[ga] FYI: EU Council thinking about ICANN

[Alexander Svensson <alexander@svensson.de>]

[This is a note from the Presidency of the Council of the EU
-- the body of the member states -- to Coreper, the Committee
of Permanent Representatives, sort of ambassadors to the EU.
The document is from 3 June 2002 and it's preparing the 
Telecom Council meeting on 17/18 June 2002. It confirms the
rumour that there has been an undocumented GAC meeting in
Canberra and gives some insight into the current EU member
states' thinking about ICANN. Some interesting excerpts
follow. /// Alexander]

http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st09/09526en2.pdf
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[...]
1. The ICANN Mission
   ICANN should have a clearly defined, limited and stable mission, 
   giving priority to technical functions that are essential for 
   the coordination and stability of the Internet. Certain existing
   activities could be reduced to improve that focus. Relevant legal 
   and contractual work should be reduced to what is essential.

    The ICANN mission should be stabilized: the agreed definition 
    should be adopted and revised by the Board by a 2/3 majority, 
    after a GAC opinion.

  Bottom-up participation and consensus building should continue to be 
  guiding principles of ICANN's working methods. [...]

  In many cases, ICANN’s mission impinges on public policy issues. In 
  these cases GAC must play a stronger role in the decision making process.

2. The Public-Private Partnership
   There is a need for clarification of this open public-private 
   partnership ICANN must be, in which governments should have a greater 
   involvement, particularly in matters of public policy.

   Government involvement in the ICANN processes should be through an 
   enhanced relationship between ICANN and GAC rather than through 
   direct governmental participation in ICANN's Board and Budget.
   [...]

3. ICANN structure, membership and financing
   The private sector participants concerned are responsible for reaching 
   mutually acceptable agreements regarding the structure of ICANN, its 
   membership and financing and its decisionmaking processes. Due 
   consideration should be given to the adequate protection of the
   public interest by strengthening the standing of GAC Advice.

   Such agreements, however, must give full weight to internationalisation, 
   transparency and fairness and to maintaining the principle of geographic 
   diversity and representation throughout the organisation.
 
   Governments should [...] satisfy themselves that the interests of other 
   appropriate international stakeholders are adequately recognised in the 
   final structure.

   Governments should not contribute directly to ICANN's budget.

4. Treatment of public policy issues
   Where ICANN's activities are likely to involve public policy implications, 
   ICANN must consult the GAC. The scope of relevant public policies should be 
   agreed in advance between GAC and ICANN[1 -- Public policy issues may 
   include, for example, competition, DNS Security, ccTLD policy,
   IPR, languages and geographical terms, abusive registrations, data protection 
   and privacy, telecommunications numbering.] The ICANN Board should only 
   be able to ignore or reverse GAC advice in such areas by a super [2/3] 
   majority. In all cases, ICANN should inform GAC on how its advice has been 
   taken into account. The legal implications of this approach need to be 
   considered further.

5. The Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC)
   Governments agree that the GAC is the principal forum for the international 
   discussion of public policy issues related to the ICANN mission and the Domain 
   Name System. In this respect, Governments attach great importance to strengthening 
   the role of GAC and ensuring its independence from ICANN.

   In order to effectively fulfil this role vis-ā-vis ICANN, GAC needs to work 
   more effectively and be better integrated into the policy formulation process. 
   This will require the necessary organisation and secretariat and in due course a 
   more appropriate legal structure. Governments should provide the necessary 
   resources to this effect. In anticipation that other administrations
   will also make available such resources, the European Commission is also 
   encouraged to allocate appropriate resources for this purpose. Responsibility 
   for the GAC secretariat could thus be shared between several GAC participants. 
   This secretariat would provide services to GAC both for policy making and logistics.

   GAC may seek the assistance of other qualified international entities for specific 
   tasks or projects.

6. Reserve Powers
   Governments will of course retain reserve powers of last resort in the event of 
   ICANN failing to fulfil its essential tasks and for the public oversight of the 
   maintenance of the authoritative Root Zone File. This responsibility would be 
   exercised through the GAC or another appropriately constituted entity.

7. Control of the Root Zone File
   Governments, in co-operation with the stakeholders concerned, need to work 
   towards internationalising the oversight role currently exercised by the United 
   States government. Implementing the agreed reforms should be phased in the 
   interests of stability. Governments, including the EU, will wish to re-visit the 
   outcome of the current ICANN reform in the foreseeable future. Monitoring the 
   results of the reform and ICANNīs performance should be part of GACīs remit.
[...]
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