RE: [ga] Domain Transfers

["John Berryhill" <john@johnberryhill.com>]

>
> The problem begins at Company A - which doesn't have reliable
> information on the customer, either.

Incorrect, except for an extremely small number of cases.

>think hotmail.com

Think VISA.

Just how do you think Company A's customer paid for that domain name?  I
don't care whether the customer has a hotmail email address, a Nevada
corporation, a geocities website and a Swiss bank account.  Company A is the
only clown at the circus who knows who bought the popcorn.

And it is worth mentioning that the first step to the current hi-jacking
scenario is to use a stolen credit card number to pull off the initial
registrar transfer.  The object of the game is to delete the domain name
registration before anyone can catch up with the unauthorized charge.

Very simple fix.  Do not allow a deletion or another registrar transfer
(yes, I've seen it done in more than one hop) within a sufficient reasonable
time after an initial registrar transfer for the crows to come home to
roost.

But this particular exercise in "consensus building" has nothing to do with
protecting domain name registrars, and much more to do with prying the cold
dead fingers of NSI off of domain name transfers.  The end result is going
to be easier transfers and more hi-jackings.  The agendas of the parties
practically determine that result, so there is no need to get worked up
about it.

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