[ga] (fwd) [nc-str] Structure - Past, Present and Future

[DPF <david@farrar.com>]

Below is a post from me to the Structure Taskforce.  I would welcome
feedback, support, dissent, suggestions about the post (and specific
apsects of it) and if there is a clear consensus or feeling on issues
I will report these back also.  I realise this is difficult as certain
aspects of recommendations are far from detailed.

DPF

On Sun, 16 Dec 2001 10:44:51 +1300, DPF <david@farrar.com> wrote:

>Firstly apologies in advance for the lack of brevity but I wish to
>explore in some detail the problems I have with both our current
>structure and how the ALSC recommendations will work with that, and
>finally some suggestions.
>
>In *theory* the structure of ICANN is excellent.  A three way split
>between domain names organisations, IP addresses organisations and
>protocols organisations balanced by at large users.  Each SO gets
>three board members and the at large nine.
>
>The concept has always been that the grunty policy work will be done
>in a consensus seeking manner in each SO and the Board process would
>be not quite a rubber stamp but merely a check the proposal is not
>repugnant and has followed proper process.
>
>The reality though has been massively different.  In our own area of
>the DNSO there has been almost no useful input into domain name
>policy.  The Board adopted its own variation of the UDRP, the Names
>Council was pretty much ignored on the Verisign variation issues, the
>DNSO was told that even stuff such as changing the rules so there is a
>registry/registrar split in *.com is not a policy issue for the DNSO,
>the GAC gets listened to more than the DNSO on policy about domain
>name exclusion etc.  This list is not to beat up on anyone but to
>recognise that the status quo is not working at all well, at least in
>some eyes.  The Board and the staff are deciding domain name policy to
>the near exclusion of the DNSO as a formal body.
>
>This has caused me to relook at the ICANN structure and how the board
>is comprised.  The first issue which strikes me is why do the three
>current SOs have equal votes on the Board?  It appears to date 95% of
>Board time and decisions have been taken up by domain name issues,
>around 4% by Internet addressing issues and maybe 1% by protocol
>issues.  It appears to me that the DNSO is seriously under represented
>on the Board and this could well contribute to why the Board feels
>able to ignore the DNSO on so many issues.
>
>Now looking at the DNSO itself one has seven constituencies each with
>equal representation and one has to ask why are they equal?  There is
>no logical reason to conclude that these seven constituencies fairly
>balance out each other and represent the full range of stake holders.
>Apart from the obvious missing individual registrants constituency,
>there are many other constituencies you could have.
>
>The Business Constituency is about to tighten its rules.  That raises
>the possibility that there is room for another business aligned
>constituency.  There is IMO an excellent case for gTLD registries to
>be split into sponsored and non sponsored as their interests can be
>very very different.  Going the other way one can make the case that
>the Business, IP and ISP constituencies are all the same group of
>people and should be collapsed into one.  In fact of the three current
>NC reps from the BC, one works for a leading Intellectual Property
>Organisation and the other two for businesses which are or own large
>ISPs.  This is not an attempt to suggest any wrong-doing but merely to
>highlight that one could credibly have anywhere from four to 12
>constituencies and just giving them each three votes on the NC is not
>necessarily logical.   
>
>Lastly we have the GA.  I believe we have a chicken and egg situation
>here.  The GA has absolutely no power to do anything.  Now many will
>says neither should it because (in their view) it is dominated by a
>few individuals who are seen as anti-ICANN or worse.
>
>Can I put forward a view that if one did two things - both give the GA
>some authority and also had a registrants constituency then the GA
>would have a reasonable chance of returning to what I hope was its
>purpose - a place where people from all constituencies could gather to
>discuss and even come to consensus on issues.  The GA should be the
>place in theory where the Registrars, Registrants and Registries talk
>about issues such as transfers etc.
>
>There is no incentive at the moment for the GA to work or for people
>from constituencies to participate in it.  If you have an individual
>registrants constituency much of the present debate could well
>transfer to within that constituency and if for example one adopted a
>bicameral approach and required policy to be adopted by both the NC
>and the GA this would be a large incentive for people to make the GA
>work.  
>
>Anyway now onto the issues raised more directly by the ALSC and ccSO
>proposals.
>
>The first and massive issue for the DNSO is do we fight to keep the
>DNSO as the official main source of policy advice to the Board on
>domain name issues or do we recognise this is not even the case at
>present and become one of a number of competing voices on domain name
>issues.
>
>Setting up an ALSO raises the potential for the Board to be able to
>choose between competing advice and marginalise the DNSO even more.
>However in the absence of individual registrants being represented
>within the DNSO then I have to say that this is something to be
>supported.  If the DNSO wishes to remain the official source of domain
>name policy advice it needs to be fully representative.  
>
>Note I support at large members remaining regardless and retaining the
>right to elect half the Board.  It is whether they should formally
>constitute a SO which provides direct policy advice to the Board which
>is the issue for me.
>
>A ccSO raises in my opinion (Note conflict of interest I am on the
>Council of a ccTLD manager) far fewer issues because a fairly neat
