Re: [ga] Comments on ICANN Reform Recommendations

["J-F C. (Jefsey) Morfin" <jefsey@club-internet.fr>]

Dear DPF,
thank you for this analysis. My comment is to say that the real result of 
the this ICANN centric proposition is not endangering the network. The only 
currently important issue is the IANA: it is well kept out his reform. 
There is no more attempt to run the root system.

I read it therefore as a desinvolvement from the network issues and a focus 
on hosting the "Internet Campus". Which is quite agood news.

On 01:43 02/06/02, DPF said:

>As with my previous comments on the Lynn plan I'm trying to comment on
>each part of the proposals separately before then commenting on the
>overall effect.
>
>1.      THE ICANN MISSION
>
>I was disappointed that the Committee dismisses call for a "thin"
>ICANN with a statement saying everyone wants a thin ICANN so long as
>it includes the specific functions that they are interested in.
>
>This suggests an inability to apply sound judgement as to what is
>appropriate and also dismisses that in the public comments made to
>date there has been a clear similarity of views between many
>stakeholders.
>
>Recent GA discussions have shown that ICANN does believe it is
>appropriate that it tries to impose global trademark policies on
>ccTLDs for example.  The Committee's definition of ICANN mission is so
>wide that it is difficult to think of a single possible activity it
>would be precluded from getting into.

The thin ICANN we want the IANA. All the rest is "mission/territory creep" 
management, ie the switch from PostelNet to a worldwide non US centric 
system. The proposition permits the old world (gTLDs) and the current real 
world (ccTLDs) to coexist and to develop in parallel. It also permits new 
worlds to develop and join later on (new large applications, like may be ENUM).

>2.      BOARD COMPOSITION
>
>The ex officio board members proposal is not all bad.  I actually
>support reducing the board members appointed by the PSO and ASO as in
>reality the Board deals with 95% domain name issues.
>
>I fully support having the Chairs of the GNSO, ASO, CNSO, RSSAC and
>TAC on the Board - so long as they are appointed bottom up by the
>stakeholders in each area and not by the Board which would create even
>more of an IOC style self perpetuating model.  They are all legitimate
>stakeholders who should IMO have Board representation.
>
>I do not support the CEO being on the Board - this can create a
>conflict of interest.

This is certainly a good and major remark. Also in term of escalation. The 
BoD becomes an ultimate escalation for the Staff. You cannot be your own judge.

>I am unconvinced ICANN needs an SAC and believe this could operate as part 
>of the TAC.

Yes.

>I am hesitant about taking the first step towards official government 
>representation on the Board as it may prove to be a mouse which grows to 
>an elephant.  But on balance there is a place for government 
>representation but I would prefer to have the ITU have a place on the 
>Board than the GAC  which seems too much of a personal fiefdom for certain 
>people.

Introducing the Govs, even at very low level, makes the BoD a governing 
body. It will eventually lead the ICANN to be an UN Agency of some sort, 
housing meetings to establish concerted doctrines. This is obviously a 
waranty to survive. The UN agency to the Internet.

Beware that introducing the ITU in the BoD would eventually lead to a take 
over of the Internet by Telcos, while it should be at equal level. However, 
there is probably no objection to have liaisons at this level (trhough non 
voting members) to balance the liaison with JDRP (Joe Sims acts for long as 
a non voting BoD Member).

>With ex officio members numbering 8 (ICANN proposal) or 6 (my preference) 
>I would balance this with the same number of member elected directors.

We have voting and possibly non voting members, what gives some 
possibilities. I would support some non voting members :
- ex-officio : GAC, SAC
- ex-officio from new creation :
   Consumer Consultative Committee
   Civil Rights Consultative Committee

>Some ICANN insiders sneer at the idea and call it "global democracy 
>experiments" when in fact it is nothing of the sort.  What should happen 
>is as simple as what happens in millions of other organisations - you 
>allow people to become members and allow members to elect most of their 
>Board.  This is not an experiment - this is a model that is absolutely 
>normal throughout the world.
>
>Even if there were some sort of membership input into the ICANN Nominating 
>Committee, this would be no substitute for the accountability and 
>responsiveness that direct membership elections would bring.

Let be realistic, we will never get and I doubt we really want worldwide 
elections. But we get a de facto control through the equal level granted to 
the ccTLDs.

>The test of any organisation has to be "If the organisation is being 
>governed badly, can the governing board be held accountable and 
>replaced?".  This is not true with the current ICANN and looks to be
>less true with the proposed ICANN.

Let be candid, this reform does not precludes DNS innovation. That 
innovation will decide about the future of the network and the network will 
decide about the ICANN. This is the true democratic judgement through the 
market.

