[wg-c] Straw poll response

["Milton Mueller" <mueller@syr.edu>]

WG-C STRAW POLL

QUESTION ONE

I support Option 4:

> 4. ICANN should simply select new registries and leave issues of names and
> charters (including whether to limit the universe of people who can
> register in the domain, and if so how) to the new registries.

QUESTION TWO

I support #4:

> 4. ICANN should simply select new registries and leave issues of names and
> charters (including whether to limit the universe of people who can
> register in the domain, and if so how) to the new registries.

QUESTION THREE

> 1. ICANN picks a set of registries according to objective criteria.
> (Alternatively, ICANN narrows the set of applicants using objective
> criteria, and chooses among the remaining applicants, if necessary, via
> lotteries or auctions).  Once chosen, registries pick their own gTLD names
> and associated charters (if any), subject to a process under which ICANN
> can resolve conflicts and can deem certain gTLD strings out of bounds.

This is the best option. Here are some elaborations/qualifications:

ICANN defines a set of minimal technical/operational criteria for
registries, and then receives applications from registries. The criteria
would include the term (duration) of the right. The applications would
specify the desired TLD string.

First cut: ICANN decides whether applicants meet the tech/op criteria. These
should be minimal -- in the spirit of RFC 819.

Second cut: Because we have an artificial limit of 10, some rationing must
be performed. I would propose an auction in the initial stage. Qualified
applicants would bid for the right to be among the first ten introduced.

We know that a lottery will not deliver the license to the most able or
competent service provider, and if the right is transferale the lottery
winner will just hold their own auction after winning the right. So we may
as well start with an auction. (Yes, in an environment of artificial
scarcity this will eliminate non-commercial players in the first round of
distributions. But that's a problem with artificial scarcity, not auctions.)
Another problem with lotteries is that it encourages everyone to submit an
application, regardless of whether they are serious or not. While this is
fine in the long term, because there can be thousands of TLDs, in the
initial distribution it creates administrative problems for ICANN and slows
down the process.

Another good point about auctions is that it raises money for ICANN, and
gives ICANN an incentive to draft the license terms in a way that is not too
onerous. The bids for an unattractive license will be low.

Registries will make their bids based on their own ideas of the value of the
license. This means that registries must be able to choose their own TLD
string and business plan. There is no way to value the right to run a
registry otherwise.

Another interesting question along these lines is when, whether or how ICANN
intervenes to deem TLD strings out of bounds. My preference is to keep ICANN
as far away as possible from regulating the content of names and the content
that goes under names.