Re: [registrars] FW: [nc-transfer] Drafting Team Status Update
Why is it so hard to see how much less this arbitration would be a concern, or become necessary if the losing regitrar is at least allowed to postively verify a transfer first? The exchange below just makes it clear how far we are away from any sort of useful enforcement. With the proposed process, if a mistake is made the customer potentially looses control of his/her domain for who knows how long. Tim -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [registrars] FW: [nc-transfer] Drafting Team Status Update From: "Ross Wm. Rader" <ross@tucows.com> Date: Mon, September 2, 2002 8:57 am To: <tim@godaddy.com>, <mbilow@registrationtek.com> Tim: "We also are concerned about the lack of enforcement of this proposed policy and existing contractual obligations. Adopting a policy that is not enforceable gets us nowhere and opens the transfer process up to even more problems than it already experiences." Agreed completely Tim. The TF is cognizant of this issue. I think that this excerpt from the recent TF call might give you and the membership a better idea where we stand on this issue. Summary is that while we recognize the need for enforcement, the registry constituency has indicated that they are unwilling to take that role. Unless their position changes, we must start looking at alternatives like ICANN or third parties. Jeff Neumann's (of the Registry Constituency) comments seem to summon up the current "detente" quite clearly: "...we want none of it. We don't want to be the arbiters of disputes between registrars." Jeff has committed to take the issue back to his constituency to see what sort of alternatives or compromises could be explored, but so far nothing. [Note: Cade is Marilyn Cade, the chair of the TF, Jeff is Jeff Neumann, the registry constituency delegate and chair of the registry constituency, Ross is myself and the <snip>'s are side-explorations of an alternate proposal by the IPC that doesn't fit the model cleanly] ROSS: What I would like to do here with the remaining time that I've been allocated is to start on page 14 of the document, Section eight, and have a general discussion that takes into account the - sort of, the new reality that we're faced with in adopting this as policy, which is that it's not appropriate - my submission is that it's not appropriate for the losing registrar or the gaining registrar to enforce good policy. Because of the environment that this was drafted, it was viewed that the registrar constituency could adopt this as part of the code of conduct and self impose, which meant that there would literally would be little, if any, oversights bar the registry or ICANN (ph) in the day-to-day execution of theses processes. Given that this is not going to be incorporated into a self-regulating code of conduct, but rather become part of the foretold (ph) policy, it only makes sense that those other parties - the other parties to the contract have some role in enforcing (ph) it (ph). So, I'd like to hear, generally from the group, thoughts on that so that we can start adapting (ph) this portion and replacing it with something more appropriate. CADE: So, that would be - there would need to be some kind of an appeal body? ROSS (ph): When the - when something has gone wrong with the process ... CADE: Right. ROSS (ph): ... either by design or by mistake, the registrants need ways to get the problems fixed, gaining registrars need ways to get domain names transferred and losing registrars need ways to protect their customers. CADE: So, there needs to be a process by which dispute - I'm just trying to grapple with this. ROSS (ph): Exactly. CADE: There needs to be a process by which disputes can be investigated and somebody can play Solomon? ROSS (ph): We need a Solomon and we need - certainly the Solomon, but also the default rule - the explicit statement default rule. CADE: Right, right. Do others have comments on this? I think that a - typically, Ross (ph), in the business world I sit in, where we had disputes with our customers, we often write into our - extended practice that we write into many of our contracts that we will first go to dispute (ph) resolution and - sometimes finding arbitration before we go to court. That's pretty much business process in the commercial business world. ROSS (ph): I think in instances where the information is unclear, that would be an reasonable last - you know, the resorting to private contract enforcement, i.e. the court's arbitration, is reasonable as a last - as a last measure. I think there is a lot that, not only the industry can do before that, but also the industry conduction with ICANN (ph) can do before that to remediate these complaints more expediently. Certainly, the fact that we have a reasonably expedited process that allows intellectual property owners to protect their rights through the UDRP (ph) ... CADE: Right. ROSS (ph): ... would indicate that as - as a community, we have what it takes to put together something of that nature. CADE: And so, would that be - that would - might be a possibility, a uniform dispute fast track procedure. I think it would properly need to be even faster than the UDRP (ph), though, really. ROSS (ph): Yes, because the - all this while, there is a registrant that is being affected, either the - you know, there is somebody at the end of this ... CADE: Right. ROSS (ph): ... that doesn't have a domain name or doesn't have the domain name they wanted. <snip> CADE: What would you think - maybe instead of solving it here, we could think about some different models which might be a panel of - you know, the information would have to be blind in the sense that, you know, you don't know who the registry - why don't we think about different ideas and whether there's a role for the - do you see a role for the ICANN (ph) staff, Ross (ph)? The . ROSS (ph): What I kind of - I conceived of was something that brought the registries into the picture, that provide the registrar either/or, losing or gaining, to appeal through ICANN (ph) or through independent arbitration. There's no - in this conception, I don't see any reason why this cannot be a fee for service. These are things, you know, this kind of mediation which is not cheap or free, so why should the registries not charge for it, and I don't see any reason why if we have standardized forms of authorization ... CADE: Yes. ROSS (ph): ... and an agreed upon definition of appropriate authorization and all of these other things, making these determinations is not going to require the wisdom of Solomon. CADE: And then, there should be an appeals process of some - so you could have it rose (ph) and regionalized (ph) and then have a pass to appeal. ROSS (ph): I would much rather take care of 80 to 90 percent of the issues that pop up day-to-day that are very simple, but fall through the cracks because there are no defined processes and take the remaining 10 percent to the math and spend a year