>3.      BOARD SELECTION
>
>The Committee makes an assertion which is somewhat scary.  They
>comment that the current selection process has produced good directors
>but they are concerned that this is not "guaranteed"in the future.
>
>Putting aside the huge variety of views of what makes a "good"
>director I object to the assertion that the process should be
>something which will guarantee good directors.
>
>I am unaware that for example the US constitution guarantees that only
>good Presidents will be elected.  I am equally unaware that the ISOC
>rules guarantee only good Chairpersons will be elected?
>
>The only way to "guarantee" a good director is to have the people who
>define good to select the directors.  So the question is whether
>"good" should be defined by a dozen individuals or by a much wider
>group.
>
>The last at large elections had a nominating committee but also had
>the ability for at large members to make their own nominations which
>they did and in two of the five regions (and the two with around 80%
>of the world's internet activity) the unsanctioned nominees won.
>ICANN's proposal will eliminate the possibility of this ever happening
>again which one can only suspect is in fact the motivating factor for
>the change.

This area is probably full of possible compromises. Again either the ICANN 
is well managed and it will stay, either it is not and it will not stay. 
The only real issue is to know if it will continue blocking innovation. I 
think it does not it that much any more. New.net (as an example I do not 
support that much) will survive, others will develop. There is now the hook 
to getthem on-board as an openTLD SO.

>4.      NOMINATING COMMITTEE COMPOSITION AND RESPONSIBILITY
>
>If ICANN does go down the nominating committee route the issue of its
>composition is absolutely crucial.  I consider the committee failure
>to come up with a specific recommendation a failure on their part.
>Cynically one suspects this is to try and get agreement in principle
>to the concept and then produce a specific committee composition that
>will be highly unrepresentative.
>
>The suggestion that former Board members would be a suitable members
>will only further entrench a circle of unaccountability where the
>Board appoint themselves and their former colleagues to the nominating
>committee which in turns appoint themselves back to the Board.  It
>would not be dis-similiar to how the Catholic Church elects a Pope but
>without the divine guidance [unless JDRP has been promoted to
>celestial status] :-)

The authoritative unique root theory is funded on the idea that that root 
is perfect. Either it is the empty dot of the RFCs and this is OK; or if it 
is suppoed tobe the ICANN root, the Trinity is Lynn, Louis and Joe, so why 
not the BoD to a Sacred College.

>  a very minimum such a nominating committee should include some
>representatives from sectors such as free speech and individual
>registrants.  This would reduce the anxiety somewhat about their
>possible selections especially when one considers the comments that
>the Nom Cmte should not just select much of the Board but be
>responsible for soliciting nominations also.
>
>The proposal that the Nom Cmte also elect members of SOs creates
>another entrenched circle where the Nom Cmte elects members of SOs
>which elect Board members which in turn elect the Nom Cmte.

Nothing says that there would only one NomCom or that the NomComgress is a 
single constituency.
You can imagine that different classes of NomCommers elect different BoD 
Directors.

>5.      POLICY DEVELOPMENT STRUCTURE
>
>I agree that the SOs should be given staff support - in fact this has
>been a major reason for the DNSO's failure to date.  I also agree that
>inevitably policy decisions will be made at Board level because ICANN
>already spends 95% of its time only on domain name issues.
>
>The renaming of DNSO to GNSO is appropriate.

I beg your pardon, but there is no need for any other gTLD as conceived by 
the ICANN. So let leave the ICANN manage their own monster. It will keep 
Louis Touton and DoC buzy. Any objection to that?

>The refusal to acknowledge that individual registrants should have a
>constituency within the GNSO is disappointing but not unexpected.

Individual registrants are not a NSO class. This is the whole problem of 
the D. Jennings/J. Teernstra unsucess. DNS is not affected if the 
registrant is single handed or not. It is however by the Registrants as a 
large group.  A registrants Constituency should include individual, 
corporate and bulk Registrants.

>Having the Board appoint the GNSO Chair is contrary to the bottom up
>principles most people support.  However I do support the GNSO Chair
>being also the GA Chair - this would significantly enhance the role of
>the GA.

Yes.

>I also support the GA returning to its role as a cross-constiuency
>forum but if and only if there is a individual registrants
>constituency.  To do so without having registrants represented will
>cut off what for many is the only forum where they can currently have
>their say in ICANN.  If ICANN does this it will look like trying to
>silence critics.

Yes, but the registrants at large.

>Agree with keeping ASO and abolishing PSO.

But added control on the ASO.
PSO is obviously a major abdication since the future is with Protocols and 
Applications.

