Re: [wg-c] new TLDs

["Milton Mueller" <mueller@syr.edu>]

I'm not sure that we even disagree, so let me clarify my position and see if
we do.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Dave Crocker"
> The discussion about implementing such a category (schema) of TLDs has
been
> in terms of assigning administrative responsibilities to a group cognizant
> of the charter topic.  It would be their responsibility to provide daily
> enforcement of the charter.  Therefore, ICANN's size is not likely to be a
> relevant factor.

I don't agree. What if the group doesn't enforce its "charter"? There are
serious monitoring and enforcement issues here, as anyone who has
familiarity with public trustee licensing of broadcasters can attest. A
grant of a license is given on the basis of ex ante promises; unless there
is adequate enforcement capability and monitoring the ex post behavior may
bear no relation to the ex ante promises. Before the sword of enforcement
(presumably, withdrawal of the license after term expiration) can be
wielded, the licensor must have fairly extensive knowledge about the
behavior of the licensee. Gaining that knowledge requires resources; it is
labor and expertise intensive. Withdrawing the right on grounds of
non-performance of a charter is likely to be litigious.

more comments below:

> Mueller:
> >2. mightn't ICANN's performance of such a function lead to an
illegitimate
> >and troublesome transfer to it of regulatory authority over a wide
variety
> >of social and economic activities?

> Crocker:
> No.
>
> Since your raising the questions suggests you feel otherwise, please make
> the case for your view.
>
> To help focus that response:
>
>          How is administration of an Internet system name space capable of
> having any significant effect over any significant social or economic
> activities, other than the social and economic activities of name space
> administration?

Perfectly phrased question. Here is the answer. Administration of the name
space can have a major effect on social and economic activities when the
delegation of a name is linked to regulatory, political, or legal criteria,
especially in an environment of artificial scarcity.

Example: Delegation of .bank. Under Kent's concept (and please correct me if
I am mis-stating or misunderstanding) .bank is delegated to some legitimate,
authoritative inernational organization that ICANN thinks is best suited to
decide what is and is not a bank.

Suppose ICANN delegates the .bank TLD to SWIFT. Now, six months later, ICANN
is approached by a small start-up firm, let's call it "emoney, inc.", based
in Spain, and it wants to run .banco. It hasa business plan for digital cash
and its business model calls for running a TLD.

If ICANN behaves the way I want it to, it will insure that "emoney, inc."
has a properly designed registry that won't affect the technical stability
of the Internet. It will apply the same technical criteria to emoney that it
applied to SWIFT. And if emoney, inc. meets those criteria, it will get a
delegation. ICANN will not even ask itself whether emoney is a "legitimate,
authoritative" organization capable of deciding who is able to determine
what is a bank and what is not. That job is left to national and
international banking regulators.

Now let me see if I understand what Kent is saying. As I understand it, Kent
believes that when approached by emoney, inc., ICANN will say, "sorry, guys,
we've already delegated a banking TLD. It's run by SWIFT. If SWIFT thinks
you're a bank, register in there. We only give names to organizations that
already have some established, institutionalized relationship to the name."

I fervently hope that this is NOT what Kent or you are proposing, but it
seems as if you are.

At any rate, it should be obvious that such an approach to delegation
(whether that represents your position or not)would give ICANN's name
delegation decisions significant influence over social and economic
activities. ICANN would become a kind of certification authority for
cyberspace.