[council] gTLD Registry Constituency Memorandum on proposed new SO

[Cary Karp <ck@nrm.se>]

MEMORANDUM

July 24, 2001

At the Stockholm meeting in early June, the ccTLD managers present
voted unanimously to withdraw from the DNSO and form a ccTLD
Supporting Organization.

The gTLD Registry Constituency of the DNSO recently formed a task
force to survey the contractual and other issues raised by the
possible formation of a ccTLD SO.  We ask the ICANN community to
consider the following questions.

-- Chuck Gomes, chair, gTLD Registry Constituency

I.  Contractual questions

A. Will it be a condition of creation of a new SO that the ccTLDs be
required to enter into a contract with ICANN? Will that contract
require compliance with consensus policies?  If not, especially with
regard to open ccTLDs, would that constitute inequitable treatment
in violation of ByLaw and contract requirements?

B. What should be the relationship between a ccTLD-ICANN contract on
re-delegation to a general ICANN policy on presumptive right to
renewal for uTLDs (unsponsored TLDs) or sTLDs (sponsored TLDs)?

II.  Reasons to have SOs

A. If the rationale for creation of a ccTLD SO is (at least in part)
based on ensuring the payment of fees to ICANN, would that rationale
also support creation of other SOs more directly reflecting the
interests and views of others who also pay a high portion of ICANN
fees?

B. If the rationale for a ccTLD SO involves assuring adequate
representation on the ICANN Board of those whose interests may
diverge and who are bound by contracts with ICANN, would that
support creation of numerous additional SOs to reflect the distinct
interests of gTLDs, sTLDs, registrars, registrants, etc.?

C. Are sTLDs sufficiently differently situated from uTLDs, with
respect to their contractual relationships with ICANN and the role
of Sponsoring Organizations in the development of policies, that
they should have their own SO?

III.  Creation of policies

A. If ccTLDs had their own SO, would domain name policy issues be
required to be referred, routinely, to two or more SOs? Will that
increase or diminish the difficulty of developing and documenting
consensus policies?

B. Would a ccTLD SO have multiple constituencies, allowing groups
affected by ccTLD policies to participate in ccTLD policy creation?

C. Would gTLD registries have input into ccTLD SO deliberations or
would ccTLDs have input into DNSO deliberations? If not, how would
disagreements be resolved?  Would the Board resolve such disputes?
How would consensus among affected parties be developed and
documented?

IV.  Effect on the DNSO

A. If a ccTLD SO were created, what structural changes in any
remaining DNSO would be necessary?

B. Would current contractual documents be required to be revised if
the Names Council no longer existed or if it was not a definitive
source of judgment on consensus policies impacting gTLD registries?
Should gTLD registries agree to any such changes?

V.  Board membership

A. If a ccTLD SO were allowed to elect a specified number of members
of the ICANN Board, would that diminish the role of the DNSO in
selecting Board members? Would it increase the number of Board
members familiar with registry operations?

B. Would creation of an sTLD SO increase the representation of the
"registry voice" on the Board? If sTLDs declined to continue to
participate in the DNSO, would that force the creation of a separate
SO for each category of registry?

C. If the main job of the Board is to recognize documented
consensus, should Board membership be reallocated to assure that
every group that could prevent a consensus (or unmask a false claim
of consensus) on important policy issues has an appropriate voice?

VI.  Structural proposals

A. What structural changes will make sense in light of ICANN's
purpose?

B. Should restructuring provide an occasion for reallocating fees
and costs across a wider array of groups?

C. Should a restructuring lead to substantial innovations in meeting
structure and use of online deliberation tools?

D. Would a realignment of interests around SOs, combined with
separate at large elections of a few Board members and the creation
of an open forum for public participation in each SO, help to
resolve disputes concerning representation of registrants and
individuals, diminish complaints regarding capture of the DNSO by
particular constituencies and overlaps between DNSO constituencies,
fix the dysfunctional performance of the General Assembly and Names
Council, and remedy other problems?