>The proposal that the CNSO should include those with legitimate
>interest in the global policy issues relating to ccTLDs is misguided.
>Most ccTLDs (and I agree) assert that the only global policy issues
>relating to ccTLDs should relate to narrow technical issues such as
>name servers, backups etc.  IP lawyers should not be included in a
>CNSO - they should participate at national level in each local ccTLD.
>
>There could well be a role for Governments in a CNSO, especially in
>areas of redelegations where they have legitimate interests.
>
>The committee insists that any ccTLDs who participate in the CNSO must
>agree to abide by any ICANN developed policies despite any restraint
>on how intrusive or far reaching such policies could be.  Such
>insistence will merely lead to probably less than a dozen ccTLDs
>taking part as to do so would compromise their duty under RFC 1591 to
>the internet community (which is not ICANN).

This is the interest of the proposition.
Either they will have this way and they will go nowhere.
Or they becomes real.
This will be a decision by the BoD. From then on the ccTLDs are free.

Please remember that at thuis stage you have opposing forces. Dreamers are 
still inforce at the BoD. DOnt spoil the chances to have the BoD to get real.

>I do support creating a Technical Advisory Committee but feel the security 
>advisory committee should be incorporated into it - perhaps as a sub-cmte.

Yes.

>6.      POLICY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
>
>I have read this section several times and as far as I can tell the
>committee has come to the stunning conclusion that there should be a
>process but that they have no idea what it is.

This is the other good news. It will take years for them to come with a 
process. In the meanwhile the current incertitude will stay. The ccTLD will 
not pay. This will help towards a lean solution. This is a self reformation 
of an non necessary body which wants to survive. They will need to find of 
which use they can be, and how. Obviously this delay will serve the 
Internet Yalta "signatorrees" but also gives innovation time to respond.

>7.      PUBLIC OVERSIGHT AND PARTICIPATION MECHANISMS
>
>The non binding arbitration proposal is a good one, even though it is
>not a substitute for the independent review process.
>
>The Ombudsman office is also a good proposal if it can have truly
>independent management.  Rather than have the Board solely appoint the
>person there should be a right of mutual veto by the Board and say key
>stakeholder groups.
>
>The Manager of Public Participation I am less sure on.  The theory is
>sound but the reality may be that it allows all consideration of
>public input to be sidelined from the rest of ICANN into this
>cubbyhole.

If he does, the alternative will be the media, the market, etc.. There no 
real need for ICANN. Except to divest the USG involvement in the 
gouvernance down to a standard involvement in proportion to its involvement 
into the Internet.

>8.      FUNDING
>
>My translation of this section is "We want more money and want ideas on 
>how to get it from more people"

This will be the best self reformation incitation. No money, no creep.

>9.      GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN ICANN
>
>Having the GAC liaise directly with components of ICANN is a sensible one.

They may see that as a buoy right now. This was a "King of Ireland" policy. 
We will be protected by the complexity of the reality.

>10.     UTILISATION OF OUTSIDE RESOURCES
>
>There is an interesting revelation that ICANN Board saw WIPO as an
>expert adviser on the UDRP and hence adopted its recommendations in
>full rather than recognise WIPO as a partisan player in trademark
>issues and only one of a number of stakeholders who should be listened
>to.
>
>With that in mind the suggested further use of experts suggest to me
>we may end up with selected lobby groups being commissioned as expert
>advisers to back up the Board.

hmmmm. True, but I have been on enough non-profit BoD to know that any 
external "expert" position becomes quickly gospel, because one paid for it 
and it saves internal disputes. It is true sovereignty abandon.

>11.     INTERNAL ICANN STRUCTURE
>
>It is pleasing to see acknowledgement that some current ICANN
>functions could be given to other bodies and that a policy and
>operations split is seen as desirable in principle.

This is an ICANN rebid, but by the ICANN instead of by the USG.

>12.     TRANSITION
>
>No substance on key issues such as who will replace the nine Board
>members who disappear this year as it is unlikely ICANN II will be in
>place this year.
>
>
>SUMMARY
>
>This is effectively the Lynn plan in full with some minor variations -
>some good and some bad.
>
>Overall it falls massively short of suggesting that the new ICANN
>would have any accountability at all.  At large directors are
>abolished, the board effectively appoints itself in perpetuity and the
>one place where individuals can have a say is to be amended to exclude
>them.  Also all meaningful external controls are removed such as
>independent review.
>
>If ICANN decides to go down this path I would assert that ICANN would
>be totally unsuitable to continue to perform the IANA role for the US
>DOC and support any initiatives for a new body to be formed to take up
>this role.

 From what I gather the IANN could be subcontracted. This is a de facto 
rebid by the ICANN. This is a good approach as it would not make the IANA 
dependent from the USG, but from the rules set-up by the ICANN. All what is 
needed is to cut-off the IANA from the Staff. My suggestion is that it is 
provided by an independent ITU-I secretariat, under joint ITU-T/Internet 
supervision.

jfc