Re: [wg-review] Voting Rights

[Jefsey Morfin <jefsey@wanadoo.fr>]

Dear Babybows,
Thank you for your pertinent analysis.

On 19:17 06/02/01, Kent Crispin responded to Babybows:
>On Tue, Feb 06, 2001 at 11:35:47AM -0500, Babybows.com wrote:
> > When I look at the current DNSO structural model, at the most rudimentary
> > level I see two groups of participants... those who by dint of their
> > contractual relationship with ICANN are obligated to adhere to "consensus
> > policies", and those who have no such contractual relationship.  I question
> > the wisdom of the former group having been granted "voting rights" in the
> > Names Council,
>
>Sorry, you have it backwards.  In any democracy, those who are governed
>are the ones who should vote -- we have other names for systems where
>you are governed but don't get a vote.  Those in contractual
>relationships with ICANN are the ONLY ones directly "governed" by ICANN,
>therefore, there is a strong argument that they are the only ones who
>should have a vote.  The difficult argument is how to justify anyone
>else having a vote.

Sorry you have it backward the other way. iCANN is not a governance as
a government, but a governance as a "gouvernante" in French, the netkeeper.
The real owners are obviously the users who also are the producers (your
mail is the information I come on Internet to read). These users belongs to
the LICs (Local Internet Communities) and the active ones are the @large.
These LICs found the legitimacy of the ccTLDs (cf. ccTLD Best Practices),
@large associations like mine, Govs (hopefully managing the deregulation)
etc... So it is legitimate to the LICs, through the ccTLDs/GAC Reps and
@large groups to associate together into a common secretariat dedicated
to a no conflict administration of the three lists they share: master-root, IP
addressing, Protocol numbers. This calls for three persons (considering
that one is on vacation).

Historics, interest in having some other tasks centralized and he importance
for the world of these tasks give a few more importance to the iCANN. The
voting problem you face is due to transition period from an American
Gov+University oriented system sponsored by big groups, to an international
secretariat organized by the Countries and co-managed by Operators and
Users.

> > as it would seem to me that "observer status" would be more
> > appropriate.
>
>That's simply a dictatorship: the entities being governed are relegated
>to "observer" status, while those who have no obligations get to call
>all the shots.  Does being a dictator have a special appeal for you?

You are right with an important provision. The contracting organizations
do not have a contract with iCANN: they have a "contract" with their
national Internet communities and the iCANN has a contract with them.

As the iCANN has no other reason to exist than these contracts,
these contracts found the iCANN and are de facto its articles. So the
the best would be that at the end of the Internet "deregulation" period,
the iCANN would be reincorporated as the association of the national
LIC representatives. So, you see they are more the "organizers", the
first level Members.

But as in real life the iCANN must be a dialog between those who
operates and those who own, i.e. those who are concerned by the
"netwide" matters (the Support Organizations) and the stakeholders
concerned by their own interests (@large), it is appropriate that the
BoD is 9 SO + 9 @large (+1 Staff to report the common work).

This WG-Review was only about allowing the DNSO to become
eventually itself and efficient in removing the @large interests from
it (cf. Joe Simms testimony about the DNSO hosting of @large
interests) and transferring them to the @large organization under
way. This is a big change/issue (50% of the iCANN decision power
and 99.95% of its final Membership) ...

You may understand why people like Kent who are attached to
the existing transient scheme are destabilized and fight the change.
And why some want to manipulate it in one way or another.

This is also why Kent's positions are of real interest because in
defending the statu-quo he helps not going to far, too fast. The
noise and the constituency "seat protection/hope" schemes have
however made (IMHO) this WG-R fail. But the experience acquired
and the people trained like you, is really worth at the end of the
day. This is why I definitely pay a tribute to Greg and all of you.

> > I also wonder why the GA doesn't have a large block of seats
> > on the Names Council as that too, in my humble opinion, seems
> > appropriate.
>
>Because the GA is not a *body*, it is an *activity*, like a "school
>assembly", as I described elsewhere.

Because the NC is of no interest. The DNSO covers a much broader
scope than the PSO and currently than the ASO (the ASO should
be much important than the DNSO in the future) so the GA is good
for it. The DNSO has been created as different SIG. They went into
the constituency model only to elect the BoD Directors and to have
some coordination.

The obvious model for the DNSO is what Karl Auerbach proposed.
The GA to include everyone feeeling concerned and housing SIGs,
Centers Of Interest, WGs...created/uncreated at will, with their own
charters to address particular needs or group of needs. Their real
interest and value is their capacity to share into the study,
decision preparation, etc... to serve the BoD and for the Internet
community.

In such a scheme the NC is just a common secretariat and a
polling committee. The GA elects its Chair and the BoD. The
question here is qualification, not policy. So the real issue is the
nomination of the candidates (hey have to be qualified): it is up to
the GA groups (approved as nominators by the GA) to qualify them
and to the GA to elect them.

This scheme will become fully operational once the @large
movement is identified enough and the @large interests hosted
by the DNSO have gone. We may therefore expect that the
transition period will last for 18 months.

Had this WG-Review been not directed by the TF, manipulated
by some and hijacked as Kent described it very well, it could have
already implemented such a scheme.

Jefsey


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