Re: [wg-c] about the consensus call

["Milton Mueller" <mueller@syr.edu>]

----- Original Message -----
From: "Jonathan Weinberg" <weinberg@mail.msen.com>

> I'm coming to wonder, though, whether this vision is limited in a way that
> I didn't focus on initially.  The advantages that I suggest above for a
> system in which the initiative comes from applicant registries come into
> play in connection with *commercial* TLDs.  They're got less value in
> connection with noncommercial TLDs such as Jamie's .SUCKS.

This distinction makes no sense to me.

The idea behind the consensus call is that innovation comes from people who
are ready, willing and able to execute new ideas. Innovation does not come
from people who merely suggest or propose, it comes from those who act. It
matters not at all whether the idea is for making money or not. Jamie's idea
was for supporting free expression and a free speech foundation, as CPT
proposed to do with .sucks. But why should Jamie/CPT be given "policy
authority" over a .sucks TLD merely for stating the idea? Anyone can do
that. If he is not willing to put together a package of operational
arrangements, he doesn't have a real proposal.

We are having an indirect debate. It's time we made it more explicit.
Crispin and Crocker want "policy authority" to be separated from registry
operation because they want all authority over DNS to be centralized in
ICANN's hands. There are two fundamentally different notions of ICANN at
stake here. Those of us who want a registry-driven process see ICANN as a
mere coordinator of private initiatives, "private" meaning both commercial
and non-commercial activity -- activity driven by civil society, not by the
state. The other pole in this debate wants registries to be disposable
contractors and for everyone involved to be entirely dependent upon ICANN.
The "policy authority" would be beholden to ICANN, because it would have no
operational capability without ICANN's approval and intervention. The
operational entity(s) would be headless horsemen, no business plan, no
strategy, just people willing to accept a ho-hum outsourcing contract. All
this does is further upend "bottom up" and make everything "top down."

Some of us view the Internet as a mechanism for coordinating autonomous
actors of civil society. Others view "Internet" as something that is "owned"
by a central entity (ICANN) that decides what is "good" for the rest of us.
This is what the debate is about now.

> But we're still left with Kent's
> question whether there's any *value* to requiring Jamie to establish such
a
> relationship in advance.)

If they haven't established that relationship, they don't know what they are
doing. What does such a proposal consist of? How does ICANN select one
proposer over another? How does it judge competence, the ability to deliver
what it promises? These questions I raised days ago. They have never been
answered.

> Harold Feld, a while ago on this list, suggested
> that ICANN might use entirely different selection mechanisms for
commercial
> and noncommercial TLDs.  I'm wondering whether that would indeed be a
> superior approach.

No. As a long term matter ICANN should be blind to that distinction. In the
short term (6-10) it has enough discretion to do what it wants with it.

> Another point: Several people, while casting votes in favor of the
> proposal, have commented that the proposal is acceptable to them only if
> the selection process is bounded by meaningful objective criteria, so that
> ICANN can't exercise wholly unbounded discretion in picking the 6-10.
That
> sounds right to me: It seems to me that that concern is important.  At the
> same time, as Eric has recently pointed out (and Kent has emphasized
> previously), we haven't in fact made much progress in developing criteria
> that meaningfully limit ICANN's discretion.

Jon, if we are talking about picking a miniscule number such as 6-10, there
is no way to limit ICANN's discretion meaningfully, except in a highly
general way such as the Sheppard/Kleiman principles. ICANN is going to
receive hundreds of potentially valid, desirable applications. As long as
you have highly constraining and entirely artificial scarcity, its choice
among them will be highly discretionary. That is built in to 6-10. It is
something we have been warned about from day one, but it is something we
will have to live with until the next round of additions.

The S/K principles set some very broad guidelines. The first new TLDs should
differentiate, for example. They should not authorize some potentially
deceptive string. And so on. The principles are good enough for the
situation. Let's move on!

> Reactions?  Am I right in these late-night assessments, or is the
> consensus call proposal a better one than I'm giving it credit for just
> now?

It is a step forward. Obviously, it needs filling out. But late-night
reassessments of fundamentals, with two days left, are not very advisable,
eh?

--MM