working through the courts just through arbitration on them, if I could get that first 80 percent resolved. JEFF (ph): Can I just say that the registry has, in the past, discussed this issue because it's come up several times as should the registries be one that looks at this. And I can just tell you from the registry constituency standpoint, we want none of it. We don't want to be the arbiters of disputes between registrars. And certainly a fee that we would charge would be - not because we want to make money off of it, but any fee that we would charge would be much higher than anybody would probably want to pay. ROSS (ph): But Jeff (ph), the reality of the situation is ... CADE: . wait, wait ... <snip> CADE: Jeff (ph), are you guys resistant because of liability? JEFF (ph): Well, that's a big issue, yes. But it's also - it's not something we want to do ... ROSS (ph): Well, Jeff (ph) ... JEFF (ph): . we are not arbiters. ROSS (ph): The fact of the matter is though that you and ICANN (ph) are literally the only party in this entire process that has sufficient standing to do any sort of enforcement whatsoever. So, I don't understand where this reticence comes from; there was a willingness to sign the contracts that gave you that oversight responsibility, but there's no willingness to assume that enforcement responsibility. So, I would question our ability to even come up with a reasonable policy is ... Thanks, -rwr Got Blog? http://www.byte.org/blog "People demand freedom of speech as a compensation for the freedom of thought which they seldom use." - Soren Kierkegaard ----- Original Message ----- From: "Tim Ruiz" <tim@godaddy.com> To: <mbilow@registrationtek.com> Cc: <ross@tucows.com>; <registrars@dnso.org> Sent: Monday, September 02, 2002 8:40 AM Subject: RE: [registrars] FW: [nc-transfer] Drafting Team Status Update > Mike, > > Very well put. We agree completely. There is no way that it is > appropriate to attempt to tie the losing registrar's hands in this matter in favor of the gaining registrar under the false impression that it is somehow better for the registrant. We also are concerned about the lack of enforcement of this proposed policy and existing contractual obligations. Adopting a policy that is not enforceable gets us nowhere and opens the transfer process up to even more problems than it already experiences. > > Tim Ruiz > Go Daddy Software, Inc. > > -------- Original Message -------- > Subject: RE: [registrars] FW: [nc-transfer] Drafting Team Status > Update From: Michael Bilow <mbilow@registrationtek.com> > Date: Mon, September 2, 2002 1:59 am > To: "Ross Wm. Rader" <ross@tucows.com> > > On 2002-08-30 at 13:42 -0400, Ross Wm. Rader wrote: > > > The draft policy generally contemplates the following; > > > > 1. That the default rule on a transfer request from the registry > > to the losing registrar should be an "ack" in all cases unless the > > losing registrar has explicit knowledge that the registrant does > > not wish to undertake the transfer. > > What about the case where a determined hijacker repeatedly puts in > transfer requests for a domain name? The registrant would be > expected to affirm repeatedly that they disapprove each transfer. > One could argue that in such a case the current registrar has > explicit > knowledge, but that's not the kind of thing that could easily be > automated. Locking the domain at the registry would also help in > such cases, but this still places the burden on the legitimate > registrant, and that is unfair: if the legitimate registrant messes > up even once, or they have a problem with their e-mail, or someone > takes a vacation, or the contact for the domain is naive and > unsophisticated, the domain might inappropriately transfer. > > Even saying that the burden rests with the requesting registrar is > no solution, since presumably a hijacker would give whatever false > assurances were requested and could move from one registrar to > another, creating fake accounts and doing all sort of other > underhanded things. In the face of this, it really seems > inappropriate to burden the legitimate registrant. > > > 2. That the gaining registrar must only initiate the transfer > > process with the explicit consent of the registrant or an entity > > that the registrar reasonably believes has the authority to act on > > the > > registrants behalf. > > This is the core of the problem: the gaining registrar has no real > way to determine this. On the one hand, the registrar can tell the > customer that initiating a request to transfer a domain is a claim > of apparent > authority, and can ask the customer to affirm such authority. Our > procedure is to make the customer check a box on a web form which > makes this claim under penalty of perjury. Obviously, someone could > lie, but it gives us a little more leverage in undoing an improper > transfer should we decide that our own customer wrongly requested > it. > > On the other hand, the majority of transfer requests are legitimate, > and putting a lot of obstacles in the way is unfair as well. > > What I am particularly leery about is the possibility that two > competing claimants for apparent authority will use registrars as > proxies to fight their dispute. If this kind of thing happens, the > gaining registrar is likely to end up one of the defendants. > > > 3. (This one is perhaps the most important) That the processes > > employed by registrars to undertake these types of transactions > > are registrant friendly and do not require the implementation of > > bureaucratic artifice such as double acknowledgements, artificial > > barriers to portability etc. In other words, the processes might > > be complex for registrars to carry out, but simple for registrants > > to deal with - "designed for the consumer" in other words - > > simple, efficient and safe. > > Where we draw the line is between those cases which can be processed > automatically and those which cannot. For the tiny minority of cases > which cannot, our approach is to involve a real human who can apply > reasonable common sense and decision making skills. Trying to > oversimplify this into a set of rigid rules is really impossible: > the losing registrar has, I think, a clear duty to confirm the > intent of the registrant before allowing the transfer. We do not > request a notarized affidavit and a DNA sample, but we apply > whatever methods are appropriate to resolve the uncertainty we > believe is present in a particular case. > > I concede that this duty of the losing registrar is in addition to > the duty of the gaining registrar to confirm apparent authority > before initiating the request, but such duty of the losing registrar > seems to exist nonetheless. Trying to constrain the losing registrar > into refusing a transfer only on the basis of "explicit knowledge" > of the registrant's contrary intent would introduce very serious > complexities and subtleties. > > -- Mike
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