[wg-review] Regarding Veto Power

["babybows.com" <webmaster@babybows.com>]

Jonathan Weinberg was kind enough to forward to me these remarks regarding
the proposal advanced by Jefsey Morfin:

1.      Under these rules, it would appear that 10% of the GA could
self-organize as the "oatmeal body," and then the *same* 10% could
self-organize as the "porridge body," and have the two votes necessary to
block consensus (since, after all, "no individual or entity shall be
excluded from participation in a Body merely because of participation in
another Body.")  Compare this language from the 2/4/99 "Paris draft" for the
DNSO:

a. Members of the General Assembly shall self-organize into diverse
constituencies. No member shall be a member of more than one constituency.
The initial constituencies shall be recognized by the ICANN Board based on
the following criteria:  Constituencies other than the constituency
representing registries, shall represent at least 5% of the members of the
General Assembly.  Constituencies shall be open to membership without regard
to geographic
location.  Constituencies shall adopt open and transparent processes that
comply with these Rules and the ICANN Bylaws.  Constituencies shall not be
formed or recognized insofar as they are based on geographic location,
religious affiliation, governmental affiliation, or membership in any
particular corporation or organization.

2.      I suspect that even without that problem, under these rules, the
DNSO could *never* produce a consensus declaration on any remotely
interesting issue.  For example, we could not have gotten a declaration in
favor of adding new gTLDs, since both IPC and B&C were hostile.  That's true
with the eight initial bodies you propose, and it's even more true if the
number of bodies grows over time, but the veto of any two of the (many)
bodies can still block a resolution.  Part of this relates to a
contradiction at ICANN's heart -- ICANN purports to operate by consensus,
but it was formed to decide controversial policy issues for which consensus
is unavailable.  But to resolve that contradiction by requiring that all GA
resolutions have the acquiescence of all bodies (or all but one) will likely
make the DNSO incapable of passing anything, which will by default leave
ICANN staff in the position of making all of the decisions themselves.

Jon
-------------------------------------------------

Jonathan's discerning comments are well appreciated.  The last line of the
proposed resolution that reads, 'The veto of any two such bodies will thwart
a declaration of consensus by the GA' should probably be eliminated.  As
long as the entire GA votes on any consensus policy formulation (thereby
making its collective will known), there is no truly overriding need for a
veto mechanism.   Such mechanisms only allow for the politics of "capture".
This is not what is needed in a bottoms-up organization.

There is also merit in the Paris draft figure of 5%, (about 15 members in
view of the current size of the voting registry).  10% might be too unwieldy
at a time when probably less than 30% of the members of the voting registry
actually participate on either the GA or WG list.

Best regards,
Danny Younger


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