believe in subordinating DNS to trademark protection 4
constituencies, and those who oppose them one or no constituencies.
>
> Consider the following case: AIM, an organization of major European brand
holders, is a member of the Business and commercial constituency. That
organization's representative, Phil Shepard, is on the Names Council. Now
obviously, as an organization devoted to brand holders, AIM is concerned
primarily if not exclusively with trademark protection. Likewise, AT&T, a
major lobbying force, is an ISP, a member of B&C, and holder of hundreds of
trademarks. So these groups, who do not represent more people or even more
investment stake in the Internet than, say, the non-commercial constituency,
can play around in three or four constituencies, whereas other points of
view are confined to one.
>
> Just do the political arithmetic.
>
> Adding an individuals' constituency is not going to change much. IF we are
going to retain a constituency structure at all (and I'm not convinced we
should) we need to completely rework it.
>
>
>
>
>