>dividing line can be drawn between gTLD issues and ccTLD issues.  Very
>few ccTLD issues can be dealt with globally - they tend to be local
>solutions to local problems and I believe a ccSO is an effective way
>of dealing with these.  However some in the GA are strongly against a
>ccSO and unlike the debate on at large board numbers in the GA (which
>clearly favours nine from my observations), I can not detect at this
>stage whether there is either clear support for or against a ccSO.  I
>believe proposed bylaws for an ccSO will need to be viewed before
>asking the GA to vote.
>
>My thinking is that ICANN needs to fundamentally decide whether it is
>abandoning its model of distinct semi-autonomous SOs with no policy
>overlap, or to recognise the reality that power is with the Board (and
>staff) and then focus on how that Board should be comprised.
>
>There is a recurring issue about massive influence by ICANN staff.  My
>observation is that this is not unique to ICANN but happens in almost
>all voluntary organisation.  What is different about ICANN though is
>that the staff basically service the Board only and not the SOs.  If
>one really wants the SOs more involved in policy areas one would need
>to either develop your own staffing base (beyond admin) or have ICANN
>treat SOs as fundamental parts of ICANN and have them directly service
>SOs.  For example Louis Touton just made some useful observations on
>the .org issue.  Wouldn't it have been more useful though if a staff
>member had been assigned to work with the Taskforce so these issues
>could have been considered as part of their work?  
>
>I know of few other organisations where staff only service the Board
>and not what is in effect sub-committees of the Board (SOs are at the
>end of the day glorified sub-committees of ICANN).
>
>Having got my introductory comments out of the way (yes Virginia there
>is an end to this), I'll comment on Philip's evaluation.  There has
>been little substantive comment to it on the GA list but I will post a
>copy of this post there which may generate some.
>
>EFFICACY OF POLICY MAKING WITHIN DNSO
>
>I agree that an IDNH constituency is preferable if policy making stays
>within the DNSO.  In fact there is a need for both - an IDNH to have
>an effective voice within the DNSO on domain name issues and an ALSO
>which would concern itself with wider ICANN issues.  It is not
>necessarily a case of one or the other but preferably both - with well
>defined areas of responsibility.
>
>If the DNSO becomes a providers SO and the ALSO a users SO I agree
>with Philip that there will be a very high overlap of issues.  Note
>however that while the DNSO remains without an IDNH constituency this
>will be seen by many as a positive thing.  If the DNSO becomes truly
>representative of all stake holders then it would be less desirable.
>
>Philip correctly identifies that there is no mechanism for cross-SO
>communication.  If an ALSO is set up as recommended then I suggest
>there will be some sort of need for an ICANN General Assembly which
>SOs can get together and talk.  This need not be identical to the DNSO
>GA but it is possible that an ICANN GA could replace the DNSO GA if
>domain name issues are no longer the theoretical exclusive preserve of
>the DNSO.
>
>EFFICACY OF POLICY MAKING WITHIN ICANN
>
>Philip identifies the possibility of the Board receiving contradictory
>advice from different SOs.  I agree this is likely but as the DNSO
>already has such small influence (as a formal body, some individuals
>are very influential) on domain name issues the actual difference may
>be little.  As I said previously the DNSO needs to sharpen its act up
>if it wants to retain the preserve of domain name policy.
>
>It is also a good thing that the ALSO will allow individuals input
>into any issues arising out of the ASO and PSO.  While there are not
>many of these issues, there is also no effective way for individual's
>to have a direct say on these issues except through public forums.
>
>I disagree with Phillip's evaluation that the real test of
>individuals' interest in an at large SO will be when members are asked
>to pay because it all depends on what the fee is.  I can not see an
>ALSO functioning for less than US$200,000 as it has to cover the costs
>of staffing, website, online voting, organisation to have any chance
>of being able to compete with other SOs in having input into Board
>issues.
>
>Now that is asking 2,000 members to pay US$100 each.  Well of course
>heaps are not going to.  If the ALSO is asked to self-fund itself it
>will never amount to more than a larger version of the GA and will be
>doomed to ineffectiveness.
>
>What is needed IMO is a partnership between ICANN and an ALSO.  First
>of all one has to recognise that individuals will always be at a
>massive disadvantage compared to businesses when it comes to funding
>an organisation.  100 businesses paying $1,000 each (for example) is
>far easier to organise than 10,000 individuals paying $10 each.
>
>A fee should be set for the ALSO in the US$5 - US$10 range.  This is
>enough that people will be showing some commitment to ICANN.  I can
>not see any alternative except ICANN itself fund surplus costs of the
>ALSO as an expense of democracy basically.  And yes this is registries
>and registrars and businesses subsidising individuals but I would
>suggest that said individuals directly or indirectly fund the
>registries, registrars and businesses :-)
>
>The last part of Philip's evaluation I also disagree with - strongly.
>The ALSO proposal does not in any way increase the at large
>representation from five to six.  It decreases it from nine to six.  
>
>
>Once again apologies for the length of the post.  Hopefully some
>issues for consideration and debate.
>
>DPF
>--
>david@farrar.com
>ICQ 29964527

--
david@farrar.com
ICQ 29964527
--
This message was passed to you via the ga-full@dnso.org list.
Send mail to majordomo@dnso.org to unsubscribe
("unsubscribe ga-full" in the body of the message).
Archives at http://www.dnso.org/archives.html