RE: [ga] By-passing the DNSO

[Roeland Meyer <rmeyer@mhsc.com>]

I agree, partially. However, we do need to have some assurance mechanism
that the contract properly implements and supports the policies.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gomes, Chuck [mailto:cgomes@verisign.com]
> Sent: Friday, April 27, 2001 9:16 AM
> To: 'Jonathan Weinberg'; Gomes, Chuck; 'babybows.com'; ga@dnso.org
> Subject: RE: [ga] By-passing the DNSO
> 
> 
> I may have mischaracterized Danny's post if your characterization is
> correct.  If that is the case I am sorry about that.
> 
> I do believe that the DNSO should be involved in the 
> development of policy
> but I strongly disagree that it should be involved in the 
> implementation of
> contractual provisions.  Nor do I believe that the DNSO 
> should be involved
> in negotiating contractual provisions.  To make every detail 
> of contracts a
> policy issue that requires consensus will bring progress to a 
> complete halt.
> 
> Chuck
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jonathan Weinberg [mailto:weinberg@mail.msen.com]
> Sent: Friday, April 27, 2001 11:34 AM
> To: Gomes, Chuck; 'babybows.com'; ga@dnso.org
> Subject: RE: [ga] By-passing the DNSO
> 
> 
>          I don't understand Danny to be saying that the DNSO 
> should be 
> involved in the application of individual sanctions.  Rather, he is 
> objecting to a provision contemplating that the overall rules 
> governing the 
> sanctions program can be overhauled, wholesale, without DNSO 
> participation.  The provision is consistent with the apparent 
> view of ICANN 
> staff that questions such as whether there should be a 
> sanction program, 
> how it should be constructed, what it should look like, etc., have no 
> policy content.  That position seems to me, though, rather hard to 
> defend.  I'm not sure, Chuck, whether your derisive dismissal 
> of Danny's 
> comment is because:
> [1] you think it's absurd to believe that such questions 
> (whether there 
> should be a sanctions program, how it should be constructed, 
> what it should 
> look like, etc.) have policy content;
> [2] you think that such questions have policy content, but 
> you think it's 
> absurd to believe that the DNSO should be involved in the process of 
> changing those policy decisions; or
> [3] you're just mischaracterizing his post.
> 
> Jon
> 
> 
> 
> At 11:12 AM 4/27/2001 -0400, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
> >To suggest that the DNSO should be involved in the sanctions 
> program is
> >ABSURD.  Somewhere along the line it would be nice if some sort of
> >"reasonable business sense" existed.  But maybe that is 
> asking too much.
> >
> >Chuck
> >
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: babybows.com [mailto:webmaster@babybows.com]
> >Sent: Friday, April 27, 2001 10:19 AM
> >To: ga@dnso.org
> >Subject: [ga] By-passing the DNSO
> >
> >
> >In a new paragraph added to the Proposed Unsponsored TLD 
> Agreement (3.5.6.)
> >which matches the language in the Verisign agreement, the 
> ICANN Staff has
> >introduced a provision regarding changes to the proposed "Sanctions
> Program"
> >that effectively eviscerates the policy-recommending role of 
> the DNSO:
> >
> >"In the event that the gTLD Constituency of the Domain Name 
> Supporting
> >Organization proposes a substitute Appendix Y at any time 
> prior to 1 May
> >2002, and ICANN determines (following an appropriate process 
> of public
> >notice and comment) that substitution by that Appendix Y 
> would serve the
> >interests of the Internet community, the substitution shall be made."
> >
> >This sanctions program (appendix Y) deals with violations of 
> Subsections
> >3.5.1 through 3.5.5 and Appendix H (certification and separation
> >requirements) and Appendix I (Registry Operator's Code of 
> Conduct) of the
> >Registry Agreement.  This action to deny the role of the 
> DNSO (supplanting
> >it with the role of the gTLD constituency), is akin to 
> allowing the fox to
> >propose new rules regarding its own distance and conduct 
> with respect to
> the
> >hen-house.
> >
> >The "Sanctions Program" also calls for a "Confidential Notice of
> >Investigation", which to my view subverts the concept of open public
> >evaluation of charges of abuse; this bears further consideration.
> >
> >Details of proposed sanctions are as follows:
> >
> >"Sanctions of up to US$10,000 for each violation may be 
> assessed for each
> >minor violation found and sanctions of up to US$100,000 for 
> each violation
> >may be assessed for each major violation found. The amount 
> of the financial
> >sanction shall be proportionate to the violation and other 
> relevant facts."
> >
> >This "fixed scale" of sanctions effectively allows giant 
> well-financed
> >corporations to sustain multiple violations of conduct with relative
> >impunity as they can well afford the cost of such fee assessments.  A
> >"proportionate scale" tied to the relative size of the 
> registry might be a
> >more reasonable consideration.
> >
> >In the last round of discussions on the Verisign agreement, 
> the DNSO was
> >played like a fish on a hook; it was specifically asked for 
> comments to
> >focus on the "substantive merits" of the agreements, which 
> then allowed
> >Stuart Lynn to make the following comment to the Department 
> of Commerce:
> >
> >"As this recitation indicates, the ultimate Names Council 
> recommendations
> to
> >ICANN are, in general, not focused on "policy" issues, but rather are
> >suggestions about how the proposed new agreements could be 
> modified, by
> >changing contractual dates and the like, to make them better 
> agreements in
> >the view of those supporting the resolutions. These expressions are
> >certainly important, but they can hardly be described as 
> representing the
> >kinds of policy issues that are, pursuant to ICANN's bylaws, 
> the initial
> >responsibility of the DNSO within the ICANN structure."
> >
> >We must take a hard look at the policy implications within 
> these proposed
> >agreements and argue primarily on the basis of policy.
> >
> >Sanctions are a punitive enforcement mechanism.  The degree to which
> >violations must be met with punishment is a matter of consensus-based
> >policy.  There are six other constituencies, as well as unrepresented
> >members of the general public, that have a stake in reigning 
> in potentially
> >abusive registry conduct.  The DNSO should not be by-passed in this
> process.
> >
> >
> >
> >
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